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4 **UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY**
5 **WASHINGTON D.C. 20460**
6
7

8 December 18, 2003
9

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR
EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD

10
11 Note to the Reader:
12

13 The attached draft report of the Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis
14 Special Council Panel for the Review of the Third 812 Analysis (COUNCIL) is still undergoing
15 discussion and review. Once discussed by the COUNCIL at a public session, and after approval,
16 it will be transmitted to the EPA Administrator and become available to the interested public as a
17 final report.
18

19 This draft has been released for general information to members of the interested public
20 and to EPA staff. The reader should remember that this is an unapproved working draft and that
21 the document should not be used to represent official EPA or Council views or advice. Draft
22 documents at this stage of the process often undergo significant revisions before the final version
23 is approved and published.
24

25 The SAB is not soliciting comments on the advice contained herein. However, as a
26 courtesy to the EPA Program Office that is the subject of the review, we have asked the Program
27 Office to respond to the issues listed below. Consistent with SAB policy on this matter, the
28 Council is not obligated to address any responses it receives.
29

- 30 1. Has the Committee adequately responded to the questions posed in the Charge?
31 2. Are any statements or responses made in the draft unclear?
32 3. Are there any technical errors?
33

34 For further information or to respond to the questions above, please contact:
35

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REVIEW OF THE REVISED ANALYTICAL PLAN FOR EPA'S SECOND PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS - BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990- 2020

**An Advisory by a Special Panel of
the Advisory Council on Clean Air
Compliance Analysis**

[Date]

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD

EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-ADV-XX-XXX

Governor Michael Leavitt
Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20460

Subject: Review of the Draft Analytical Plan for EPA's Second Prospective
Analysis - Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990-2020: An
Advisory by the Advisory Council for Clean Air Compliance
Analysis

Dear Governor Leavitt:

The US EPA Science Advisory Board's Advisory Council for Clean Air
Compliance Analysis Special Panel (the Council) presents in this document a review of
the Draft Analytical Plan for EPA's Second Prospective Analysis - Benefits and Costs of
the Clean Air Act, 1990-2020.

The Draft Analytical Plan reflects the Agency's design for the second prospective
"812 analysis." The series of Section 812 reports analyses produced by the Agency are
the flagship examples of benefit-cost analysis of environmental regulation in the U.S.
These analyses have assisted the Agency in developing methods used in quantifying
benefits for rules issued by EPA pursuant to the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
Those benefits have been recognized by OMB as constituting the majority of quantified
benefits attributable to federal regulation over the ten-year period, October 1, 1992 to
September 30, 2002. (OMB 2003 Report, *Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2003 Report
to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates
on State, Local, and Tribal Entities*).

Congress established the Council to review the data and methodologies to be used
for the 812 Analyses and make recommendations on their use. Section 812 of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 also require the Council to review the findings made in
reports developed under Section 812, and "make recommendations to the Administrator
concerning the validity and utility of such findings.

The 812 analyses were initially mandated as ongoing biennial reports to Congress.
The Council understands that the 1995 Reports Elimination and Sunset Act removed the
requirement for the Agency to report to Congress. However, the Council strongly

1 advocates that the Agency continue to conduct these important benefit-cost assessments
2 as Clean Air regulations continue to evolve. These analyses provide a rigorous example
3 for other regulatory impact assessments and serve an important educational role for the
4 Agency. Information requirements identified in the 812 Analysis stimulate important
5 research both inside and outside the Agency.

6
7 The Council emphasizes that the 812 analyses are not merely a perfunctory
8 accounting exercise, but an ambitious and difficult enterprise that pushes the Agency to
9 the frontiers of science in many different disciplines. To an extent unmatched in almost
10 any other benefit-cost assessment, these analyses require the creative synthesis of
11 knowledge across many interrelated fields--from engineering to atmospheric chemistry to
12 meteorology to epidemiology and ecosystems science to toxicology to economics and a
13 number of other specialties.

14
15 A significant portion of the value of the 812 Analyses lies in the extent to which
16 they can shape future regulations and legislation. Their role is not limited merely to
17 assessment of the 1990 Clean Air Act. For example, the Agency learns much from the
18 812 Analyses that can guide strategic planning for the programs of the Office of Air and
19 Radiation.

20
21 In this report, the Council has highlighted several technical points that deserve the
22 Administrator's attention. These include scenario development, mortality risk valuation
23 (which is both important and controversial), the role of Quality Adjusted Life Years
24 (QALYs) in assessment of the benefits of implementing the Clean Air Act, uncertainty
25 analysis and characterization, computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling for
26 capturing indirect costs and benefits, and approaches to discounting. Highlights for these
27 topics and others are presented in our Executive Summary. This summary collects the
28 bullet-points that conclude each section of our main report..

29
30 The Council received 37 formal charge questions from the Agency concerning
31 technical questions related to data and methodologies to be used in the Second
32 Prospective Analysis. This report addresses overarching questions of the analytical
33 framework for the analysis and detailed questions related to economic analysis. This
34 report is supplemented by auxiliary reports from the Council's Air Quality Modeling
35 Subcommittee (EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-03-00X *Advisory on Plans for Emissions*
36 *Estimation Presented in the May 12, 2003 Analytical Plan: An Advisory by the Air*
37 *Quality Modeling Subcommittee of the Advisory Council for Clean Air Compliance*
38 *Analysis*) and the Health Effects Subcommittee (EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-ADV-03-00
39 *Advisory on Plans for Health Effects Analysis in the Analytical Plan for EPA's Second*
40 *Prospective Analysis – Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990-2020: An Advisory*
41 *by the Health Effects Subcommittee of the Advisory Council for Clean Air Compliance*
42 *Analysis*. A third subcommittee, the Ecological Effects Subcommittee (EES) is only just
43 being constituted. Its perspective and advice will be available for future consultations.

44
45 We appreciate the opportunity to review the Analytical Plan and to provide you
46 with advice on the design of the Agency's approach so that the resulting study would

1 have the most validity and utility for the Agency and Congress. The Council would be
2 pleased to expand on any of the findings described in this report and we look forward to
3 your response.
4

5
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7 Sincerely,
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9

10
11 Dr. Trudy Ann Cameron, Chair
12 Advisory Council on
13 Clean Air Compliance Analysis
14

NOTICE

This report has been written as part of the activities of the EPA Science Advisory Board, a public advisory group providing extramural scientific information and advice to the Administrator and other officials of the Environmental Protection Agency. The Board is structured to provide balanced, expert assessment of scientific matters related to problems facing the Agency. This report has not been reviewed for approval by the Agency and, hence, the contents of this report do not necessarily represent the views and policies of the Environmental Protection Agency, nor of other agencies in the Executive Branch of the Federal government, nor does mention of trade names or commercial products constitute a recommendation for use.

Distribution and Availability: This EPA Science Advisory Board report is provided to the EPA Administrator, senior Agency management, appropriate program staff, interested members of the public, and is posted on the SAB website (www.epa.gov/sab). Information on its availability is also provided in the SAB's monthly newsletter (Happenings at the Science Advisory Board). Additional copies and further information are available from the SAB Staff [US EPA Science Advisory Board (1400A), 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20460-0001; 202- 564-4533].

1
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3 **Science Advisory Board**
4 **Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis**
5 **Special Council Panel for the Review of the Third 812 Analysis***
6
7
8

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11 Also Member: Executive Committee
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The responses to each charge question addressed in this report begin with a number of bulleted points that highlight the key points in the discussion that follows. In this summary, we paraphrase a selection of the most important points associated with each main topic.

Scenario development: The evolving baseline assumptions for the 812 Analysis need to be carefully benchmarked against realized values of key forecasts from previous editions of the analysis, and sensitivity analysis with respect to key assumptions will be important. Care must be taken to ensure that key assumptions affecting different components of the overall 812 Analysis (discount rates, income growth projections, substitutability) are consistent across all the models used in the analysis. Furthermore, the evolutionary nature of regulations pursuant to the CAAA means that is difficult to forecast future benefits and costs based solely on knowledge of the shape of current regulations. The Agency needs to be clearer about how feedback and regulatory evolution will be modeled. Finally, the Council applauds the Agency's transition to short turn-around air-quality models that will enhance opportunities for sensitivity analyses.

Costs: Econometric models for abatement costs are limited by their incomplete coverage but they can sometimes offer insights not available from engineering estimates of compliance costs, in particular, with respect to the impacts of abatement activity on total factor productivity. Econometric models are one important source of the stylized facts about economic relationships that are used to calibrate CGE models. Indirect costs should be defined and itemized more clearly in the Analytical Plan, and ongoing comparisons of the predicted and actual costs of air quality regulations will be important to the evolution of the ongoing Section 812 Analyses.

Computable General Equilibrium Models: Incorporation of spillover costs of air quality regulations is important and these costs should continue to receive close attention. CGE models have the capability to reveal spillovers of air quality regulations into unregulated sectors, not just to better estimate the direct costs of regulation on regulated sectors. The current Analytical Plan describes CGE methods only for "post-processing" and relegates them to secondary status. General equilibrium modeling should enjoy similar status to direct cost calculations, even though each of the main CGE models which are proposed for use in the 812 Analysis has some limitations. CGE models and econometric models for costs are not competing methods, but complementary methods. Econometric results, where available and appropriate, are generally more desirable than expert judgment for calibrating the parameters of CGE models. However, where no econometric estimates exist for key parameters, expert judgment is essential.

Discounting: The 812 Analysis should conform to the recommended treatment of discounting spelled out in the EPA's [Guidelines for Preparing Benefit-Cost Analyses](#). Deviations from this advice are admissible, of course, but they should be explained and justified by more-recent research. The discount rate that is used should be consistent throughout the analysis where this is appropriate. Exceptions should be justified by large

1 differences in the time horizons involved or perhaps large differences in the ages of the
2 affected populations, supported by empirical results to back up any assumed differences.

3
4 **Ecological Effects:** Human health risk reductions may be the most substantial benefit
5 from the CAAA, but they are not the only important benefit. Benefits to ecosystems and
6 other welfare benefits such as visibility are likely to be substantial and are still receiving
7 limited attention. The Council nevertheless recognizes substantial challenges in
8 quantitative assessment of these benefits. The greater heterogeneity in ecosystems
9 services makes it even more difficult to produce estimates of the benefits from their
10 protection than for the protection of human health. The input of the new CVPSS may
11 be able to stimulate the development of greater expertise on this issue than is presently
12 available. Ecological effects to be valued must be limited to those effects for which there
13 is a defensible, rather than just speculative, link between air emissions and service flows.
14 The Council strongly objects to using inappropriate or unsupported placeholder values in
15 the absence of better information.

16
17 **Value of a Statistical Life:** Uncertainty analysis with respect to VSL values requires
18 information about the distribution of VSL estimates corresponding to risks and
19 populations that are similar to those relevant for the CAAA. The marginal distribution of
20 all empirical VSL estimates derived across all contexts is unlikely to be appropriate for
21 this purpose, as is any arbitrary convenient distributional shape.

22 Discounting of lagged effects is advisable, but it is not clear on whether
23 straightforward discounting using an exponential model and a common rate will be
24 appropriate. Sensitivity analysis and caveats are recommended. Ad hoc adjustments for
25 future changes in aggregate income levels, however, are not advisable. These
26 adjustments, if made, should be made in the context of a formal model of preferences and
27 the relevant elasticities.

28 The Panel recommends a primary focus, at this juncture, on the Viscusi-Aldy
29 estimates based on U.S. studies. The Agency should not yet rely heavily on the Kochi et
30 al. meta-analysis, which has not yet been peer-reviewed and published.

31
32 **Quality-Adjusted Life Years:** QALY analysis should be undertaken to permit
33 comparison of CAAA benefits with those of other public health programs. However, the
34 Agency should be careful to emphasize that QALYs are inconsistent with the utility-
35 theoretic models that underlie benefit-cost analysis and they often do not reflect the
36 preferences of a representative sample of the population. A Workshop may be helpful,
37 but its scope would need to be very carefully defined and the differences between cost-
38 effectiveness analysis in the typical health context versus cost-effectiveness for certain
39 health benefits of the CAAA would be an important dimension of the discussion.

40
41 **Morbidity:** The Agency should continue to use WTP estimates for morbidity values,
42 rather than COI estimates, should these be available. Where WTP is unavailable, COI
43 estimates can be used as placeholders, awaiting further research, provided these decisions
44 offer suitable caveats.

1 The Dickie and Ulery study is a valuable addition to the repertoire of empirical
2 results concerning WTP for acute respiratory illnesses and symptoms, although it is no so
3 superior as to supercede all earlier studies.

4 Values for “bad asthma days” might be approximated by transfer of results fro
5 respiratory-related minor restricted activity days, pending the development of updated
6 results on this topic. Better data are still needed on WTP to reduce the risk of non-fatal
7 heart attacks, since current COI estimates assuming average lost earnings over 5 years do
8 not comport entirely with all evidence in the literature concerning employment and
9 earnings effects.

10
11 **Uncertainty:** The Second Prospective Analysis should address the pervasiveness of
12 uncertainty in cost and benefit estimates. Those elements that are both highly uncertain
13 and have a significant impact on the results should be the focus of sensitivity analyses.
14 Sensitivity/uncertainty analysis needs to be an iterative process to identify and assess the
15 significance of key uncertainties in each step of the assessment. Only a selected set of the
16 most influential uncertainties should be quantitatively followed all the way through to the
17 final results. The Council advises the Agency to develop its uncertainty analyses with
18 reference to the recommendations in reports of the National Research Council (2002) and
19 OMB (2003). It also advises the Agency to use the list of “key uncertainties” from the
20 first Prospective Analysis as a framework.

21
22 **Pilot on Uncertainty in Compliance Costs:** Simply including uncertainty in
23 engineering costs is an important improvement over the First Prospective Analysis. But
24 uncertainty in more than just engineering cost estimates should be explored. Other
25 sources of cost uncertainty will also be important and should not be neglected.

26
27 **Data Quality and Intermediate Products:** Preliminary release of raw data, intermediate
28 data, intermediate models, and other analytical components will improve the transparency
29 of the benefit-cost exercise, but may result in substantial costs to the Agency.

30 Before comparing the intermediate results of the Second Prospective Analysis
31 with other sources of similar information, there should be some theoretical basis for
32 expecting similarities. Along with a careful accounting of differences between the
33 Second Prospective Analysis and other analyses, there must be an effort to understand the
34 most likely sources of any differences.

35
36 **Results Aggregation:** The Agency should anticipate strong demand by policy-makers
37 and stakeholders for disaggregated benefits and costs. Spatial disaggregation is
38 problematic because of all the connections among markets. A more through explanation
39 of the inadvisability of further disaggregation by title of the CAAA would be helpful. The
40 Council supports EPA’s plans to report costs and benefits disaggregated by major
41 economic sectors as an important addition for the Second Prospective study.

42
43 **Reporting:** Reporting of central and alternative cases should be associated with
44 likelihoods of these cases, and any provision of a “low” alternative estimate should be
45 balanced by a corresponding “high” alternative estimate. Pivotal assumptions should be

1 clearly identified and the need for additional research on these issues should be
2 emphasized.
3

4 The Council urges the Agency to dispense with benefit-cost ratios and focus
5 attention on net benefits estimates as the appropriate summary measure in Benefit-Cost
6 analysis. The Council urges to Agency to persist in its efforts toward converting time
7 profiles of benefits and costs into net present value (NPV). In the meantime, the Agency
8 must more clearly explain its rationale for annualizing costs but not calculating present
9 discounted values of net benefits.

10
11
12

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The purpose of this Advisory is to continue the Council's advice to the Agency in developing the third in a series of statutorily mandated comprehensive analyses of the total costs and total benefits of programs implemented pursuant to the CAA. Section 812 of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA) of 1990 requires the EPA periodically to assess the effects of the 1990 CAA on the "public health, economy and the environment of the United States" and to report the findings and results of the assessments to Congress. Section 812 also established the Council and gave it the following mission: "to review the data and methodology used to develop the 812 Study and to advise the EPA Administrator concerning the utility and relevance of the Study." EPA has, to date, completed two assessments and received the advice of the Council on them: *The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act: 1970 to 1990* (published 1997) and *The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990 to 2010* (published 1999).

In this document, a special panel of the Council provides an initial installment of it's a review of the May 12, 2003 Analytical Plan for the study, and revisions to that plan dated July 8, 2003. The Analytical Plan is more formally titled Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990-2020: Revised Analytical Plan for EPA's Second Prospective Analysis. It The Analytical Plan reflects earlier advice that the Council provided in September 2001 in its earlier Advisory concerning a draft version of the Analytical Plan (EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-ADV-01-004).

In the course of the review of the 2003 Analytical Plan, the Council will reviewed the Agency's major goals, objectives, methodologies, and analytical choices for the Section 812 Study before it the analysis is implemented. In its review of the Analytical Plan, the Council and its panel and subcommittees are guided by the charge questions as identified in the CAA of 1990¹

- a) Are the input data used for each component of the analysis sufficiently valid and reliable for the intended analytical purpose?
- b) Are the models, and the methodologies they employ, used for each component of the analysis sufficiently valid and reliable for the intended analytical purpose?
- c) If the answer to either of the two questions above is negative, what specific alternative assumptions, data or methodologies does the Council recommend the Agency consider using for the second prospective analysis?

¹ Specifically, subsection (g) of CAA §312 (as amended by §812 of the amendments) states: "(g) The Council shall -- (1) review the data to be used for any analysis required under this section and make recommendations to the Administrator on the use of such data, (2) review the methodology used to analyze such data and make recommendations to the Administrator on the use of such methodology; and (3) prior to issuance of a report required under subsection (d) or (e), review the findings of such report, and make recommendations to the Administrator concerning the validity and utility of such findings."

1
2 The Agency provided the Council with additional detailed charge questions for its
3 consideration. These detailed charge questions were initially provided to the Council in
4 May 2003 and then revised and resubmitted in July. The final set of 37 charge questions
5 is included in Appendix A. Appendix A indicates charge questions that have been
6 addressed in detail by the Council's two subcommittees and documented in their two
7 reports, which have been reviewed and finalized by the Council.²
8

9 1.2 Process for Developing this Advisory

10
11 To address the charge questions identified by the Agency regarding the Analytical
12 Plan, the SAB Staff Office, with the advice of the Council Chair, formed a Special
13 Council Panel for the Review of the Third 812 Analysis to provide the Council with
14 additional expertise in the areas of expert elicitation, uncertainty analysis and statistical
15 and subjective probability. The Staff Office also issued a call for new membership on the
16 Council's Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee (AQMS) and its Health Effects
17 Subcommittee (HES).
18

19 The Council Special Panel held a public teleconference on May 28, 2003 to plan
20 its approach for providing advice. Those members participating in the teleconference
21 voted to cancel a planned face-to-face meeting during June 11-13, 2003, pending more
22 information about those portions of the Analytical Plan that were to be revised. The
23 majority of these revisions were completed and submitted to the council on July 8. The
24 Council held one teleconference on July 11 and another on July 15, where a subset of the
25 charge questions considered most urgent by the Agency were addressed. Those charge
26 questions were 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9. Teleconferences on September 23 and September 24
27 continued this discussion and also addressed charge questions 32 and 33. A
28 teleconference on October 23 reviewed the draft report on discussion to that point.
29 Discussion of question 1 (Project Goals and Analytical Sequence), question 3
30 (Alternative Pathways) and question 9 (Discounting) raised the need for additional
31 information from the Agency, so discussion was deferred to November 5-6 when the first
32 face-to-face meeting of the Panel was held in Washington, D.C. Subsequent
33 teleconferences were held on December 19 and December 22.
34

35 In addition to the advice provided in this document, the Council's AQMS has met
36 to address issues concerning the Agency's plans for estimating emissions and the HES
37 has met to address the Agency's plan to assess health effects. The advice developed by
38 these Council Subcommittees will be provided in separate reports.
39

² EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-03-00X *Advisory on Plans for Emissions Estimation Presented in the May 12, 2003 Analytical Plan: An Advisory by the Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee of the Advisory Council for Clean Air Compliance Analysis*, and EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-ADV-03-00 *Advisory on Plans for Health Effects Analysis in the Analytical Plan for EPA's Second Prospective Analysis – Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990-2020: An Advisory by the Health Effects Subcommittee of the Advisory Council for Clean Air Compliance Analysis*.

2 PROJECT GOALS AND ANALYTICAL SEQUENCE

2.1 Charge Question 1

Does the Council support the study goals, general analytical framework, disaggregation plan, analytical sequence, and general analytical refinements defined in chapter 1? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternatives the Council recommends?

2.2 Summary of Council Response:

- Disaggregation is a very desirable strategy which should be pursued to the extent that analytical resources permit, subject to the constraints imposed by nonlinearities and general equilibrium effects. The Council supports EPA's plans to report costs and benefits disaggregated by major economic sectors as an important addition for the Second Prospective study.
- Air toxics remain an important issue in the 812 Analysis. The benzene case study is a good start, but much more work is still necessary. Case studies are merely a beginning.
- Human health risk reductions may be the most substantial benefit from the Clean Air Act, but they are not the only important benefit. Benefits to ecosystems and other welfare benefits such as visibility are likely to be substantial and are still receiving limited attention. The Council nevertheless recognizes substantial challenges in quantitative assessment of these benefits.
- Chapter 1 of the 812 study should address the pervasiveness of uncertainty in cost and benefit estimates, but then identify the methods EPA will use to identify the most important areas of uncertainty. Those elements that are both highly uncertain and have a significant impact on the results should be the focus of sensitivity analyses. Sensitivity/uncertainty analysis needs to be an iterative process to identify and assess the significance of key uncertainties in each step of the assessment. Only a selected set of the most influential uncertainties should be quantitatively followed all the way through to the final results.

2.3 Disaggregation

The Council applauds the Agency's willingness to disaggregate, something that the Council has recommended for some time. In an ideal world, the disaggregation

1 would be at the level of individual regulatory decisions so that the Agency, Congress, and
2 society would know whether each regulation should be tightened or loosened. Effort
3 toward disaggregation to the level of individual sectors is an important step. The next
4 steps beyond sectoral disaggregation might be limited regulation-by-regulation
5 disaggregation and/or some cautious region-by-region disaggregation (although this is
6 likely to be more feasible for selected benefits than for costs)
7

8 There remain some important constraints on the task of disaggregation. The
9 Council understands that it is often impossible to separate the benefits or costs of abating
10 one pollutant versus another. Analytical resource constraints must also be
11 accommodated. The Council also warns that the benefits and/or the costs associated with
12 different sectors, regulations, or regions may not be additively separable because of
13 nonlinearity or interaction effects among the disaggregated entities. In addition, general-
14 equilibrium adjustments may shift incidence among sectors and regions. These
15 complications make the process of disaggregating benefits and costs more difficult.
16 However, decision makers often are interested in sectoral and regional effects. Providing
17 disaggregated estimates wherever possible will increase the usefulness of the analysis in
18 policy making.
19

20 The Council suggests that the Agency consider disaggregating by region or
21 program on a case-by-case basis, where costs are significant or other policy needs are
22 well articulated, and then evaluating the result.
23

24 2.4 Air Toxics

25
26 The planned attempt to address the particular benefits and costs of abating toxics
27 is a step forward and the Council applauds the Agency for this effort. While the
28 proposed case study on benzene will be very helpful, however, the effort should not be
29 expected to stop there. For example, Congress mandated maximum achievable control
30 technology (MACT) for a list of chemicals, but the chemicals on this list were not
31 identified by any rigorous systematic analysis. This mandate has imposed substantial
32 costs on the economy without any formal assessment of either its benefits or its costs.
33

34 The Agency is entering a period when it must examine the residual risk after
35 MACT to determine whether more stringent regulations are required in some cases. One
36 role of the Section 812 analyses is to explore new methods relevant to the assessment of
37 environmental management strategies. This is a good reason for the Second Prospective
38 Analysis to address the task of benefit-cost analysis with respect to the control of air
39 toxics. The Agency is likely to find that MACT is justified for some chemicals and
40 unjustified for others. These insights will be important to the Administrator, to Congress,
41 and to society more generally.
42

43 The benzene study was recommended in the last round of Council advice
44 primarily because of the relatively greater availability of data on this hazardous air
45 pollutant (HAP). It would be useful to have the Agency propose some other target

1 examples for case studies. Whether these can actually be pursued in the context of the
2 Second Prospective Report is questionable, but assessment of HAPs should be a priority
3 among longer-term assessment tasks facing the Agency. Perhaps additional resources
4 could be made available for this “sidebar” enterprise that will have to take place
5 contemporaneously with the Section 812 evaluation.
6

7 As a starting point for future analyses, perhaps the Agency should pick at least
8 one chemical that is likely to have regulatory benefits exceed costs, and at least one
9 chemical that will have costs exceed benefits. This would constitute a useful
10 demonstration exercise that could reveal what resources are required for this type of air
11 toxics analysis. Alternatively, some argument can be made that it would be preferable to
12 see a more representative sample of HAPs being analyzed, for example, those from
13 relatively small sources, such as perchlorethylene from dry cleaning establishments, or
14 chromate from plating operations. These tend to be from isolated sources, rather than
15 major sectors, and to be common in urban areas.
16

17 Are case studies really useful in the formal benefit-cost analysis of the Section
18 812 study? Perhaps not directly, but the Council advocates these exercises as part of
19 “progress toward a goal,” rather than suggesting that they represent any intermediate or
20 final input to the current benefit-cost analysis. More-complete and more-formal analysis
21 of air toxics is certainly needed as the Section 812 analytical process matures. As in the
22 case of certain aspects of the calculation of non-market economic benefits, the air toxics
23 tasks fall into the category of methods development, or contributions to the evolution of a
24 body of knowledge—efforts that are relevant to the ongoing Section 812 analytical
25 activity. Fostering valuable new research is a tangential goal of the 812 process.
26

27 2.5 Non-health benefits

28 Mortality risk reduction benefits are about 90% of total benefits in the previous
29 Section 812 analyses. But it is likely to be implausible to most people (and most
30 members of Congress) that non-mortality health benefits are small, or that benefits other
31 than human health benefits are tiny or immeasurable. The Analytical Plan touches on
32 visibility as a non-health effect. More contentious, and probably more important, are the
33 benefits from protection of the natural environment (ecosystems) stemming from the
34 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA).
35

36 In the first round of advice from the Council to the Agency concerning the Second
37 Prospective Analysis (EPA-SAB-COUNCIL-ADV-01-004), the Council emphasized that
38 the Costanza et al. (1998) method was an inappropriate way to approach the task of
39 ecosystem benefits estimation. However, the Agency cannot ignore this category of
40 benefits or continue simply to characterize their valuation as intractable. Certainly the
41 planned case study is too little. Delays in bringing online the SAB Committee on
42 Valuing the Protection of Ecological Systems and Services and a new subcommittee of
43 the Council, the Ecological Effects Subcommittee, may lead to corresponding delays in
44 any advice that can be provided to the Agency concerning the challenges presented by

1 valuation needs in this area. Nevertheless, the insights from the Special Panel's
2 deliberations will be very important to the 812 process.

3 2.6 Uncertainty

4
5 Uncertainty will be addressed much more comprehensively in the Council's
6 discussion of Chapter 9 of the Analytical Plan. However, with respect to the overview of
7 the Agency's goals in Chapter 1, it would be helpful to see more attention to the
8 pervasiveness of the problem of uncertainty, especially where linearity assumptions are
9 crucial and tenuous. Uncertainty analysis is something that needs to be ongoing
10 throughout the assessment process. Informed judgments need to be made about what
11 might be the key sources of uncertainty, and the potential consequences of this
12 uncertainty, in each step of the assessment.

13
14 However, this does not mean that every alternative model and alternative
15 assumption needs to be tracked all the way through the assessment to the bottom line.
16 The Council does not wish to lead the Agency down an intractable path of including so
17 many alternative models and alternative assumptions that the assessment loses its focus
18 and coherence. For example, it is vitally important that the electric utility cost analysts
19 do some assessment of how sensitive the cost results are to different assumptions about
20 the future price of natural gas on general economic growth, and some discussion of this
21 exploration should be reported in the Second Prospective Analysis. However, only those
22 elements that are both highly uncertain and have a significant impact on the results need
23 to remain at center stage throughout the formal uncertainty analysis.

1

2 3 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND ALTERNATIVE PATHWAYS

3 3.1 Agency Charge Questions Related to Scenario Development and Alternative 4 Pathways

5 Charge Question 2

6

7 Does the Council support the choices for analytical scenarios defined in Chapter 2?
8 Are there alternative or additional scenarios the Council recommends EPA consider for
9 inclusion in the analysis?

10

11 Charge Question 3

12

13 Does the Council support the alternative compliance pathway estimation and
14 comparison methodology described in chapter 2, including the specification of alternative
15 compliance pathways which may not reflect precisely constant emissions or air quality
16 outcomes between scenarios due (primarily) to the non-continuous nature and interaction
17 effects of emission control options?

18

19 3.2 Summary of Council Response:

20

- 21 • Agency Charge Question 3 was made largely obsolete by revisions in the
22 Analytical Plan that were made clear to the Council at its November 4-5, 2003
23 meeting and thus this Council report does not address the question.
- 24
- 25 • The evolving baseline assumptions for the 812 Analysis need to be carefully
26 benchmarked against realized values of key forecasts from previous editions of
27 the analysis, and sensitivity analysis with respect to key assumptions will be
28 important.
- 29
- 30 • Care must be taken to ensure that key assumptions affecting different components
31 of the overall 812 Analysis (discount rates, income growth projections,
32 substitutability) are consistent across all the models used in the analysis.
- 33
- 34 • The “with CAAA” and “without CAAA” scenarios are neither observable nor
35 likely to materialize exactly as described. They are artificial constructs.
36 However, they should at least be internally consistent.
- 37
- 38 • The Agency should make it very clear to the audience for the 812 analysis to what
39 extent the post-2000 benefits of the CAAA are expected to stem from the
40 prevention of deterioration in air quality versus absolute improvements from 1990
41 conditions.
- 42

- The evolutionary nature of regulations pursuant to the CAAA means that is difficult to forecast future benefits and costs based solely on knowledge of the shape of current regulations. The Agency needs to be clearer about how feedback and regulatory evolution will be modeled.
- Finally, the Council applauds the Agency's transition to short turn-around air-quality models that will enhance opportunities for sensitivity analyses.

3.3 Benchmarking and sensitivity analysis

First, the Council recommends changing the description of the different scenarios from "pre-CAAA and post-CAAA" to "with CAAA and without CAAA." This simple change will eliminate confusion between differences over time and counterfactual differences over alternative scenarios, which is the intended distinction.

To evaluate the implications of the proposed update of the 1990 Baseline Emissions assumptions, it would be helpful to have an explicit comparison of how the proposed update to the 1990 baseline differs from the earlier 1990 baseline. The Second Prospective Report should compare the ambient pollution concentrations implied by the 1990 baseline used in the First Prospective Report versus the new baseline, and each ambient concentration should be compared with the 1990 actual monitored values for each pollutant. This could be done for targeted metropolitan areas (e.g., the Los Angeles air basin).

The description in the First Prospective Report suggests that a scaling factor was used to adjust the projected ambient quality in 2000, and 2010. This scaling factor was apparently derived by taking the ratio of modeled target year to modeled base year, and applying this ratio to scale base year concentrations [whether monitored directly or estimated using e-VNA] to get the projected target year concentration. This type of benchmarking, of backcasted simulations to actual observed outcomes in 1990 and 2000, should be possible in the Second Prospective Analysis. It would help policy-makers understand the sensitivity of the results from air quality models to changes in the emissions profiles used in the analysis.

3.4 Consistency: economic activity and incomes

At the time the analysis was done for the First Prospective Report, expectations for economic activity were completely different than the realities experienced between 1999 and 2003. There is no discussion of how the recent slowdown in economic activity is being incorporated into the projections for 2000, 2010, and 2020. *There must be some discussion of this linkage.* A component of the uncertainty analysis will have to consider the status of the aggregate economy, including any assumptions about when there may be a return to a more robust growth pattern. Otherwise, the exercise might seem foolish.

1 There should be some explicit discussion of the connections between assumptions
2 about economic activity at aggregate level and the corresponding assumptions about
3 household income growth that underlie the benefit measures. These assumptions should
4 be consistent throughout the analysis. The Agency needs to make its “central case”
5 economic assumptions perfectly clear, although the Council notes that there will continue
6 to be considerable uncertainty about the nature of the relationship between economic
7 activity and emission rates. Even a well-defined central case assumption about future
8 levels of economic activity will not lead to an unambiguous forecast about pollutant
9 emissions.

10
11 There is a need for sensitivity analysis concerning any assumptions about the
12 baseline level of overall macroeconomic growth. However, the need to understand
13 uncertainty about baseline growth rates for the economy as a whole is distinct from the
14 need to understand the uncertainty about any differences in growth rates across individual
15 sectors of the economy. It is possible that assessments of the behavior of particular
16 sectors are excessively dependent upon the predictions of just a small set of models.
17 These models are, in general, rather highly aggregated and have been developed for
18 different purposes than those for which they are being used in the Second Prospective
19 analysis. The Agency should use alternative models and solicit expert judgment on these
20 issues, perhaps via a workshop. Rather than starting with the predictions of these models,
21 it is important to step back and evaluate each model’s assumptions and the sensitivity of
22 its predictions to these assumptions.

23
24 Consistency is also an important issue in several other places in the Analytical
25 Plan. For example, there is some discussion of meta-analysis with respect to the value of
26 a statistical life to be used in the analysis. In the context of this discussion, there is
27 mention of the prospect of making adjustments to VSL estimates to account for
28 differences in income levels. How do these proposed income adjustments correspond to
29 the income changes that are part of the general equilibrium consequences of the effects of
30 air quality regulations on costs of production and therefore upon factor demands?

31
32 Finally, the underlying assumptions of different types of models used in the
33 Analysis must be compatible. Most procedures for benefits assessment based on revealed
34 preferences of individuals hinge crucially upon non-separability between pollution levels
35 and observable behaviors. It is highly inconsistent to *require* non-separability in support
36 of the valuation portion of the analysis that supports the benefits estimates, yet to
37 *preclude* it in the general equilibrium assessment of cost estimates. How are the insights
38 from Williams (2002, 2003) concerning health effects and optimal environmental policy
39 to be incorporated as adjustments? Will there be scenarios to test the sensitivity of the
40 cost estimates to these adjustments?

41 42 3.5 Artificiality of scenarios

43
44 In the First Prospective Report, none of the emissions scenarios are “real” in the
45 sense of being based on actual conditions or even a forecast of actual conditions. The

baseline “without CAAA” scenario has not been observed and neither will the “with CAAA” scenario actually materialize. For example, some non-attainment areas will remain out of attainment. It is also difficult to fully anticipate all of the general equilibrium consequences of the CAAA regulations. Both the Baseline and the Control are based on hypothetical scenarios defined to meet the specific mandates of the CAAA. Neither the baseline nor the control scenarios would be interpreted as a necessarily credible forecast of real conditions. As a result it is not clear, from the description of the different scenarios, how a couple of important issues are to be addressed:

1. If firms are currently minimizing costs, increased emission controls imply higher costs and, under the assumptions of most CGE models, higher prices. These price increases will change the distribution of economic activities by sector and the resulting levels of emissions from each sector. How are these general equilibrium consequences of emissions controls to be handled? Shouldn't there be comparisons that allow uncertainties in aggregate economic activity and technical change to be described, especially as one attempts to forecast activity levels and emissions further into the future (e.g., beyond 2010)?

2. What is the nature of the feedback loop to measure changes in household incomes in response to these policies? At a minimum, one should be able to deal with Hazilla-Kopp, Jorgenson-Wilcoxon type computations of the effects of policy on their measures of costs. The price vectors derived from these models include wages and returns to capital, so it should be possible to evaluate the implied changes in household incomes. This type of interconnectedness is very relevant to the process of scenario development. It is not clear in the Analytical Plan whether there are inconsistencies across components in the different assumptions about how economic activity affects the outcomes.

3.6 Trajectories after 2000: preventing deterioration

The Council now understands that the shapes of the time profiles in Exhibit 2-1 of the draft Analytical Plan are not factual, and that the diagram is merely a schematic designed to identify the different reference periods. However, the “without-CAAA” and “with-CAAA” trajectories in this diagram, if at all realistic, suggest to readers that for 2010 and 2020, the benefits of the CAAA may result to a significant degree from how high emissions would have risen without it. It will be important to communicate to policy makers that a significant share of the benefits that the Second Prospective analysis is likely to identify for 2010 and 2020 stem from the prevention of air quality deterioration that would otherwise have occurred.

3.7 The moving target problem

The inventory of new regulations and changes since the first prospective study (pages 2-9 and 2-10) highlights the fact that the Clean Air Act was designed to be an

1 evolving regulatory process (e.g., with periodic reviews of the NAAQS). This adaptive
2 evolution allows for adjustments and/or additions to the arsenal of regulations and
3 emission control strategies in response to new scientific or engineering knowledge and
4 technological innovations.

5
6 Some previous regulations have precipitated technological innovations (e.g. as
7 with automobile emission controls) that have allowed the achievement of greater
8 emissions reductions, at lower costs, than were originally expected. At the same time,
9 most standards have been held the same or tightened due to new information that some of
10 the human health and environmental effects of air pollution are worse than originally
11 thought. All this means that assessing the future costs and benefits of the CAAA is like
12 trying to hit a moving target. There is no remedy for this, but it remains a limitation of the
13 entire assessment exercise that should be emphasized to policy-makers.

14
15 The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are a complication in
16 forecasting scenarios for the Section 812 Analysis. Are the emission controls currently in
17 place and those expected to come on line in the future, under the CAAA, going to be
18 sufficient to meet the NAAQS? If not, then more emissions limits or control requirements
19 will presumably have to be implemented. These modifications will be driven (or
20 constrained) by NAAQS attainment schedules and SIP schedules.

21
22 The discussion on page 1-3 of the Analytical Plan seems to imply that there will
23 be some mechanism in the analytical process to periodically assess progress toward
24 meeting the NAAQS under a particular scenario. If the growth in emissions is larger than
25 anticipated, this assessment could potentially trigger feedback in the form of additional
26 emissions reductions requirements (with their associated costs and benefits). However, it
27 is not as clear in Chapter 2 of the Analytical Plan that this feedback will be incorporated.

28
29 One of the most important scenarios may be the “additional controls” scenario (i.e.
30 going beyond current CAAA requirements). This scenario is likely to be more relevant
31 than the alternative pathways scenarios suggested in the current Plan. It is listed as a
32 scenario in the current Plan, but little detail is provided (Chapter 2). This scenario seems
33 important because it may stimulate discussion about what the alternatives may be for
34 different emissions source categories, and may suggest least-cost directions for future
35 policy.

36 37 3.8 Treatment of NAAQS Compliance

38
39 At the November 5th meeting of the Council, Jim Neumann of Industrial Economics
40 presented new information on the planned treatment of NAAQS compliance in the
41 construction of the post-1990 control scenarios. The bullets on the relevant slide said:

42
43 “The 1997 revisions to the PM and Ozone NAAQS *will not be*
44 *included* in the Post-CAAA scenario because of the uncertainty associated
45 with the continuing development of implementation plans.

1 EPA intends to use the ‘beyond-the-CAAA’ federal-level control scenarios to inform
2 development of the implementation plans for 1997 NAAQS revisions.
3 This approach will help the Agency *determine the air quality shortfalls* in individual non-
4 attainment areas to comply with the NAAQS revisions.”
5

6 The Council recognizes the computational convenience of the baseline of no-
7 additional-PM/Ozone NAAQS compliance measures. Presenting intermediate results on
8 this basis can be seen as part of measures EPA is taking to increase the transparency of its
9 calculations.
10

11 However, the Council is very concerned that this incomplete-NAAQS compliance
12 baseline does not correctly represent the full actual legal requirements of the 1990
13 CAAA. Use of this baseline alone to represent the Post-CAAA scenario will predictably
14 understate the legally-required reductions in PM exposures, and therefore both the costs
15 and benefits of the real Post-CAAA mandates as they are likely to be implemented
16 without additional legislation. At the same time, use of the no-additional-PM/Ozone
17 NAAQS compliance measures baseline will predictably overstate both the costs and
18 benefits of the “beyond-the-CAAA” federal level control scenarios (e.g., the “Clear
19 Skies” initiative), relative to a baseline that fairly includes measures needed to achieve
20 compliance with the PM and ozone NAAQS on an appropriate schedule compatible with
21 the existing CAA.
22

23 The Council urges EPA to calculate and present its final results for the post-CAAA
24 scenario in terms of full likely implementation of the Post-CAAA requirements. Because
25 the details of what will be needed for this “full implementation” are not fully defined at
26 present, the Council urges EPA to consider a range of plausible implementation scenarios
27 to bracket the likely range of PM and ozone NAACS compliance pathways. Utilizing
28 this bracketed range the baseline, some effects of the “beyond-the-CAAA” federal level
29 control scenarios may then be seen in part as displacing the need for some of the higher-
30 cost NAACS compliance measures and in part as achieving PM and ozone control
31 beyond that formally required for NAACS compliance.

4 COST ESTIMATES

4.1 Charge Question 7

Does the Council support the plans for estimating, evaluating, and reporting compliance costs described in chapter 4? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

4.2 Summary of Council Response:

- The Council generally supports the Agency's plans and makes several important recommendations to improve EPA's approach.
- Econometric models for abatement costs are limited by their incomplete coverage but they can sometimes offer insights not available from engineering estimates of compliance costs, in particular, with respect to the impacts of abatement activity on total factor productivity. Econometric models are one important source of the stylized facts about economic relationships that are used to calibrate CGE models.
- Indirect costs should be defined and itemized more clearly in the Analytical Plan.
- Comparison of the predicted and actual costs of air quality regulations will be important to the evolution of the ongoing Section 812 Analyses.
- Assumptions about the effect of learning on abatement costs need to be carefully thought-out and supported by the literature in this area. It is not clear that the "80% rule" is valid or even that it is an appropriate place-holder in the analysis. Learning effects are likely to be heterogeneous across sectors and processes and no consensus on their magnitude has yet emerged.
- The IPM exhibits a number of limitations for cost modeling (its lack of coverage, lack of regionality, assumptions of efficient pricing and possibly its assumptions about the initial allocation of emission allowances). All of these problems will need to be addressed carefully.
- Future conditions in energy markets may have strong implications for realized abatement costs. Sensitivity of the benefit-cost results to alternative assumptions about energy markets may be an important dimension of the 812 Analysis.
- Other concerns with respect to abatement costs include some caveats about comparisons with the PACE data, the need for consistency in discounting assumptions, some questions about the use of ControlNet, the NAAQS and PACE

1 data, and the relative cost of abatement via market-based instruments versus
2 command and control.
3

4 4.3 Econometric models and costs

5
6 Econometric models allow the researcher, in principle, to get at indirect effects
7 and behavioral responses to changes in regulations. These models can be used to 1)
8 suggest the magnitude of additional costs beyond direct pollution abatement
9 expenditures, and 2) provide parameters and functions for use in CGE models.
10

11 The econometric methods section in the Analytical Plan looks at several different
12 cost studies of specific industries that have tried to isolate the full incremental costs to
13 these industries from abatement activities. EPA's current method for estimating industry
14 costs focuses on the direct cost of abatement equipment as required by the regulations.
15 The value of these econometric studies is that they can suggest the magnitude of the
16 additional costs (or savings) to firms as a result of the direct abatement expenditures.
17 Hence, they suggest whether these indirect effects are important enough that the Agency
18 should worry about capturing them in the 812 analyses.
19

20 One type of indirect cost stems from the impacts of abatement activity on total
21 factor productivity. Barbera and McConnell (1990) find some evidence of reductions in
22 total factor productivity in five industries as a result of abatement equipment, but the
23 magnitude of the effect is relatively small. Gray and Shadbegian (1994) and Joshi, Lave,
24 Shih and McMichael (1997) also find evidence of effects on total factor productivity.
25 The estimated effects are relative large for the steel industry.
26

27 The other industry study described in Chapter 4 of the analytical plan is that by
28 Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih (2001). This study examines the extent to which a dollar of
29 abatement expenditure can be expected to result in more or less than \$1 of expenditure on
30 other non-environmental factors of production in four polluting industries (i.e. are direct
31 abatement expenditures strongly complementary with other inputs, such as specialized
32 labor?). They do not find strong evidence that direct abatement expenditures either over
33 or under-estimate the total costs associated with controls. If anything, there is some
34 indication that abatement expenditures may overstate full costs for some industries.
35

36 On net, there is mixed evidence about whether estimating abatement costs by just
37 calculating direct abatement expenditures through engineering cost functions will result
38 in under- or over-estimates of costs in individual industries. It is important to at least
39 review the evidence from this literature, and make a judgment about whether to do any
40 adjustment to forecast of future costs on the basis of the empirical evidence.
41

42 The limitations of econometric cost estimation raised on page 4-7 of the
43 Analytical Plan apply with equal force to engineering estimates of future compliance
44 costs, because similar assumptions must be made about factor prices, levels of output
45 produced, and so on. These estimates must be made just as far into the future for

1 engineering cost models as for econometric models. Thus, it is difficult to argue that the
2 described limitations are a particular disadvantage for econometric cost forecasting
3 models as opposed to other types of cost forecasting models. Because these types of
4 assumptions must also be made for the CGE modeling, how will these separate estimates
5 be reconciled? This issue is not well explained in the Analytical Plan.
6

7 In areas where new control technology is needed or costs are highly uncertain,
8 econometric techniques are not a good substitute for uncertainty analysis, relying as they
9 do on observed choices by firms. When no empirical data exist concerning new
10 technologies, expert judgment may be the only available source for information about
11 likely costs.
12

13 4.4 Direct costs versus broader definitions of costs 14

15 In the Second Prospective Analysis, the major thrust of the effort to estimate costs
16 is still to forecast the direct abatement costs associated with the CAAA. However, the
17 Analytical Plan does make a number of attempts at capturing broader, more complete
18 estimates of costs. But indirect costs, in the context of the Analytical Plan, are not
19 presently defined very clearly. Whatever the Agency has in mind when it refers to
20 “indirect costs” needs to be spelled out explicitly. It is important to identify what these
21 more-complete measures of cost include and how different they might be from narrowly
22 defined engineering cost estimates.
23

24 Some of the relevant indirect costs include costs borne within industries, but other
25 costs stem from productivity effects. Econometric studies can shed some light on how
26 important these additional costs might be. Other relevant indirect costs stem from
27 process changes. Treatment of the effect of learning on costs is addressed in detail
28 below.
29

30 Other indirect costs stem from price changes and their effects on consumer
31 behavior in the good market and in the labor market. Regulations change prices which
32 can change behavior. For example, in emissions inspection and maintenance (I/M)
33 programs, significant emissions-related repair costs appear to be inducing some drivers to
34 sell their vehicles outside of the Inspection/Maintenance (I/M) area. This has both costs
35 and benefits beyond the direct effects usually measured for the program.
36

37 4.5 Validation against realized historical costs 38

39 Earlier comments by the Committee have emphasized that it is important to try to
40 validate the assumptions underlying key scenarios in the 812 Analysis. A major
41 refinement in the Second Prospective Analysis will be to enhance validation of the cost
42 forecasts by comparison with historical data and with the results from models which are
43 alternatives to those used in the analysis. This task is very important and the Council
44 applauds the Agency’s attempts to do more of this. Earlier ex ante cost (and emissions

1 reductions) forecasts should be compared, where possible, with ex post measurement of
2 these costs in subsequent prospective studies.

3
4 CAAA regulations are in many cases designed to encourage innovations and
5 technological advancement to reduce emissions at lower costs. Market based regulations
6 are explicitly designed to do so, but other regulations have also done this—for example,
7 automobile emission limits. It is a huge success story for the CAA that we are enjoying
8 reduced emissions at lower costs than were originally expected. Comparisons with ex
9 post costs are not just a matter of validating previous forecasts, but is also an indication
10 of the effectiveness of the CAA and a potentially important part of the story concerning
11 the costs and benefits of the CAA.

12
13 Of course, it will be important to assess whether technologies or processes have
14 changed compared to what was expected when the ex ante forecasts were made. Ex post
15 assessments of the success of prior cost forecasts must be made for the same regulatory
16 program as was assumed in the ex ante prediction exercise, and the same baseline must
17 be used. The predictive model in general may perform well if it is run using the right
18 assumptions, even though it predicts less well if the forecasted determinants of its
19 predictions are less accurate. Predicting the future is never an easy task.

20 21 4.6 Learning

22
23 The Council is concerned that the Agency is oversimplifying the 80% rule. The
24 effect of “learning” on compliance costs received much emphasis in the document, but
25 the 80% rule for all sectors for a doubling of cumulative production is a gross
26 oversimplification, even though it is an improvement over entirely failing to acknowledge
27 the effect of the learning process on costs. It is hard to come up with a better suggestion
28 than the rule of thumb, but there has been growing experience with compliance costs over
29 the last three decades and it will be important to do the analysis that will allow the rule to
30 be refined.

31
32 Across different sectors, there is great variance in the extent to which “learning”
33 can be assumed to decrease compliance costs. The opportunities for reducing costs by
34 learning differ across sectors. There is likely to be extensive heterogeneity.

35
36 Alternative conceptualizations of learning. Learning is not carefully enough
37 defined in the Analytical Plan. Does the analysis propose to account for measured
38 “learning curves” in the sense of observed empirical relationships that support the
39 contention that productivity or unit costs are related to cumulative experience with new
40 machinery or processes? (See Argote and Epple (1990).) In an economic context, there
41 has been only a conceptual treatment of this notion of learning (Auerswald et al. (2000)).

42
43 Alternatively, does the learning process envisioned by the Agency relate to the
44 learning-by-doing phenomenon that has been suggested to accompany technological

1 innovations? These two perspectives on learning and its effects on costs are related, but
2 formal economic models have been developed for the latter.

3
4 Should learning be captured via the discount rate?. A comment was made during
5 the Council's deliberations that the RFF HAIKU model accommodates learning via
6 assumptions about technological change and the Oak Ridge AMIGA model finesses
7 learning through adjustments of the discount rate. It is not at all clear how learning can,
8 or why it should, be incorporated via adjustments to discount rates.

9
10 Econometrics of scale effects and learning. The Agency should consider the
11 econometrics of doubling outputs and the empirical evidence about scale economies. The
12 sophistication of these models varies widely across applications. Some models consider
13 a pure learning effect in the form of technical change, while others consider differences
14 in the scale of production and changes in the mix of inputs. It is not even clear that a pure
15 "learning effect" can be empirically isolated.

16
17 Meta-analysis. Peretto and Smith (2001) conducted a 48-study meta-analysis of
18 the effects of learning on compliance costs. A PDF file for a recent final report to the
19 U.S. Department of Energy has been provided to the Agency. In that report, pp. 20-25
20 and Tables 2-9 summarize the database and a preliminary analysis that was conducted for
21 all learning curve studies that the authors could identify, including published and
22 unpublished research.

23
24 As the tables in Peretto and Smith document, a diverse set of industries is
25 covered. Unfortunately, none of the studies in the meta-analysis adopted a framework
26 that would be consistent with conventional neoclassical models. While the work of
27 Peretto and Smith remains at an early stage for a meta-analysis, the tables certainly
28 document a simple inventory of what is known. The evidence one can glean from these
29 tables is unfortunately at odds with the contentions of the literature that claims there is
30 empirical support for the 80% rule.

31
32 The preliminary results of the Peretto and Smith meta-analysis can thus be
33 characterized as "pretty grim." One would like to identify a range of alternative values by
34 sector for learning effects, but the extant studies vary greatly in terms of their quality.
35 This meta-analysis focused only on energy industries. The central tendency of the
36 magnitude of estimated learning effects suggested by the meta-analysis depends on how
37 the research elects to impose quality control. The distinction between learning via
38 changes in process versus learning related to "management technique" matters, especially
39 in the service sector.

40
41 Uncertainty analysis. As research into learning effects matures, uncertainty
42 analysis needs to be incorporated to insulate the bottom line from any vulnerability to this
43 problem. There will be deviations from the 80% rule for cost savings. These are likely
44 to differ not just across industries or sectors, but across processes (for example, taking
45 NOx out of coal and gas combustion). These cost savings may be an important issue, but

1 capturing them may require that the corrections to all the way to the process level, not
2 just to the industry level.

3
4 The “learning rule” for costs will be refined and tailored to different contexts with
5 the emergence of additional credible research. Until then, and the Agency cannot afford
6 to pursue the same level of detail everywhere, since identifying process- and sector-
7 specific estimates will be very labor-intensive. It would seem most appropriate to tailor
8 the level of detail to the significance of the sector. For example, it will be important to
9 evaluate carefully how the Agency plans to handle learning for the EGU sector.

11 4.7 IPM versus HAIKU models for cost estimates

12
13 The industrial sector is not completely treated in the proposed analysis. The IPM
14 model focuses on EGUs. ERCAM focused on VOC and NOx costs, but nothing else.
15 Fortunately, ControlNet, to be used in the Second Prospective Analysis, covers more than
16 just VOC and NOx. Unfortunately, it is not clear where the rest of the sectors are being
17 treated in this analysis.

18
19 The Draft Analytical Plan states that the IPM will be used for utility cost
20 estimates. The IPM model is apparently national in scope, but involves 26 modeling
21 regions for the US power market. In many regions there is, and will continue to be, fairly
22 stringent economic regulation of the utility sector. Thus, a capability to do some analysis
23 of EGU environmental regulation at the regional level will continue to be important. For
24 future analyses, the Agency may wish to compare the results from the IPM model with
25 the predictions of other models, such as the RFF HAIKU. While regional impacts are
26 certainly policy relevant, the Council re-affirms its concerns about the general
27 equilibrium consequences of regulation and the difficulty of distinguishing regional
28 effects because of cost spillovers via product, labor, and capital markets.

29
30 In addition, the RFF HAIKU model incorporates estimates of consumer and
31 producer surplus (social costs). The relevant question concerns how to account for both
32 industry private costs and social costs.

33
34 The IPM model does appear to take account of utility purchase and sale of
35 emission allowances. The initial allocation of those allowances can be very important for
36 the outcome in terms of the final allocation of control responsibility and the resulting
37 costs of control, especially if allowance markets are thin or if unequal market power rests
38 in the hands of some traders. There should be some provision in the proposed analysis
39 for how these allowances are to be allocated initially. Is it assumed they will be
40 auctioned or given away according to some grandfathering formula, or some combination
41 of these two allocation strategies?

43 4.8 Uncertain future energy demand conditions

1 Relative prices of natural gas, and assumptions about their future trajectories, will
2 be very important to the forecasting of future costs of the CAAA. The Analytical Plan is
3 not clear about how assumptions about natural gas prices will be made and supported.
4 These assumptions have direct implications for the calculated costs of the CAAA. If the
5 price of natural gas, a cleaner fuel, is much higher than initial estimates, then more of
6 other dirtier fuels will be substituted, and more air quality controls will be needed.
7 Future natural gas prices are a major source of uncertainty in cost forecasts, and
8 sensitivity analysis with respect to different assumptions about these prices will likely be
9 an important part of the uncertainty section of the Second Prospective Analysis.

10
11 It will also be important for the Agency to be clear about how demand is
12 determined for the electricity produced by EGUs, and how these demands are
13 regionalized in the models used for cost estimation. Will energy demand models be
14 integrated with the CGE model? In general, fuel prices, energy demand conditions, the
15 competitiveness of different regional (energy) markets, and technical progress
16 assumptions are key ingredients in the forecasting of costs for the utility sector.

18 4.9 Competing risks due to higher energy prices

19
20 The Council's report must acknowledge that one Council Special Panel member
21 has drawn attention to the suggestion that the Agency's benefit-cost analysis should not
22 ignore the impact upon health, including both mortality and morbidity for adults and
23 children, from increased energy costs due to air quality regulations (specifically, higher
24 electricity prices). The low-income elderly appear to be especially vulnerable to higher
25 energy costs. This subgroup also appears to be at high health risk for PM exposure. There
26 was a question as to whether it is relevant to compare the direct health risk to the elderly
27 from PM with the indirect health risks stemming from higher energy prices operating
28 through, for example, lesser ability to pay for air conditioning during heat waves or
29 adequate heating during severely cold weather.

30
31 It could also be argued that the Agency should consider the health impact of
32 increased prices from air pollution emission controls in other sectors of the economy,
33 such as transportation. There are tradeoffs between fuel economy (and its air quality
34 effects) and vehicle weight (and its safety implications) that may be equally important in
35 determining competing risks to be considered in formulating air quality regulations.
36 These tradeoffs are considered in the literature on "risk-risk analysis." Other
37 considerations are related to the "richer is safer" literature (also called "health-health
38 analysis," where risks are mediated through changes in disposable incomes). There is
39 also a literature that tries to quantify how regulatory (or other) costs can simultaneously
40 reduce health for some populations, in addition to improving it for others, in ways that
41 might not be fully anticipated. For example, regulation may also reduce vehicle miles
42 traveled and thereby reduce the risk of highway accident deaths.

43
44 The "health-health" approach is useful in policy comparison settings where one
45 looks only at the beneficial health effects of an intervention and ignores the costs. The

Council notes that this approach is not as useful, however, in the context of the 812 studies where both health effects and costs are explicitly considered. Such a benefits-only approach would be a new strategy. Since benefit-cost analysis accounts for the costs directly, there is a risk of double counting when the analysis includes both costs and foregone benefits. By foregone benefits is meant the specific goods, such as better health that people give up when they incur regulatory costs, through the richer-is-safer pathway. If the adverse health consequences of higher prices are to be considered for inclusion in the 812 analysis, there will need to be a careful justification for why these costs are not captured directly by the decreases in incomes that are already likely to be part of the explicit costs. This can happen, in principle, when there are externalities involved, but the literature on the existence of such externalities is insufficiently developed. There is also a risk when undertaking a piecemeal accounting of selected general equilibrium effects without considering others. Some secondary effects will be harmful to health, but others will be beneficial. If it is appropriate to address some secondary effects, it is appropriate to consider all of them.

A further difficulty in the richer-is-safer literature is that the empirical estimates are difficult because of the problem of sorting out causality. Income and health are likely to be jointly endogenous. Higher income is likely to promote health, but health may also promote income, and additional factors may contribute to both. The most useful papers in the richer-is-safer literature probably include Chapman and Hariharan (1994, 1996), Keeney (1990, 1997), Lindahl (2002), Lutter, Morrall, and Viscusi (1999), Ruhm (2000, 2003), Smith (1999), and Viscusi (1994).

4.10 Miscellaneous

Problems with Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditures (PACE) Survey data comparisons. Some of the problems with the PACE data on costs of air pollution control for utilities (identified on page 4-5 of the Analytical Plan) will also afflict direct engineering cost estimates. Neither approach to the calculation of control costs includes process changes or integration of abatement with other firm activities, nor do they include insurance costs. It is important to determine how previous cost forecasts might not be expected to match realized reported PACE costs. Has the Agency determined whether there are any other unique or specialized opportunities to examine data on actual costs or expenditures on air pollution control by electric utilities besides the PACE data? If so, it will be important to take advantage of any reasonable opportunity to validate cost assumptions.

Consistency in interest rate assumptions. Throughout the 812 analysis, there is a need to enforce consistency in key assumptions. For example, is the interest rate being used to annualize costs consistent across sectors and models, and the consistent with the discount rates being used to compare benefits across different time periods? A 5% interest rate is used in the cost analysis. The plan is to convert fixed capital costs to a real capital cost and then to annualize using this interest rate. If 5% is used here, it should also be used elsewhere in the analysis when the same types of time tradeoffs are at stake.

1
2 Use of ControlNet. In general, there needs to be more explanation of how
3 ControlNet will be used to develop costs of alternative scenarios. Under certain of the
4 scenarios that will be developed (either the current “alternative pathways” proposed in
5 the Analytical Plan or some revision to those), sectors will require either more or fewer
6 controls depending on the assumptions of the scenario. How are these reallocations of
7 abatement responsibility to be implemented with the ControlNet model? There are many
8 options for control. How is it decided which controls will be used? Even under command
9 and control regulations, there can be various possible ways of achieving goals. How will
10 forecasts be generated concerning how firms will choose between different compliance
11 strategies?
12

13 The model used to evaluate some of the scenarios will need to allow for the
14 impacts of changing factor prices. Does ControlNet allow for changes in factor prices?
15 Page 4-6 of the Analytical Plan says it does, but the document is not clear about how. Is
16 it necessary to make specific assumptions about a variety of elasticities, for example?
17 Does ControlNet allow process changes to be built into cost scenarios for alternative
18 pathways (top of page 4-11)? How?
19

20 Consideration of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The
21 approach to construction of cost estimates seems to include too little consideration of the
22 relevance of NAAQS attainment requirements. It appears that the process models do not
23 take into account specific regulations put in place for ambient standards. There is some
24 scope to supplement this analysis with an examination of the PACE data to produce
25 additional checks on the process models. Addressing the same costs using several
26 different approaches will give a better sense of the validity of the cost estimates.
27

28 Market Based Incentives (MBI) lower-cost than command and control. In an
29 interesting paper on costs of pollution control, Harrington, Morgenstern and Nelson
30 (2000)³ found that MBI as pollution control policies have tended to have both lower costs
31 and greater emissions reductions than predicted. This implies that regulations that allow
32 market based solutions should be treated differently in terms of cost estimates. Is this
33 being accounted for in the analysis?
34

³ Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson. 2000. “On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 19, No.2, pp. 297-322.

5 COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELING

5.1 Charge Question 8

EPA seeks advice from the Council concerning the choice of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model which EPA intends to use as a post-processor to gauge the general equilibrium effects of the various control scenarios. In the first 812 study –the retrospective– EPA used the Jorgenson/Wilcoxon model to gauge the general equilibrium effects of returning to the economy the reported compliance expenditures which formed the basis of the retrospective study direct cost estimates. This model has since been refined in many ways, and EPA considers both the Jorgenson/Wilcoxon/Ho and AMIGA to be acceptable tools. Although a final decision on model choice can be deferred until later in the analysis, EPA has tentative plans to use the AMIGA model because of its greater sectoral disaggregation, better industrial sector matching with CAA-affected industries, richer representation of relevant production and consumption technologies, and better model validation opportunities due to its use of open code. However, AMIGA is limited given its inability to deal with dynamics over time. Does the Council support the current, tentative plan to use the AMIGA model for this purpose? If not, are there alternative model choices or selection criteria the Council recommends?

5.2 Summary of Council Response:

- The choice of a CGE model should be moved up in the analytical sequence.
- Incorporation of spillover costs of air quality regulations is important and these costs should continue to receive close attention.
- CGE models have the capability to reveal spillovers of air quality regulations into unregulated sectors, not just to better estimate the direct costs of regulation on regulated sectors. The current Analytical Plan describes CGE methods only for “post-processing” and relegates them to secondary status. General equilibrium modeling should enjoy similar status to direct cost calculations.
- Each of the main CGE models which are proposed for use in the 812 Analysis has some limitations. The JHW model has a longer track record and has been more extensively reviewed. The extent of substitutability in the AMIGA model represents a cause for concern to the Council. The topic of the AMIGA model may be revisited by the Council after further discussion.
- The Council advocates a serious effort to accommodate the consequences of possible tax interactions in the 812 Analysis. Considerable sensitivity analysis is

1 indicated, however, since simple formulas for the magnitudes of tax interactions
2 for regulations imposed on particular sectors have not yet been identified.

3

- 4 • CGE models and econometric models for costs are not competing methods, but
5 complementary methods. Econometric results, where available and appropriate,
6 are generally more desirable than expert judgment for calibrating the parameters
7 of CGE models. However, where no econometric estimates exist for key
8 parameters, expert judgment is essential.

9

10 5.3 Costs outside the regulated market

11

12 Theory and empirical work suggest that some of the most important cost-impacts
13 of environmental regulations occur outside of the regulated market. In some
14 circumstances these impacts are of greater magnitude than the impacts in the targeted
15 sector or industry. Thus it seems important for the Agency to consider these impacts in
16 its assessment. The Council commends the Agency for its commitment to addressing
17 these impacts.

18

19 5.4 Post-processing, or emissions projections too?

20

21 It is not clear how the CGE cost estimates will be linked to CGE models.

22

23 The Analytical Plan needs to be clear about whether a.) CGE modeling will be
24 done as a “post-processing” exercise with the sole objective of producing more-
25 comprehensive estimates of overall costs, or b.) CGE models will also be used to help
26 clarify emissions projections.

27

28 The existing text of the Analytical Plan suggests that the CGE modeling would
29 serve largely as a check on the direct cost estimates from the engineering and sector
30 studies. This suggests that the CGE analysis largely covers the same impacts as the other
31 models, and it implies a subordinate role for the CGE modeling. This characterization
32 does not convey the main purpose or significance of the CGE modeling

33

34 While CGE models can indeed give information on the direct costs, they are
35 especially important in capturing indirect cost-impacts that cannot be considered by the
36 other analyses. For such impacts, there seems to be no substitute for CGE models. Thus,
37 the discussion of the purpose of CGE analysis should be modified.

38

39 CGE models can track the spillovers of air quality management measures into
40 other sectors that are not directly regulated. However, they can also track how emissions
41 regulation will directly affect output and prices in the regulated sectors, and therefore
42 how they will also *indirectly* affect demand and supply conditions in related sectors and
43 thus emissions levels in those sectors.

44

1 These secondary general equilibrium effects have the potential to significantly
2 affect overall emissions levels. The Analytical Plan emphasizes the use of CGE models
3 on the cost side, but the Agency must recognize the importance of consistency throughout
4 the set of models used in the analysis. Will there be big changes in emissions in
5 industries that are not being directly regulated, due to shifts in relative prices of inputs
6 and the mix of outputs?

7
8 The document should be clear on the relative importance of CGE compared to
9 other analyses of costs. The most crucial aspect of CGE modeling is that it provides
10 information on indirect costs, which may be substantial. General equilibrium effects of
11 regulations are not captured in any of the direct cost calculations. What the Analytical
12 Plan currently describes is NOT the emphasis that is appropriate.

13 14 5.5 Competing CGE models

15
16 Jorgenson-Ho-Wilcoxon (JGW) model track record. The Analytical Plan
17 recommends the use of the JGW model for the CGE analysis. This model has
18 continually improved over the years and has a long history of peer review. Its most
19 important virtues are:

- 20
21 (1) attention to margins of substitution among factors, inputs, and goods
22 which seem most important *a priori*,
23 (2) a serious empirical (econometric) basis for its parameters,
24 (3) careful modeling of saving behavior, capital demands and technological
25 change,
26 (4) significant degree of sectoral disaggregation, and
27 (5) incorporation of pre-existing distortionary taxes. (The significance of this
28 last feature is discussed below.)
29

30 Like all models, this model also has some limitations. These include an overly
31 optimistic specification of the sectoral mobility of capital (it is assumed to be perfectly
32 mobile), excessively elastic savings behavior, and the absence of explicit modeling of
33 natural resource stocks and associated extraction-cost implications. However, for the
34 purpose of gauging the general equilibrium cost impacts, this model is, overall, probably
35 a good choice.
36

37 It will be important to explain further the choice of CGE model, even if it to be
38 used only for the “post-processing” tasks. The Jorgenson-Ho-Wilcoxon model and the
39 AMIGA model are the current contenders. The JHW model has many antecedents in the
40 literature, and while it is not perfect, it does capture a lot of processes that are crucial to
41 our understanding of the responses of the economy to air quality regulations. It
42 incorporates an elastic treatment of capital and has a good representation of savings
43 behavior. However, its treatment of natural resource stocks is rudimentary and issues of
44 exhaustibility of domestic petroleum stocks are not adequately represented. One

1 attractive feature of the JHW model is that it has been extensively peer-reviewed and is
2 “about as good as it gets” among the class of thoroughly vetted models.

3
4 AMIGA model; validation. The Analytical Plan also refers to the AMIGA model
5 as a possible vehicle for CGE analysis. As of the present point in this review process,
6 few members of the Council are sufficiently familiar with the details of this model. It is
7 important for the Council to examine this model carefully during the review process
8 before making any suggestions about its suitability. The Agency has provided
9 supplementary review materials.

10
11 In contrast to the Jorgenson-Ho-Wilcoxon model, the AMIGA model has no track
12 record in peer-reviewed journals. It is a “new entrant.” There is one paper forthcoming.
13 It will be necessary for the Agency to examine the model very closely to compensate for
14 the lack of peer review. It will be important to assess the relationship between current
15 conditions and the prediction of the AMIGA model based on earlier conditions, to see
16 how well the AMIGA model can predict realized historical outcomes. This needs to be
17 done to reinforce our confidence in how well the AMIGA model might perform in
18 predicting future developments.

19
20 On pages 4-23, the document describes a number of what are described as “minor
21 concerns”. The last is described as follows: “...for consumption of goods other than
22 transportation and housing-related services, the *model’s implicit assumption of zero*
23 *substitutability may not be supported empirically*” (emphasis added). The Analytical
24 Plan does not contain sufficient information about the AMIGA model for the reader to
25 understand this comment. If it implies that the AMIGA model assumes that all
26 commodities except housing and transportation are consumed in fixed proportions, then
27 this is a very restrictive assumption.

28
29 During the October 23, 2003 teleconference of the Council Special Panel, the
30 Council was provided with additional information about AMIGA indicating that the
31 model does feature substitutability in that it embodies price elasticities for all goods and
32 services relevant to households, and there is labor, capital and energy substitutability
33 among producers. However, despite the presence of own-price elasticities in these
34 models, the Council remains concerned about the extent of cross-price elasticities.

35
36 The “deadweight losses” due to taxation occur because these taxes drive a wedge
37 between buyer’s gross prices and the seller’s net prices of a variety of goods. If demands
38 for some goods are unresponsive to the prices of other goods, quantities traded of these
39 goods will not change when these other goods are taxed and the analysis may not be able
40 to capture these deadweight losses fully. It may be the case, however, that the description
41 of this aspect of the model in the Analytical Plan is just prone to misinterpretation.

42
43 The Council wishes to emphasize that use of the AMIGA model, if it does indeed
44 embody limited substitutability assumptions, would be inconsistent with the objective of
45 a CGE analysis. That objective is to reflect inter-sectoral substitution effects of the costs
46 that arise from environmental policies. If AMIGA is limited in terms of cross-price

1 elasticities, a choice to use AMIGA by the Agency would reduce the standing of the CGE
2 analysis in relationship to other cost analyses.
3

4 5.6 The tax-interaction effect 5

6 Two years ago, in its preliminary review of the Draft Analytical Plan, the Council
7 was disappointed about the Agency's treatment of the tax interaction effect. The
8 literature indicates that the tax interaction effect is not just a second-order effect, but a
9 first-order effect, and it therefore needs greater status in the analysis. The Council
10 endorses the Agency's commitment to attend to this effect in its current study.
11

12 Overview. The tax-interaction effect stems from the impact of environmental
13 regulations on relative prices. In particular, to the extent that regulations raise costs and
14 lead to higher output prices, they raise the prices of goods in general. This effectively
15 lowers the real returns to factors of production (e.g., the real wage). To the extent that
16 pre-existing taxes have already reduced factor supplies below the efficient level, the
17 further reduction in factor returns stemming from higher goods prices produces a first-
18 order efficiency loss. This is the tax-interaction effect. In several studies, this effect
19 involves a greater cost than the direct cost or compliance cost in the regulated market.
20

21 The Analytical Plan's characterization of the tax-interaction effect still has some
22 problems. The Plan correctly points out that there is uncertainty surrounding the
23 magnitude and sign of the tax-interaction effect. However, it incorrectly concludes from
24 this that the central case estimates should assume that this effect is zero. It is more
25 appropriate to use a best estimate of the mean of the tax-interaction effect.
26

27 Both theoretical and empirical studies consistently indicate that, in realistic
28 settings, the tax-interaction effect involves a positive cost. Moreover, for environmental
29 regulations that do not raise revenue – for example, performance standards, technology
30 mandates, or freely allocated emissions permits – there is no “revenue-recycling effect”
31 to offset the tax-interaction effect. For these regulations, if the required emissions
32 reduction is a small percent of baseline emissions, the tax-interaction effect can be
33 several times larger than the direct costs.
34

35 The tax-interaction effect will be smaller to the extent that the regulated
36 commodity is an especially strong complement to leisure. However, even in this case this
37 effect will generally imply an extra cost rather than a reduction in cost. The regulated
38 commodity would have to be an extremely strong leisure complement to switch the sign
39 of the tax-interaction effect.
40

41 Benefits-side tax-interaction effect. The general equilibrium effects of
42 compliance costs are critical, but so may be the general equilibrium effects of beneficial
43 health changes. Abatement of air pollution by the CAAA is intended to create positive
44 health effects. It is just as important that the analysis not overlook the general
45 equilibrium consequences of improved health status on labor availability and

1 productivity, and therefore on the cost of labor, and on the costs of health care. Morbidity
2 certainly has indirect effects on productivity that need to be recognized. General health
3 consequences of changes in the ambient levels of pollutants need to be considered, not
4 just mortality.

5
6 The impact of regulations on labor productivity and the associated “benefit-side”
7 tax-interaction effect is indeed an important issue, and has been analyzed specifically by
8 Williams (2002, 2003). This beneficial effect offsets the adverse tax-interaction effect
9 described in the previous section. However, Williams’s work indicates that, in general,
10 this offset is not likely to be large enough to entirely offset the adverse tax-interaction
11 effect. Thus it seems appropriate to assume in the central case that the tax-interaction
12 effect does raise costs.

13
14 On page 4-26, the Analytical Plan suggests that: “Improvements in CGE models
15 that the Agency is considering for this analysis have made it possible to account for tax
16 interaction effects more precisely.” The Council assumes that this comment pertains only
17 to indirect effects on the cost side of the analysis, not the benefits. Part of the tax
18 interaction effect can be addressed in CGE models, but no existing CGE model will
19 capture all of it. At a minimum the Williams’ (2002, 2003) adjustments for the
20 productivity-enhancing consequences of health improvements due to environmental
21 regulations need to be considered.

22
23 However, there are in fact a number of citations concerning the health benefits of
24 emissions controls for labor productivity and their spillovers into less-regulated sectors.
25 The Council is aware of several papers on this topic. Some of these papers (e.g. Espinosa
26 and Smith, 1995) demonstrate how non-separability between pollutants and private
27 goods, a prerequisite for such beneficial spillovers, can be incorporated into CGE models.

28
29 Two of the already-published papers in this literature are Espinosa and Smith
30 (1995) and Smith and Espinosa (1996).⁴ These papers use an updated version of the
31 Harrison-Rutherford-Wooton model that includes measures of particulate matter, sulfur
32 dioxides, and nitrogen oxides as non-separable influences on consumer preferences. The
33 model includes eleven regions and six goods and three factors in each region.
34 International trade and transboundary pollution are included. There is a simple air
35 diffusion model between the different countries in Europe. The model relies on the
36 concentration response functions presented in Desvousges, Johnson, and Banzhaf (1998)
37 and uses estimates of willingness to pay that are adjusted for each country. A newer paper
38 that addresses the tax interaction effects, Espinosa and Smith (2000) is under review for
39 publication.

40
41 The Committee endorses a balanced approach to CGE modeling, so that indirect
42 *benefits* as well as indirect costs are considered.
43

⁴ The fifth one is in *Environmental and Resource Economics*; I have not located my copy. It is a conceptual paper Schwartz and Repetto (2000)

1 Tax-interactions should be explicit. The tax interaction effect should be an
2 explicit dimension of the presentation of costs. The precise methods for including tax
3 interaction considerations in the Second Prospective Analysis are not adequately
4 described in the current Analytical Plan. The Council could be more confident in its
5 advice on this matter if the Analytical Plan included more-specific details on these issues,
6 including a description of how engineering cost estimates will be linked to the CGE
7 models for the analysis of tax interaction effects.

8
9 It should be noted that the Analytical Plan's suggestion of a 25-35% increase in
10 costs due to the tax interaction effect in the current document may be a result of
11 miscommunication in, or misinterpretation of, the earlier Council review of the Draft
12 Analytical Plan. The indirect cost consequences of the tax interaction effect can differ by
13 orders of magnitude, and can be vastly larger when regulations actually result in little
14 abatement and when there is no revenue recycling. For the SO₂ emissions covered by
15 Title IV, it may be appropriate to make the assumption of a 25-30% increase in costs, but
16 such an assumption is unlikely to be universally appropriate.

17
18 The question thus remains as to how large a cost-impact the Agency might
19 assume for tax interactions. The Agency could address this issue two ways. First, it can
20 employ its commissioned CGE model or models to evaluate the costs of specific
21 regulations. The tax-interaction effect should be embodied in the aggregate cost-impacts
22 obtained from such models. Second, the Agency should consult results from other, prior
23 CGE studies of particular regulations. This second step will be useful as a cross-check on
24 the results from the Agency's commissioned model or models. Moreover, this second
25 step may be necessary to obtain general equilibrium cost-estimates in some instances,
26 since there will surely be some particular regulations that the commissioned model or
27 models cannot capture.

28
29 Given the uncertainties surrounding the magnitude of the tax-interaction effect
30 and of cost-impacts in general, it is very important that the Agency require considerable
31 sensitivity analysis in its CGE assessments. Past applications of the Jorgenson-Ho-
32 Wilcoxon model have tended to skimp on sensitivity analysis.

33 34 5.7 Tension between CGE, econometric models

35
36 The Analytical Plan rejects econometric methods for developing cost estimates
37 but accepts CGE models. This sort of top-down approach in the cost calculations,
38 embracing CGE models, is puzzling. The Council feels that both types of models should
39 be informative. Their implications should be convergent, and a plurality of methods is
40 desirable. However, it is possible that the implications of the different approaches will
41 not be convergent. If this is the case, then there is a clear need for more basic research to
42 resolve the conflicts.

1 One way or another, the analysis needs to attend to general equilibrium effects. In
2 terms of first-order effects, however, it is likely that most of the cost impacts on other
3 markets are likely to work through their interactions with electricity markets.
4

5 Are CGE models sufficiently comprehensive? Some members of the Council
6 have voiced a concern about whether even the largest CGE models are large enough?
7 These are based on empirical studies of individual industries, but more coverage is
8 certainly needed. There is not presently enough coverage by empirical studies to permit
9 reliance on econometric models exclusively. CGE models are calibrated on a selection of
10 empirical results and researchers can then rely upon plausible assumptions, informed by
11 expert opinion, to fill in for missing information.
12

13 There could, however, be more use of engineering and expert judgment when
14 empirical results from econometric models are absent. The analysis could proceed based
15 on expert judgments, using an engineering “bottom-up” strategy. For example,
16 assumptions about the availability of natural gas will be critical to forecasts. Even the
17 experts do not know enough about the determinants of availability of natural gas to base
18 the modeling assumptions on existing empirical results, so the analysis may need to rely
19 more heavily on engineering expert judgment.
20

6 DISCOUNTING

6.1 Charge Question 9:

In the two previous 812 studies, the primary cost estimates reflected use of a 5 percent real discount rate, which an earlier Council endorsed as a reasonable compromise between a 3 percent real rate considered by EPA to be an appropriate estimate of the consumption rate of interest or rate of social time preference and a 7 percent rate, OMB's estimate of the opportunity cost of capital. Limited sensitivity testing was also conducted in the previous 812 studies by substituting 3 and 7 percent rates to annualize the benefit and cost streams. EPA's new Economics Guidelines (peer-reviewed by the SAB EEAC) call for using both a 3 and a 7 percent rate. A recent draft of new OMB economic guidelines suggests providing results based on both 3 and 7 percent discount rates, while also acknowledging the need for further efforts to refine analytical policies for discounting methods and rates. EPA plans on following both sets of Guideline documents by using both 3 and 7 percent in our core analyses. It is true that this will require presentation of two sets of results – one based on each rate. This may not be necessary given the expected insensitivity of the overall results to the discount rate assumption. Does the Council support this approach? If not, are there alternative rates, discounting concepts, methods, or results presentation approaches the Council recommends?

6.2 Summary of Council Response:

- The discounting of future benefits and costs by individuals is a complex cognitive process and the literature on discounting is replete with empirical anomalies. Economic theory provides a framework for thinking about social discounting, but exactly what social discount rate is the “right” social discount rate remains an open question. Time preferences depend upon the particular choice context, which includes factors as diverse as the time horizon, the sizes of the benefits and costs, and the subjective life expectancies of the affected populations.
- The 812 Analysis should conform to the recommended treatment of discounting spelled out in the EPA's Guidelines for Benefit-Cost Analysis. Deviations from this advice are admissible, of course, but they should be explained and justified by more-recent research.
- There is some tension between realistic ambiguity in what constitutes the “best” discounting assumption and how a general audience may interpret the provision of a range of results, as opposed to a point estimate. The most informative depiction of uncertainty about discounting would be a distribution of net benefits corresponding to an assumption about the likely distribution for “the” discount rate. But this exercise is likely to be too costly to execute.

- Wherever the 812 Analysis must accommodate non-contemporaneous benefits and costs, the discount rate that is used should be consistent. Exceptions should be justified by large differences in the time horizons involved or perhaps large differences in the ages of the affected populations, supported by empirical results to back up any assumed differences.

6.3 Theory

There are important theoretical (and therefore empirical) differences between the discounting of future consumption streams and the discounting of future utility levels. As the Analytical Plan indicates, the theoretically appropriate rate at which to discount future values (benefits and costs, as opposed to future utilities) is the sum of a pure social rate of time preference and an adjustment term reflecting future changes in the marginal utility of consumption (future goods may be worth less at the margin as people get richer). The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is important. The researcher still might want to use a positive discount rate even if the first term is zero.

There is considerable discussion about whether the social rate of time preference should be revealed by markets, but there are a number of reasons why the market does not give reliable information. There is actually no clear connection between the social rate of time preference and market interest rates. One reason is that the appropriate rate for public decisions need not conform to the discount rates that individuals apply in their private decisions. As social beings, we may collectively endorse a discount rate that differs from the rate we apply privately.

Even if one were to adopt the assumption that the social discount rate should reflect private preferences, the appropriate social discount rate will still differ from market rates. The 7% rate advocated by the Office of Management and Budget is based upon the opportunity cost of capital. However, externalities, taxes on capital, and inability to pool risks perfectly can all cause market interest rates (that firm's opportunity costs of capital) to differ significantly from individuals' inherent rates of exchange between future and current goods.

A recent survey concerning discounting and the rate of time preference (Frederick et al., 2002) reveals broad heterogeneity in individual discount rates and systematic effects upon discounting that depend upon the context of the choice. The choice context includes the time horizon over which the discounting is to occur, the sizes of the benefits and costs at stake, and a number of sociodemographic factors. See also Warner and Pleeter (2001) and Harrison et al. (2002). There is no single private discount rate that can be readily translated into a social discount rate for use in collective choice in all possible social choice situations.

6.4 Guidelines for economic analysis

It is crucial that the Analytical Plan reiterate the general issues surrounding discount rates. The relevance of discounting stems from the details of changes in abatement costs and benefits over time, across different scenarios. When costs and benefits are not identically distributed over time, the discount rate assumptions in the analysis will be important.

The strategy for calculating firms' annualized private costs using some specific discount rate in conjunction with the cost of specific abatement measures needs to be consistent with the way that the social benefit cost-analysis is conducted. There should to be more detail used in describing time-profiles of costs and benefits in the different scenarios. The sensitivity of the conclusions to different discount rates and different assumptions about time profiles needs to be featured prominently.

The current guidelines for benefit-cost analysis recommend 3% and 7%, along with a complementary undiscounted time stream of benefits and costs with zero discounting.

6.5 Central assumption and sensitivity analysis

Faced with the subtleties of conceptualizing the appropriate discount rate, it is entirely appropriate, indeed crucial, to apply a range of values for the discount rate. The Agency has floated the possibility of performing all analyses with a 3 percent rate and a 7 percent rate. The Council recommends instead using a "central" value of 4 or 5 percent, and then including lower and higher rates as a sensitivity analysis. Using a central value, along with variations on each side of this value, is the standard sensitivity approach. However, the Council acknowledges that using a "central" value runs the risk that readers will focus exclusively on this central case. This problem must be weighed against the inherent awkwardness of not having a central case.

The Council wishes to emphasize the importance of how the Agency chooses to present the results concerning sensitivity of the benefit-cost analysis to assumptions about discounting. The choice between presenting a measure of central tendency, or an interval, may be an important one. Intervals may lead people to ignore the results. It can be argued that it is easier to interpret the results of an analysis when using a central tendency rather than a range, but it will be crucial to capture the consequences of uncertainty about appropriate discounting decisions. The opportunity cost of capital, on net, may be a reliable guide to the upper end at about 7%. The lower end of the range could 3% or less. So the 2-7% range in rates may be the most appropriate.

The Council commends the Agency's focus on the uncertainty surrounding the appropriate rate at which to discount future benefits and costs. It is very important to do sensitivity analysis based on a 4% or 5% mean, rather than settling on just one rate for the entire analysis.

6.6 Consistency throughout the Analytical Plan

Finally, the Agency should strive for consistency in its application of the discount rate. In particular, some of the sector-specific models may be applying a different discount rate from the “social” rate that is appropriate for a (social) benefit-cost analysis. In particular, they may be applying firms’ opportunity costs of capital. While this opportunity cost is appropriate for characterizing costs or benefits to firms, it does not correspond to social costs or benefits. Thus, if these models employ a different discount rate, a further adjustment would be necessary to arrive at social benefits and costs.

7 ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS – PLANS FOR ANALYSIS

7.1 Charge Question 18:

Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 7 for (a) qualitative characterization of the ecological effects of Clean Air Act-related air pollutants, (b) an expanded literature review, and (c) a quantitative, ecosystem-level case study of ecological service flow benefits? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

7.2 Summary of Council Response:

- Ecological effects to be valued must be limited to those effects for which there is a defensible, rather than just speculative, link between air emissions and service flows. The Council strongly objects to using inappropriate or unsupported placeholder values in the absence of better information.
- The greater heterogeneity in ecosystems services makes it even more difficult to produce estimates of the benefits from their protection than for the protection of human health. The input of the new CVPESS may be able to stimulate the development of greater expertise on this issue than is presently available.
- There is a clear need for a better conceptual basis for valuation of ecological effects, which would also permit the proposed case studies to be integrated as components of a larger model. Ongoing attention to new literature will be important.

7.3 Emphasizing Verifiable Connections

In the First Prospective Analysis, the Agency identified a limited number of ecological impacts that were amenable to quantitative analysis because there exists a defensible link between changes in air emissions and a corresponding service flow for which there are peer-reviewed money values. However, the only monetized benefits, based on displaced treatment costs, were not reported in the primary central benefit estimates because of uncertainties about actual cost displacement. There has been little increase in the inventory of available value estimates in the intervening four years since the First Prospective Analysis, so the Agency proposes to use the same approach for the second prospective analysis.

7.4 Valuing Statistical Ecosystems?

The Council's earlier efforts to render greater parallels between the way researchers think about valuing human health and valuing ecosystem health speculated that it might be possible to think about "statistical ecosystems" the same way we think about "statistical lives" in the sense that most environmental stressors do not wipe out entire ecosystems with certainty (analogous to killing individual people with certainty). Instead, they compromise the viability of a wide variety of ecosystems to some degree, resulting in the collapse of some fraction of these systems, although the identity of these particular systems cannot be identified *ex ante*. (This is analogous to compromising the health of many different people, resulting in the deaths of a few people, although these individuals cannot be identified *ex ante*).

However, the Council now recognizes the importance of heterogeneity across risks and individuals in arriving at values of statistical lives, as well as the likelihood that these problems can only be more complicated when ecosystems are being considered, rather than human health. Ecosystems are vastly more heterogeneous than humans. The number of dimensions across which the willingness to pay function for risk reductions for ecosystems may vary is likely to be much greater than number of relevant dimensions for human health risk reductions. The Council now has reservations about attempting to push the "statistical ecosystems" analogy in conceptualizing techniques for determining ecosystem benefits.

Although the language did originate from previous Council deliberations, the Council encourages the Agency to drop the "value of a statistical ecosystem" term. The term implies that it is possible to elicit reliably the public's preferences for reducing risks to ecosystems. While the possibility of obtaining such values for hypothetical risk reductions is an interesting research question, such an approach may be a distraction from the task of removing the primary impediments to improved value estimates. As EPA acknowledges elsewhere, these impediments include poor understanding of concentration-response functions for ecological resources and poor understanding of linkages between physical effects and service flows. In addition, it has proven challenging to describe changes in ecological service flows in terms that are meaningful to the public. Finally, research on valuing health risks, which are far more tangible to most survey respondents, has encountered difficulties in eliciting reliable estimates for small changes in relatively small baseline risks.

7.5 Using Available Quantitative Information

EPA's plans to *qualitatively* characterize the ecological effects of the Clean Air Act-related air pollutants is thorough and appropriately focused on a broad characterization of ecosystem services. However, more could be done to make use of *quantitative* information that is available. Although it must be acknowledged that neither the available data nor the available analytical tools are sufficiently developed to provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the ecological benefits of the CAAA, there is

1 some quantitative information available for some components of such an assessment that
2 can help to characterize the nature of the progress expected as a result of the CAAA. EPA
3 included this type of information in the first prospective study. The Agency should
4 continue to do so, and perhaps increase its prominence in the report. This information
5 includes:

6
7 a. Air quality models can provide quantitative estimates of expected reductions in
8 acid deposition (sulfate and nitrate), nitrogen deposition, and ambient ozone
9 concentrations, which are the primary air pollutants of concern for ecological
10 effects. Some emissions and/or deposition data may also be available for
11 important hazardous air pollutants (HAPs), such as mercury. This information can
12 be presented spatially on maps to illustrate the scope of the improvements that can
13 be expected.

14 b. Even though quantitative dose-response estimation may not be feasible at this
15 time, some quantitative measures of effects of air pollution on ecosystems are
16 available. These include

17 (1) the extent of acidification in lakes and streams and the implications for
18 reductions in some aquatic species,

19 (2) the locations and sizes of estuaries with degraded quality because of
20 eutrophication and other effects of excess nitrogen and the implications
21 such as lost habitat for spawning, and

22 (3) locations where forests show evidence of pollution-related stress, etc,
23 and implications for forest health and diversity.

24 The analysis should provide some nation-wide characterization of the actual extent of
25 identified ecological effects along with a description of their implications. It should also
26 provide information about the expected reductions in pollutant exposures associated with
27 these effects that may be attained due to the CAAA. These two classes of information
28 will help provide some context for the more detailed case study proposed for examining
29 the benefits of reducing excess nitrogen in one estuary. They will also begin to support a
30 link between the current conceptual discussion of ecosystem services and the likely
31 quantitative social benefits of the CAAA. This framework will also place in some
32 context the few specific benefits that have already been approximately quantified, such as
33 recreational fishing in the Adirondacks and commercial forests.

35 7.6 Integration between Conceptual Basis and Case Studies

36
37 The Analytical Plan would benefit from a better connection between the discussion of
38 a conceptual basis for valuing ecosystem services and the proposed case studies described
39 in the document. In general, there should be a more serious attempt to connect the
40 developments in literature on ecosystems and the strategies being developed by the

1 Agency. For example, the Agency should begin to pursue some of the ideas contained in
2 Sanchirico and Wilen (2001), Finnoff and Tschirhart (2003), and Smith (2003).
3

4 7.7 Inadvisability of Using Placeholder Values

5

6 The revised Analytical Plan acknowledges the disagreements among Council
7 members reviewing the initial Analytical Plan for the Second Prospective Analysis. The
8 main point here is that regardless of the validity of the Costanza et al. (1988) estimate of
9 the total value of the world's ecosystems (which was advocated by a minority of Council
10 members as a starting point for a placeholder value for ecosystem benefits), a total value
11 for an ecosystem tells us nothing useful about the value of avoiding different types of
12 incremental quality-degrading effects of air pollution at levels relevant to the CAAA.
13

14 The Council is sympathetic to the concerns that leaving the ecological benefits
15 incompletely quantified may leave the perhaps erroneous impression that they are
16 unimportant. However, the Council deems it prudent for the Agency to reject using a
17 placeholder value because it introduces purely speculative values that provide little
18 guidance for resolving persistent uncertainties. Furthermore, the use of speculative
19 values could undermine the credibility of the analysis as a whole.
20

21 7.8 Awaiting Insights from CVPESS

22

23 While the Council would like to be able to offer some clear resolution on the issue of
24 ecosystem valuation, the state of the science in this area is at present insufficiently
25 developed to allow anyone to be conclusive. The Council expects that the SAB
26 Committee on Valuing the Protection of Ecological Systems and Services and a new
27 subcommittee of the Council, the Ecological Effects Subcommittee, will provide
28 direction on this topic in the future, but the work of these groups has just gotten
29 underway.

8 ECOLOGICAL CASE STUDIES

8.1 Charge Question 19:

Initial plans described in chapter 7 reflect a preliminary EPA decision to base the ecological benefits case study on Waquoit Bay in Massachusetts. Does the Council support these plans? If the Council does not support these specific plans, are there alternative case study designs the Council recommends?

8.2 Summary of Council Response:

- If the case studies involve relatively modest opportunity costs, they will provide some data of interest to the Section 812 process, but the findings will by no means be generalizable. Advice of the new Ecological Effects Subcommittee will be valuable.

8.3 Specific points

EPA proposes to conduct a prototype case study of a specific site. EPA has solicited the Council's views on selection of one of two possible sites: Waquoit Bay in Massachusetts and the Chesapeake Bay. EPA suggests several criteria for selecting an appropriate site. It is not clear how EPA may have weighted these criteria in comparing the relative advantages of the two sites. The following table suggests some possible qualitative evaluations based on EPA's site descriptions.

Comparison of Qualitative Site Evaluation Ratings		
Criterion	Waquoit Bay	Chesapeake Bay
1. Well-documented impacts to a particular ecosystem function or service	Good	Fair
2a. Quantifiable ecological endpoints	Very Good	Good
2b. Quantifiable economic endpoints	Good	Very Good
3. Available monetary values for at least some endpoints	Good	Good
4. Take advantage of existing EPA initiatives to maximize use of available resources, avoid redundant research, and demonstrate multiple applications of ongoing projects	Good	Very Good

1 Chesapeake Bay is weakest in the area of criterion 1--documented impacts to
2 functions or services. Chesapeake Bay is a very large and complicated ecosystem that is
3 challenging to model. In contrast, Waquoit Bay is a small, almost laboratory-sized
4 system. However, the size and complexity of the Chesapeake Bay provides opportunities
5 for quantifying more endpoints, including potential impacts on commercially important
6 species and property values.

7
8 Oddly, the Agency mentions only in passing that Chesapeake Bay is more
9 representative and that Waquoit Bay provides little opportunity for potential benefits
10 transfers. Nevertheless, the Agency indicates its intention to use Waquoit Bay for the
11 primary case study because there are available dose-response models for ecological
12 indicators. Chesapeake Bay will only be used for a property value study. If the Agency's
13 primary goal is to demonstrate "current deficiencies in our knowledge about both the
14 physical effects of air quality on ecological services and the value to society of these
15 effect," then the atypical availability of dose-response models for Waquoit Bay would
16 argue against that choice. Chesapeake Bay appears to provide a far richer opportunity to
17 conduct a prototype study in a realistic setting.

18 19 8.4 Miscellaneous

20 The discussion of the economic valuation component of the Waquoit Bay study is
21 inadequate. It does not use the "direct use," "indirect use," and "non-use" approach EPA
22 has used elsewhere.

23
24 There should be a more detailed articulation of how the ecosystem services in question
25 are connected to valuation methods, as well as a discussion of what is being left out.

26 8.5 Synthesis

27 In general, there seems to be no strong sentiment among Council Special Panel
28 members to recommend modifying the Agency's proposed strategy. There is some
29 concern that the proposed case studies seem like a fairly weak response to a very serious
30 data problem. For example, it might be difficult to detect the relatively small incremental
31 effects of air pollution on water quality on property values in the Chesapeake Bay region.
32 Some members were mildly supportive of taking advantage of the relatively abundant
33 data concerning Waquoit Bay, even if this particular resource is not particularly
34 representative.

35
36 The Agency is encouraged to heed any advice coming out of the new SAB *CVPESS*,
37 which will reflect that group's greater expertise in this area. Also, as the Ecological
38 Effects Subcommittee of the Council Special Panel begins its work, helpful insights may
39 become available as the Agency's strategy on this front begins to unfold.

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9 HEDONIC PROPERTY VALUE STUDY

9.1 Charge Question 20:

Does the Council support the plan for a feasibility analysis for a hedonic property study for valuing the effects of nitrogen deposition/eutrophication effects in the Chesapeake Bay region, with the idea that these results might complement the Waquoit Bay analysis?

9.2 Summary of Council Response:

- The Agency should begin to develop an infrastructure for combining different sources of information about demand for ecosystem services. The emerging literature on preference calibration holds promise for integrating hedonic property value estimates with travel cost demand estimates and other related evidence about demand for these types of non-market goods as a function of environmental quality.

9.3 Specific Advice.

In the proposed Chesapeake Bay property value application, the same specification of ecosystem services and their explicit connection to what can be “valued” with hedonic property value needs to be described. The Council asks how this analysis relates to recreational fishing considerations and points out that the Agency has not noted the overlap discussed by McConnell (1990) and Parsons (1991) .

This would seem to be an opportunity for a preference calibration exercise (Smith et al., 2002) combining the Leggett and Bockstael (2000) hedonic with the extensive travel cost recreational demand work.

As with the Waquoit Bay application, the discussion is too vague to offer specific guidance. There needs to be a detailed description of services, approaches used for valuation, and discussion of how what can be measured relates to the services.

10 ECONOMIC VALUATION – PLANS

10.1 Charge Question 21:

Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 8 for economic valuation of changes in outcomes between the scenarios? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

10.2 Summary of Council Response:

- There are a number of additional resources that the Agency can consider in developing estimates of a variety of non-mortality benefits of the CAAA.

10.3 Additional Discussion

Charge questions 22-25 deal specifically with plans for evaluating health outcomes, which are the most important of the endpoints listed in Chapter 8. This generic question apparently relates primarily to non-health, distributional and environmental effects. The Agency's plans for identifying distributional impacts are somewhat cryptic. The Analytical Plan simply states that the Agency will assess distributional consequences across age, income, and racial sub-populations using Census county-level data for the year 2000. In light of the Agency's concerns about their ability to disaggregate costs and benefits geographically, it seems odd they are not concerned about disaggregating even further by sub-population. While some valuation models report the effect of income, there is very little known about age-specific and race-specific preferences for environmental services.

The list of environmental effects includes recreational and residential visibility, agriculture, worker productivity, commercial timber, acidification, and materials damage.

10.4 Visibility

There are several published rural and urban visibility studies available that are not mentioned in the Agency's blueprint. Some evaluation of the visibility benefit for eastern and western parks based on the meta-analysis in Smith and Osborne (1996) seems warranted. This meta-analysis offers the Agency an opportunity to adjust statistically for the different approaches used to estimate visibility benefits across different studies. The more-recent Beron et al. (2001) residential hedonic property value analysis of visibility changes should also be considered.

1 The Agency proposes combining the unpublished estimates from Chestnut and Rowe
2 (1990) with the preference-calibration approach to benefits transfer. The preference-
3 calibration approach is far superior to previous ad hoc transfer methods. Nevertheless,
4 like any transfer method, it is constrained by the quality and relevance of the original
5 study estimates. While the Agency [TAC: EPA's study? or the Smith study at CRA, for
6 EPRI?] is currently sponsoring a major visibility study, the results will not be available
7 in time for this assessment. In the meantime, the Agency's only recourse is to report
8 appropriate error bounds for existing estimates.

9
10 Quantified benefits from the improvement of visibility in the Second Prospective
11 Analysis are limited to recreational visibility benefits in the primary estimates. The
12 Agency indicated that the main residential visibility study at its disposal had been judged
13 to be too old to use. There is now additional research that is more recent (e.g. Beron,
14 Murdoch and Thayer, 2001). As much as any other category, visibility benefits have
15 figured large in empirical air quality benefits estimates from hedonic property value
16 models. The Agency should review the available studies, revisiting the older ones and
17 adding the newer ones, and develop an approach for including residential visibility values
18 in the primary estimates. There is no doubt that such benefits exist and the available
19 studies, both contingent valuation and hedonic property value, provide a substantial
20 amount of information about the likely magnitude of these benefits. Additional effort on
21 this front can help reduce errors in benefits calculations stemming from omitted
22 categories of benefits.

23
24 It is possible, independent of the Beron, Murdoch and Thayer (2001) paper, to
25 consider evaluating stated preference studies concerning residential visibility. The
26 recreational visibility studies are also rather old, dating back to 1990, and detailed
27 literature reviews and attempts to reconcile differences in results have not been updated
28 recently (e.g. Chestnut and Rowe, 1990). EPRI is sponsoring a study conducted by Dr.
29 Anne Smith of Charles River Associates. The Agency should contact this research team
30 to determine the status of its work.

31
32 An important issue that needs to be addressed in a quantitative assessment of both the
33 contingent valuation and the hedonic property value studies is that visual air quality is
34 inextricably associated, in terms of people's perceptions, with their concern about
35 potential health effects. Points on this issue include:

36
37 (a.) CV studies found that some subjects could not ignore their concerns about
38 potential health effects when answering questions about visibility. Some approach
39 to separating these values is needed. Results showed visibility aesthetics were
40 20% to 40% of value for air quality changes as a whole in residential areas.

41 (b.) Responses to CV questions for public goods, such as air quality, may include
42 altruistic values for other households as well as for the respondent. This is related
43 to the concerns expressed to an earlier SAB panel by one of the McClelland et al.
44 authors. [TAC: full citation?] This is an issue with all CV studies for public
45 goods and should not be a reason to completely ignore the study results.

1

2 (c.) Hedonic property value studies, even when using an objective measure of
3 visual air quality, can be expected to yield results that reflect values for the
4 aesthetics of air quality as well as concerns about health effects.

5 The CV and hedonic studies each have strengths and weaknesses, but considered together
6 they likely provide enough information for a quantitative assessment with some
7 reasonable amount of uncertainty.

8

9 10.5 Worker Productivity

10

11 The Agency plans to follow the same approach to worker productivity as they did in
12 the first assessment. They will use the study by Crocker and Horst (1981) on the effect of
13 ozone concentrations on worker productivity. As it does for other endpoints involving
14 productivity losses and the value of time, the Agency will use mean or median wage rate.
15 However, the relevant outcomes are impacts on marginal product and the marginal value
16 of time in a given activity. Mean wage rates are, at best, crude proxies for the average
17 product. Averages may either overstate or understate marginal values.

18

19 Here and elsewhere, the Agency treats the value of time far too simplistically.
20 Economists have studied market and nonmarket time values extensively over the last 25
21 years in areas such as labor, transportation, and recreation economics. The Agency
22 should evaluate empirical alternatives to using market wage rates to value time. Where
23 the Agency is constrained to use wage rates for pragmatic reasons, they should evaluate
24 the likely direction of bias and incorporate that assessment in the uncertainty analysis.

25

26 For specialized references on the Value of Time, see the additional reference sections
27 following the general References at the end of this document.

28

29 10.6 Commercial Timber

30

31 The Agency proposes to evaluate the most recent concentration-response and commercial
32 timber market models.

33

34 10.7 Acidification

35

36 The Agency plans to use an updated version of Montgomery and Needleman's
37 random-utility model for New York state recreational angling values. Is it possible to
38 extend the geographic coverage beyond the Adirondack region?

39

10.8 Materials Damage

The Agency cites obsolete estimates from the 1970's and plans to monetize soiling damages with new estimates of the demand for cleaning products and services. This approach has problems similar to using cost-of-illness estimates to value health. Costs are not the same as benefits. In this case, cleaning expenditures neglect esthetic losses. The Agency seems unaware of several more recent studies that have updated the initial "Mathtech" study. For example, Harrison et al. (1993) obtained updated estimates from Mathtech.

In addition to soiling damages, air pollution can corrode metals and other materials, leading to potential productivity losses, and damage structures and historic monuments. Most of these effects are not included in the demand for cleaning products and services. Acres International Limited (1991) estimated replacement costs for some of these damages. As in other areas, the Agency should provide appropriate caveats and discuss reasons that estimates are likely to understate materials damage benefits.

For research on the subject of Materials Damage, see the studies in list of specialized references provided after the main Reference section in this document.

10.9 Hedonic Property Value as Cross Check

Consider the possibility of using marginal WTP estimates for few cities (LA, Chicago, and others) where recent hedonic studies are available for comparative evaluation with health effects (see Taylor and Smith, 2000). It is also consistent with implicit logic of preference calibration but simpler.

10.10 Acidification

EPA plans to use an updated version of Montgomery and Needleman's random-utility model for New York state recreational angling values. The Plan should explain whether it is possible to extend the geographic coverage beyond the Adirondack region

11 USE OF VSL META-ANALYSES

11.1 Agency Charge Questions Related to Use of VSL Meta-Analysis.

Charge Question 22:

EPA's current analytic blueprint calls for an expert-judgment project on VSL determination that would produce a probability distribution over the range of possible VSL values for use in the 812 project. EPA is not sure how much priority to give to this project. A much simpler alternative would be for EPA to specify a plausible range of VSL values. One option would be to use a range bounded by \$1 million (based roughly on the lower bound of the interquartile range from the Mrozek-Taylor meta-analysis) and \$10 million (based roughly on the upper bound of the interquartile range of the Viscusi-Aldy meta-analysis. This range would match that reflected in EPA's sensitivity analysis of the alternative benefit estimate for the off-road diesel rulemaking. The range would then be characterized using a normal, half-cosine, uniform or triangular distribution over that range of VSL values. EPA would then ask this Committee to review this distribution. This approach could be done relatively quickly, based on the reviews and meta-analyses commissioned to date, and would allow a formal probability analysis to proceed, without suggesting that the Agency is trying to bring more precision to this issue than is warranted by the available science.

Charge Question 23:

Pursuant to SAB Council advice from the review of the first draft analytical blueprint, EPA reviewed a number of meta-analyses –either completed or underway– developed to provide estimates for the value of statistical life (VSL) to be applied in the current study. EPA plans to consult with the Council (and coordinate this consultation with the EEAC) on how best to incorporate information from the Kochi et al (2002) meta-analysis, other published meta-analyses [Mrozek and Taylor and Viscusi and Aldy], and recent published research to develop estimates of VSL for use in this study. In addition, EPA plans to implement two particular adjustments to the core VSL values: discounting of lagged effects and longitudinal adjustment to reflect changes in aggregate income. Does the Council support these plans, including the specific plans for the adjustments described in chapter 8? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

Charge Question 31:

EPA plans to work with the Council and the EEAC to develop revised guidance on appropriate VSL measures. We hope to include the Kochi et al (2002) meta-analysis, other recent meta-analysis, recent publications, and the 3 literature reviews sponsored by EPA.(a separate charge question pertaining to this element of EPA's VSL plan is presented below). In addition, EPA plans to conduct a follow-on meta-regression analysis

1 of the existing VSL literature to provide insight into the systematic impacts of study
2 design attributes, risk characteristics, and population attributes on the mean and variance
3 of VSL. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for conducting this
4 meta-regression analysis? If the Council does not support this analysis or any particular
5 aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches which the Council recommends for
6 quantifying the impact of study design attributes, risk characteristics, and population
7 attributes on the mean and variance of VSL?

8
9 Charge Question 37:

10
11 Does the Council support including the Kochi et al. (2002) meta-analysis as part of a the
12 larger data base of studies to derive an estimate for the value of avoided premature
13 mortality attributable to air pollution? Are there additional data, models, or studies the
14 Council recommends? Does the SAB think that EPA should include Kochi et al. 2003 if
15 not accepted for publication in a peer reviewed journal by the time the final 812 report is
16 completed?

17 18 11.2 Summary of Council Response:

19
20 The Council has combined the responses to charge questions 22, 23, 31, and 37
21 and has provided additional discussion concerning the use of VSLs in Appendix B
22 of this Council Report. Major summary points appear below.

- 23
24 • Since the Panel's initial receipt of the Analytical Plan, the plan for an expert-
25 judgment project on VSLs has been dropped from the blueprint. The expert
26 elicitation exercise is no longer an active portion of this charge question.
- 27
28 • Uncertainty analysis with respect to VSL values requires information about the
29 distribution of VSL estimates corresponding to risks and populations that are
30 similar to those relevant for the CAAA. The marginal distribution of all empirical
31 VSL estimates derived across all contexts is unlikely to be appropriate for this
32 purpose, as is any arbitrary convenient distributional shape.
- 33
34 • Discounting of lagged effects is advisable, but the literature on discount rates for
35 future financial outcomes and future health states is not clear on whether
36 straightforward discounting using an exponential model and a common rate will
37 be appropriate. Sensitivity analysis and caveats are recommended.
- 38
39 • Ad hoc adjustments for future changes in aggregate income levels are not
40 advisable. These adjustments, if made, should be made in the context of a formal
41 model of preferences and the relevant elasticities.
- 42
43 • The Panel recommends a primary focus, at this juncture, on the Viscusi-Aldy
44 estimates based on U.S. studies. Preferably, the variance estimates should be

1 based on the variance in the conditional expectation from the model, for a set of
2 conditions that most closely approximate those relevant for the CAAA.

- 3
- 4 • The Second Prospective Report should not rely solely on the Kochi et al. Meta-
5 analysis. Published peer-reviewed studies should be favored wherever these are
6 available.
- 7

8 11.3 Expert Judgment - VSLs

9

10 The Agency desires to bound the range of plausible VSL values between \$1
11 million and \$10 million, which seems reasonable given the state of knowledge about
12 empirical values in different contexts. This range, however, represents the marginal
13 distribution of VSL estimates aggregated across values that have been determined in very
14 different contexts. The ideal VSL distribution to employ would be the *conditional*
15 distribution of VSL values, derived for contexts that most closely match the risks and
16 affected populations relevant to the CAAA. This VSL does not necessarily lie in the
17 middle of the overall *marginal* distribution of empirical VSL estimates across the broad
18 range of contexts in the literature.

19

20 Some VSL distribution is needed from which to draw alternative point values of the
21 VSL for simulations of the effect of uncertainty about VSL values. However, the
22 Council Special Panel does not agree with arbitrary assignment of some convenient
23 distribution (e.g. normal, half-cosine, uniform or triangular) for the range of values.
24 Why not compare Mrozek-Taylor versus Viscusi-Aldy meta-analyses, including the
25 latter's re-estimates with a sample consisting of one observation per study. Use these
26 estimates to derive an appropriate mean and variance of the relevant conditional
27 distribution from that model "configured" for the policy analysis? The idea is to narrow
28 the range of plausible VSL estimates to reflect more closely the risks and affected
29 populations for the policies in question.

30

31 11.4 Adjusting for latencies, income growth?

32

33 Latency in health effects, as well as cessation lags, mean that a comprehensive
34 assessment of mortality risk reduction benefits must take into account individual
35 discounting. In discounting individual health effects, there remains an important question
36 as to whether the usual convenient exponential form of discounting is an appropriate
37 assumption, given the numerous empirical anomalies. There are also unresolved
38 questions about the difference in discount rates concerning future health, as opposed to
39 future financial status. While the Council concurs that future benefits need to be
40 discounted, there is no consensus in literature concerning how to do this. As a practical
41 matter, pending additional research, the Agency should adopt discounting assumptions
42 that are consistent with the rest of the Analytical Plan and include sensitivity analysis and
43 caveats.

44

1 The Panel does not support the use of the proposed adjustment for aggregate income
2 growth. This is arbitrary and inconsistent with VSL as a marginal rate of substitution
3 (MRS). If this adjustment is considered essential, consideration should be given to
4 obtaining it through preference calibration and adjustment in this way, consistent with the
5 relevant elasticity (see Smith, Pattanayak, and Van Houtven, 2003).
6

7 11.5 Available meta-analyses

8 Three meta-analyses were discussed in EPA's evaluation of summary measures for
9 the available VSL estimates (Mrozek and Taylor, 2002, Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, and
10 Kochi, Hubbell, and Kramer, 2003). The studies differ in several key respects, including:
11

- 12 (1) The number of observations included from each study;
 - 13 (2) The format of the observations (e.g. actual estimates, use of group means, and
14 other transformations of the primary estimates);
 - 15 (3) The sample composition – U.S. studies, international, revealed and stated
16 preference;
 - 17 (4) The set of independent variables used for controls (e.g. inclusion of industry
18 effects);
 - 19 (5) Bayesian means versus regression summaries;
 - 20 (6) Published versus unpublished summaries.
- 21

22 The background for the charge questions tends to focus attention on the selection of
23 a single study as a summary for developing for the Prospective Analysis "one" VSL
24 estimate of reductions in mortality risk. The charge questions explicitly refer to the
25 "systematic impacts of study design attributes, risk characteristics, and population
26 attributes on the mean and variance of VSL." The earlier meta-analysis strategies tended
27 to miss the opportunity to combine the insights from all studies to influence how
28 summary measures are constructed and used. We recommend that serious consideration
29 be given to using these insights in adapting how any meta-summary is used.
30

31 Equally important, the sensitivity of VSL estimates from meta-summary equations to
32 the sample composition (i.e. which studies are included) and to the controls used (i.e.
33 which study features are explicitly modeled) suggests that it would be prudent to use the
34 resulting lessons from this research in at least three ways:
35

- 36 (1) If one study, such as the Viscusi and Aldy (2003) meta-analysis, is selected,
37 evaluate the sensitivity of the conditional expectation to the baseline risk and
38 other control variables selected in measuring the conditional prediction.
39
- 40 (2) Evaluate the variance in the conditional prediction as a function of the values for
41 the independent variables included in the model in relation to the mean values for
42 these variables for the sample used to estimate the model.
43
- 44 (3) Consider the effects of inclusion or exclusion of independent variables or
45 observations on the coefficient estimate for the risk measure. The data sets used

1 in these studies are generally available for attempts at replication, so this type of
2 comparison can be readily undertaken and would permit evaluation of the
3 sensitivity of the VSL estimate to assumptions made, based on the available
4 literature.

5
6 In general, it does not seem prudent to extend the sample to include studies for labor
7 markets outside the U.S. The terms of employment, information about safety conditions,
8 fringe benefits (e.g. health insurance), etc. are likely to be so different that one could not
9 be sure that differences attributed to income or risk levels were in fact due to these
10 variables.

11 12 11.6 Interpreting CV measures

13
14 One advantage asserted for the Kochi et al. study is the inclusion of contingent
15 valuation (CV) evidence. There is an important issue that has not been adequately
16 discussed when these results are included. The VSL measure implicitly accepts the
17 proportionality assumption between ex ante willingness to pay and the risk change.

18
19 The proper theoretical interpretation of the CV measures is as an ex ante option price
20 for a risk change. If OP denotes the value for a risk reduction from P_0 to P_1 (with $P_1 <$
21 P_0), and the P 's designate the probability of death before and after the risk reduction,
22 theory implies:

$$23 \quad (1) \quad OP = f(P_0, P_1, \text{and other variables})$$

24
25
26 The comma between P_0 and P_1 implies that linear proportionality in $(P_0 - P_1)$ is an
27 approximation, not a feature implied by theory. Thus, to rewrite equation (1) as equation
28 (2) below, and then to approximate VSL as in equation (3), adds additional untested
29 assumptions.

$$30 \quad (2) \quad OP = (P_0 - P_1) \cdot g(\text{other things})$$

$$31 \quad (3) \quad VSL \approx \frac{OP}{(P_0 - P_1)} = g(\text{other things})$$

32
33
34 A meta-analysis, which includes CV studies to expand the range of risk changes (or
35 types of risks) considered, not only accomplishes this objective but it also changes the
36 summary measure from an ex ante marginal rate of substitution to a linear approximation.
37 Unfortunately, this added condition makes it difficult to evaluate whether the resulting
38 differences in summary results should be attributed to these assumptions implicitly added
39 to the model, or to the expansion in the range or types of risks.

11.7 Emerging considerations

As recent unpublished research by Cameron and DeShazo seems to suggest, the terms identified in equations (1), (2), and (3) above, and other things, may well be very important to the ex ante option price measured for the risk change. This research is presently available only as early reports from a detailed contingent valuation study. Nonetheless, it reaffirms the notion that it may be important to evaluate the sensitivity of the conditional expectation of the VSL to the conditioning variables used in its construction.

The discussion also supported efforts to refocus attention on incremental willingness to pay for an *incremental risk change*, rather than the traditional, but potentially confusing construct that is a VSL. The panel's discussion urged EPA to consider including a preamble on the concept that is sought as a benefit measure, its likely link to the conditions of daily living and illness preceding death, as well as to any latency and temporal issues associated with exposure and increased risk of death.

The Panel recognizes that the current state of research makes it unlikely that empirical measures can imminently be developed that reflect all of these concerns. Nonetheless, the discussion led to a consensus that the Panel should urge Agency staff to consider careful qualification and sensitivity analysis for the measure used to monetize mortality risk reductions.

11.8 Which meta-analyses to use

In general, the Council Special Panel recommends that the Kochi et al. meta-analysis be excluded, for now, from the summaries used for determining one appropriate measure to use for the VSL. There are several reasons:

- (a) The Kochi study is still unpublished. Both Mrozek and Taylor [2001] and Viscusi and Aldy [2003] have appeared in the peer-reviewed literature.
- (b) [Smith, check edits] There are problems in the derivation of the variance of the VSL estimates. Some appear to be typographical errors. The researchers apparently faced some problems in terms of unobserved (or unreported) covariances among parameter estimates. However, it might be possible to derive estimates of variance in mean annual wage from CPS or other sources, and use this information to fill in some of the blanks. It is not clear whether one should use a predicted wage or an actual mean wage? Overall, this is a careful study but it needs to address the potential impact of some of its key assumptions on the results of the analysis before it is possible to assess their importance.
- (c) The use of author-specific means of VSL (p. H-12 to H-13) is troublesome if the different estimates have been derived from different samples.

1 The Panel recommends a primary focus, at this juncture, on the Viscusi-Aldy
2 estimates based on U.S. studies. Preferably, the variance estimates should be based on
3 the variance in the conditional expectation from the model.
4

5 11.9 Unpublished meta-analyses?

6 In general, we believe a peer-reviewed study will have greater professional credibility
7 than one that has not met this standard. The Panel has reservations about basing an
8 analysis with the gravity of the Second Prospective Analysis on unpublished research.
9 Should this study be peer-reviewed and in the literature by the time its results are needed,
10 its findings should be assimilated along with those of existing meta-analyses, including
11 Mrozek and Taylor (2002) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Each of these studies has
12 different advantages and shortcomings so that no single study should be the sole basis for
13 information about the distribution to be used for the VSL in the Second Prospective
14 Analysis.
15
16

12 QALY-BASED COST EFFECTIVENESS

12.1 Charge Question 24:

For the 812 Report, EPA has decided to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis of the Clean Air Act provisions using quality-adjusted life years as the measure of effectiveness. This is the standard approach used in medicine and public health and this type of analysis has previously been recommended by the SAB. Moreover, the recent NAS Report (2002) on benefits analysis discussed how this method could be applied to the health gains from air pollution control.

a. Do you agree that QALYs are the most appropriate measure of effectiveness for this type of analysis? Would you suggest any alternative measures to replace or supplement the QALY measure? (This question relates to effectiveness measures, not monetary benefit measures as used in benefit-cost analysis).

b. OMB has suggested that EPA plan a workshop with clinicians, social scientists, decision analysts and economists to examine how the specific diseases and health effects in the 812 Report should be handled with respect to longevity impact and health-related preference. Participants would have knowledge of the relevant clinical conditions, the related health preference studies, and the stated-preference literature in economics. The recent RFF conference has laid the groundwork for this type of workshop. Is there a superior approach to making sure that the CEAQALY project is executed in a technically competent fashion and that the details of the work receive in-depth technical input in addition to the broad oversight provided by this Committee?

c. Does the Council support the specific plans for QALY-based cost-effectiveness described in the current draft blueprint? If the Council does not support specific elements of these plans, are the alternative data, methods, or results presentation approaches which the Council recommends?

12.2 Summary of Council Response:

- QALY analysis should be undertaken to permit comparison of CAAA benefits with those of other public health programs. However, the Agency should be careful to emphasize that QALYs do not appear to be consistent with the utility-theoretic models that underlie benefit-cost analysis. A Workshop may be helpful, but its scope would need to be very carefully defined and the differences between cost-effectiveness analysis in the typical health context versus cost-effectiveness for certain health benefits of the CAAA would be an important dimension of the discussion.

12.3 Detailed Response

Prior advice from the Council did acknowledge that there are constituencies for which QALYs are a familiar metric for comparing the cost-effectiveness of different public programs, especially those with only single types of well-defined benefits. However, the lack of any rigorous utility-theoretic basis for QALYs makes them problematic. For example, Hammitt's papers (e.g. Hammitt, 2002) make clear the difficulties in assuming they are independent of economic circumstances. Furthermore, when benefits are heterogeneous, it is difficult to adjust QALYs to compensate. The technique typically involves a process analogous to the apportioning of joint costs, which is notoriously difficult.

Individual members of the current Council expressed a range of views on the plans for QALY-based cost-effectiveness analysis. Some members are concerned that QALYs do not appear to accurately reflect individuals' preferences for their own health and longevity, and so using QALYs as a measure of health benefits is inconsistent with attempting to aggregate individual preferences. Other members acknowledge this point but also recognize that QALY-based cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is widely used in other public-health domains and that some users of the Second Prospective Analysis will wish to compare the cost-effectiveness of the CAAA with that of other public health programs.

Recognizing the tension between these points of view, the Council recommends that EPA proceed with a QALY-based cost effectiveness analysis. However, the Agency is urged to present this CEA as an alternative analysis which is based on different assumptions about how to evaluate public health interventions that are unfortunately inconsistent with the standard welfare economics and benefit-cost analysis described in the rest of the Analytical Plan.

However, since the aim of presenting the CEA will be to facilitate comparison between the CAAA and other public health interventions, the Council recommends that the EPA analysis follow the "reference case" guidance established by the US Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Gold et al., 1996). The panel was convened by the US DHHS in order to evaluate CEA and propose best-practice guidelines. Although the panel recognized that there was uncertainty about the best practices, it recommended that all CEAs include a "reference case," conducted in accordance with a standard set of assumptions, in order to facilitate comparison among CEAs.

Some specific point of advice follow. First, the Council agrees that QALYs are the most appropriate measure of effectiveness to use for this analysis. As the primary purpose of conducting the CEA is to compare the CAAA with other programs that improve health of US citizens, it is appropriate to use the measure of health, QALYs, that is conventionally used in other CEA studies of public-health and medical interventions in the US. QALYs were endorsed for use in CEA by the US Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Gold et al., 1996) and are also commonly used in countries with which the US shares many economic and cultural values, e.g., the UK, Canada, and

1 Australia. The primary alternative measure, Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) is
2 less appropriate for this analysis because it is less often used in CEAs of health-
3 interventions in the US.

4
5 Second, the Council agrees that a workshop with clinicians, social scientists,
6 decision analysts and economists would be an effective way to examine how the specific
7 health endpoints can be best handled within the QALY framework. Given the likely
8 uncertainty about both the duration and utility weight associated with each condition,
9 however, the Council is uncertain as to the value of such a workshop.

10
11 An alternative approach would be to estimate the duration and utility weight
12 associated with each condition by review of the literature, as illustrated in Appendix J of
13 the Revised Analytic Plan, or by use of a generic health utility instrument, such as the
14 Health Utilities Index, the EQ-5D, or others. These systems provide a method for
15 characterizing health states using a vector of attributes. Each health state can be mapped
16 to attribute levels by surveying individuals with the health state, or obtaining the
17 judgments of clinicians or others with relevant expertise. Once the vector of attribute
18 levels is specified, the utility weight for the health state can be calculated using a simple
19 formula associated with the system. The use of generic utility instruments promotes
20 consistency in utility weights across conditions and CEAs, and was endorsed by the US
21 Panel (Gold et al., 1996).

22
23 However, when health states are characterized in terms of attributes with “utility
24 weights” by obtaining the judgments of clinicians or other experts, they should not be
25 regarded as having been derived under conditions that recognize consumer sovereignty.
26 They thus offer no basis for consistent quantity measures – days index at least weighted
27 by economic importance.

28
29 To provide in-depth technical input about the CEA analysis, the Council
30 recommends that a panel be designated to advise the Agency concerning this analysis.
31 CEA using QALYs is a well-developed field with a large literature on the effect of
32 alternative methods for estimating health weights and other choices, and it would be
33 useful for the Agency to have the advice of experts in this field. The Council Special
34 Panel does not have sufficient expertise in this area.

35
36 Overall, the Council supports the specific plans for the CEA described in the
37 Revised Analytic Plan. However, there are a few minor details that might be revised.

38
39 1) The plan states that health and longevity are “independent random variables.”
40 (p. 8-12). There are many kinds of independence and this sentence suggests the
41 idea of probabilistic independence. As applied to QALYs, multi-attribute utility
42 theory requires that these attributes are utility independent, which means that
43 preferences for lotteries on one attribute (e.g., longevity), holding the other
44 constant (health) do not depend on the level at which the second attribute is held
45 constant (see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Pliskin et al., 1980; Bleichrodt et al.,
46 1997).

1
2 2) The plan suggests that QALYs will be estimated for four health endpoints:
3 mortality, chronic bronchitis, chronic asthma, and nonfatal MI (p. 8-13), and that
4 COI estimates of the other health effects will be subtracted from the overall
5 compliance costs before calculating the cost-effectiveness ratio. It is standard
6 procedure in CEA to include in the cost term (the numerator), any incremental
7 medical costs or cost savings associated with the health effects that are
8 represented in QALYs in the denominator. In other words, medical cost savings
9 due to reducing the number of cases of chronic bronchitis, chronic asthma, and
10 nonfatal MIs should also be netted out of the numerator. In addition, there is some
11 disagreement about whether productivity losses of the affected individuals should
12 also be incorporated in the numerator. The Council suggests that this is an area in
13 which individuals with expertise in CEA could provide valuable input.
14

15 3) The plan says the gain in quality of life will be calculated by subtracting the
16 utility weight for a given health state from one. This may be incorrect, as it
17 implies that if a given condition is prevented (e.g., chronic bronchitis), the
18 affected individuals will live in perfect health (utility weight one). In fact, affected
19 individuals are unlikely to live in perfect health. Instead, they may suffer other
20 morbidities. In calculating the gain in QALYs, it is appropriate to subtract the
21 QALYs associated with the specific health condition from the expected QALYs if
22 the person were not so effected, as is done in Appendix J. Note this also implies
23 that the utility weight for the condition of concern (e.g., chronic bronchitis)
24 should include associated comorbidities.
25

26 12.4 Longer-range planning:

27
28 The Agency should look into the possibility of developing health quantity indexes
29 using preference calibration based on an underlying formal utility-theoretic model. This
30 approach would consistently standardize for economic circumstances. Alternatively, the
31 strategy could be to develop quantity indexes by type of effect (e.g. share weighted
32 averages of days). The shares could be defined based on value share expenditures and
33 quantity index derived as a Stone or other type of index derived (see Diewert (1993) on
34 index numbers). This index could be considered in relation to criteria for quantity
35 indexes.
36

13 MORBIDITY EFFECTS

13.1 Charge Question 25:

EPA plans to use updated unit values for a number of morbidity effects, as described in chapter 8. Of particular note, EPA plans to rely on a study by Dickie and Ulery (2002) to provide heretofore unavailable estimates of parental willingness to pay to avoid respiratory symptoms in their children. This study is not yet published and has limitations concerning response rate and sample representativeness; however, EPA expects the study to be published prior to completion of the economic valuation phase of this analysis. Does the Council support the application of unit values from this study, contingent on its acceptance for publication in a peer-reviewed journal? If the Council does not support reliance on this study, are there other data or methods for valuation of respiratory symptoms in children which the Council recommends?

13.2 Summary of Council Response:

- The Agency should continue to use WTP estimates for morbidity values, rather than COI estimates, should these be available. Where WTP is unavailable, COI estimates can be used as placeholders, awaiting further research, provided these decisions offer suitable caveats.
- The Dickie and Ulery study is a valuable addition to the repertoire of empirical results concerning WTP for acute respiratory illnesses and symptoms, although it is no so superior as to supercede all earlier studies.
- Values for “bad asthma days” might be approximated by transfer of results from respiratory-related minor restricted activity days, pending the development of updated results on this topic.
- The Analysis could still benefit from new estimates of WTP to reduce the risk of non-fatal heart attacks. Current COI estimates assuming average lost earnings over 5 years do not comport entirely with all evidence in the literature concerning employment and earnings effects.
- Where mortality valuations subsume pre-mortality morbidity, the Agency should be careful to avoid double-counting. Where values for the two health states—morbidity and lost life-years—can be separated, both should be counted.

The primary challenge for EPA in determining monetary values for morbidity health effects is to match the valuation to the definition of the health effect as defined in the studies being used as the basis for the concentration-response function. The Agency has

1 done a good job with this in applying the available literature and making appropriate
2 adjustments when possible, such as for the average severity for chronic bronchitis cases.
3 The Council cautions that this needs to continue to be taken into account as new health
4 effects and economic valuation studies become available. Improvements in matches may
5 be possible as new studies emerge.

6
7 The Council recommends that, in general, all available valuation studies that pass
8 reasonable quality and applicability standards should be considered when developing a
9 range of values for a particular morbidity category. Most studies have limitations but
10 these vary for different studies. Considering the results from all available studies
11 provides a more reliable basis for valuation and a more realistic picture of the uncertainty
12 in the estimates. It may be appropriate to give some studies more weight than others
13 based on their various strengths and weaknesses and relevance for a given health effect.

14
15 The Agency should continue to use willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates when these
16 are available rather than cost-of-illness (COI) estimates. However, it is useful to compare
17 available WTP estimates to available COI estimates as the Agency is doing for some
18 morbidity categories such as chronic bronchitis because this may help provide a general
19 sense of credibility for the WTP estimates that are based on survey elicitation or revealed
20 preference estimation approaches. However, it is important to recognize that the COI
21 estimates are not appropriate alternative estimates to be substituted for WTP estimates
22 because they do not reflect the preferred concept of valuation.

23
24 It is nevertheless appropriate to use COI estimates when WTP estimates are not
25 available, such as the Agency proposes for non-fatal heart attacks, and it is reasonable to
26 presume that this strategy typically understates WTP values. However, it is important to
27 keep in mind that an individual's WTP to prevent an illness may not fully reflect the costs
28 covered by insurance. This could result in a situation where a COI value may exceed an
29 individual's WTP when medical costs are substantial and are covered to a significant
30 extent by health insurance.

31 32 13.3 Acute respiratory illnesses and symptoms

33
34 Dickie and Ulery (2002) is a good addition to the WTP literature for acute
35 respiratory illnesses, and should be included in the set of studies used as the basis for the
36 values for these health effects. As noted in the charge question, this study has limitations
37 related to sample representation and response rates, but it was a well-designed study with
38 a general population sample. The Dickie and Ulery study is not so superior that it should
39 supercede all previous studies; it should simply be added to the pool of studies available
40 for valuing acute respiratory illness or symptoms in adults.

41
42 The Council urges some caution in interpreting the Dickie and Ulery results in the
43 context of previous morbidity studies. The estimates are based on an unrepresentative
44 convenience sample of Mississippi households that are more educated and have higher
45 incomes than the general population. In addition, the authors employ a repeated

contingent valuation elicitation format. This format has not been subject to the validity testing of more conventional formats. When the problem involves eliciting tradeoffs among multiple symptoms, durations, and costs, stated-choice conjoint analysis is an alternative with better-known theoretical and empirical properties.

Dickie and Ulery provide information on WTP values for preventing acute respiratory illness in children that has not been available from previous studies. The results suggest that parents value the prevention of acute respiratory illness in their children at about twice the value they place on the same prevention for themselves. The estimates of WTP values for preventing illnesses in children from this study are appropriate to use for comparable pollution-related health effects, and the ratio of values for adults to those for children is appropriate to use when only adult values are available. It would also be appropriate to compare adult values for the same illnesses from other studies, adjusted using this ratio, to the results from Dickie and Ulery for children.

In Dickie and Ulery's Table 7 they report results from other WTP studies. Overall, the Dickie and Ulery results suggest that the current Agency values for respiratory illnesses, especially for children, are probably too low. This table also raises questions about the estimates selected for use in the previous Prospective Analysis; those numbers are generally lower than the numbers shown in the Dickie and Ulery table although based on similar set of studies. These apparent differences in the interpretation of the previous literature need to be reconciled.

It would also be useful to take a look at the results of Johnson et al. (2000). Although this study was done in Canada it was a nicely designed choice format approach for valuation of short-term respiratory and cardiovascular symptoms of varying severities. Given the limited number of U.S. studies, the uncertainties about differences in preferences between the U.S. and Canada may be acceptable given the additional information the study provides. An important concern with the Canadian study is that the health care type payment vehicle may be affected by the availability in Canada of a public health care system. One Council member (who is also an author of this study) noted that all health care costs are not covered by the Canadian health care system. This is similar to the situation in the United States where many people have health insurance, but some out-of-pocket expenses are still incurred.

13.4 Asthma exacerbations

The HES has recommended that asthma exacerbations be added back into the base case estimates, so some economic valuation of these will be needed. The Agency stopped using the estimates of WTP for preventing a "bad asthma day" (Rowe and Chestnut, 1985), because of concerns about matching the definition of a bad asthma day to the epidemiology results used to calculate asthma exacerbations. The endpoint was defined in the original study to reflect the heterogeneity in the severity of asthma symptoms in a particular panel of asthma patients.

1 However, the challenges of matching available valuation estimates to the
2 epidemiology evidence is an issue for all of the acute respiratory illnesses or symptoms.
3 Rather than exclude a study because of these transfer uncertainty issues, it may be
4 preferable to consider all the available valuation studies on respiratory symptoms such as
5 coughing, wheezing or shortness of breath for those with diagnosed asthma and the
6 general population.
7

8 As a whole, these studies suggest a reasonable range of WTP values for these types
9 of symptoms. Preventing asthma exacerbations can be presumed to be at least as valuable
10 as preventing similar symptoms in the general population, and the HES has noted that
11 asthma exacerbations are likely to result in some level of activity restriction. Thus, even
12 if a specific value for preventing asthma exacerbations is uncertain given available
13 information, it may be reasonable to presume that preventing an asthma exacerbation is at
14 least as valuable as preventing a respiratory-related minor restricted activity day.
15

16 13.5 Non-fatal heart attack

17
18 Lacking a WTP estimate for reducing the risk of having a non-fatal heart attack,
19 EPA is basing a valuation for this effect on a COI estimate. This will likely understate the
20 total welfare effect, as acknowledged by the Agency. It is reasonable to presume a
21 hospitalization for non-fatal heart attack, and the 5-year medical costs seem appropriate
22 as there is often significant follow-up treatment after an initial heart attack. However, it
23 does remain somewhat uncertain whether air pollution exposure causes a heart attack that
24 would not have otherwise occurred, or merely causes it to occur earlier than it otherwise
25 would have. This cannot be determined based on the available epidemiology results for
26 this health effect. It remains an important research question whether air pollution is a
27 factor contributing to the development of the underlying coronary heart disease (as it has
28 been associated with onset of some chronic respiratory diseases). However, a heart attack
29 does cause damage that might not have otherwise occurred until much later, if at all, so it
30 is appropriate to include follow-up costs linked to the heart attack.
31

32 Krupnick and Cropper (1990) is cited as the source of estimates on lost earnings
33 resulting from non-fatal heart attack. This study provide results of a unique analysis that
34 may not be available elsewhere in which labor force participation, and reduced earnings
35 for those who remain employed, are *both* estimated for several chronic health conditions.
36 The data used for this analysis, however, are fairly dated as they are drawn from a Social
37 Security survey on disabilities conducted in 1978.
38

39 Results from Krupnick and Cropper show a decline in earnings through age 65 for
40 those who experience a first heart attack between age 45 and 54, but no significant loss in
41 earnings for those aged 55 and older, or for those under age 45. This is not consistent
42 with the assumption used in the proposed estimates which is that everyone suffers the
43 average earnings lost for 5 years only. Wages can be updated to current levels. However,
44 if treatments for heart attack have changed significantly since 1978, then estimated
45 effects on employment and earning may be out-of-date.

13.6 Chronic Bronchitis

Charge Question 15 asks whether premature mortality implications of morbidity endpoints should be added. The HES recommendation is that mortality risks from chronic conditions caused by air pollution exposure should be presumed to be captured in the prospective cohort studies, and they have recommended against alternative estimates that totally exclude the prospective cohort mortality risk studies. Thus, adding mortality risks associated with chronic conditions that have been linked to pollution exposures in other studies would potentially result in double counting mortality risks. Consistent with this interpretation, the valuations for the chronic illnesses should not include value for any associated increase in mortality risk.

The results in Viscusi et al. (1991) provide the basis for the chronic bronchitis valuation estimates. Respondents to this survey were not told anything about changes in life expectancy associated with the condition so there is no reason to expect their responses to reflect any significant concern for this.

14 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS - PLANS

14.1 Charge Question 26:

Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for estimating and reporting uncertainty associated with the benefit and cost estimates developed for this study? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data, models, or methods the Council recommends?

14.2 Summary of Council Response

- The Revised Analytical Plan sets ambitious goals for improved treatment of uncertainty. However, due to the lack of detail in Chapter 9, the Council Panel has had some difficulty in evaluating the proposed actions implementing those plans.
- The Second Prospective Analysis should address the pervasiveness of uncertainty in cost and benefit estimates. Those elements that are both highly uncertain and have a significant impact on the results should be the focus of sensitivity analyses. Sensitivity/uncertainty analysis needs to be an iterative process to identify and assess the significance of key uncertainties in each step of the assessment. Only a selected set of the most influential uncertainties should be quantitatively followed all the way through to the final results.
- The Council advises the Agency to develop its uncertainty analyses with reference to the recommendations in reports of the National Research Council (2002) and OMB (2003). It also advises the Agency to use the list of “key uncertainties” from the first Prospective Analysis as a framework.

14.3 Detailed Comments

The Revised Analytical Plan sets ambitious goals for improved treatment of uncertainty. However, due to the lack of detail in Chapter 9, the Council Panel has had some difficulty in evaluating the proposed actions implementing those plans.

The Agency proposes to follow the guidance in the National Research Council (2002) and in the September 2001 Council report, which recommended that “parameter uncertainty, and as many types of model uncertainty as possible, be treated within a probabilistic framework.” (page 9-4) Chapter 9, however, is relatively brief. It provides mainly broad discussion, with little additional specific content on how uncertainty analysis will be accomplished.

1 The Plan discusses utilization of an expert in the field of uncertainty analysis and
2 developing a lexicon and taxonomy. The Council agrees that it is important to have a
3 common language and agreed-upon methods for analysis of uncertainty. However, the
4 Council believes that NAS (2002), and Council (September, 2001) reports, and various
5 standard references cited in these and other reports such as OMB (2003) already provide
6 the Agency with a workable taxonomy and a basis to implement uncertainty analysis.

7
8 The Agency has suggested uncertainty analysis projects in four specific areas:
9

- 10 a) A pilot project to use expert judgment to better characterize the current
11 state of knowledge about the concentration-response function for PM induced
12 mortality;
13 b) A meta-analysis of ozone mortality concentration response coefficients;
14 c) An attempt to characterize better the uncertainty in estimating the changes
15 in air pollution concentrations likely to result from emissions reductions;
16 d) An investigation of uncertainty in estimates of air pollution control costs.
17

18 Based on briefings received at its November 5-6, 2003 meeting, The Council also
19 understands that the Agency no longer intends to undertake a study of the uncertainty in
20 estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL), an additional area that was also discussed
21 in the draft Analytical Plan.
22

23 The Council advises the Agency to develop the uncertainty analyses plans listed
24 above with reference to the recommendations in the above-mentioned reports. It also
25 advises the Agency to use the list of “key uncertainties” from the first Prospective
26 Analysis as a framework.
27

28 The Council and its subcommittees have considered three of the four⁵ specific
29 proposed efforts for addressing uncertainty and have provided more-detailed comments
30 on each of them elsewhere (either in this report or in the supporting HES report). Our
31 comments about each plan are summarized below:
32

- 33 a) PM Expert Judgment Pilot Project – The Council generally supports the
34 use of expert judgment to inform policy analysis; commends the EPA for moving in
35 this direction; understands their hesitancy to move too quickly; supports the pilot
36 study; questions whether it is advantageous to use the results of the pilot study in
37 support of a major regulatory initiative; advises that the project be subjected to a
38 careful peer review; and urges the EPA to invest adequate resources, time and
39 managerial attention to further development of this approach so that it can be used to
40 inform the Third Prospective Review of the Clean Air Act. See the HES report,
41 especially CQ29, for further detail.
42

⁵Plans for this fourth project will be addressed by the Council’s Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee when the Agency has more details about the choice of models and the modeling protocols that would be employed.

1 b) Ozone Mortality Meta-analysis – While a meta-analysis of ozone
2 mortality data may be useful, we do not regard the plan for uncertainty analysis on
3 ozone as adequate. See the HES report, especially CQ30, for further detail.
4

5 c) Control Cost Uncertainty Analysis -- The Council believes that the focus
6 of this project on uncertainty in engineering cost-estimates is poorly founded and
7 recommends greater attention to issues such as – (i) what is left out or not counted in
8 the cost estimates (welfare effects, process and productivity changes); (ii) uncertainty
9 about the introduction and penetration of new technologies (e.g., penetration of
10 alternative fuel vehicles); (iii) economic changes (energy prices, aggregate economic
11 activity, and (iv) the extent of learning in different industries -- in future efforts in
12 this area. See the Council response to Q27 for further detail.
13

14 Uncertainty analysis is vital to the integrity of the Prospective Analysis. Thus, the
15 Council Special Panel also recommends that the Agency take the following steps to
16 strengthen its overall approach: (i) provide an explicit description or justification of the
17 rationale underlying the identification of these areas as the critical targets for improved
18 characterization of uncertainty; (ii) develop a strategy for using the results from these
19 specific projects to better characterize the extent of the uncertainty in estimates of the net
20 benefits expected from the Clean Air Act; and (iii) provide sufficient detail about the
21 specific plans for the projects listed above to permit a constructive critical review of the
22 Agency's plans. The Council sees this area as a priority for the Agency and for the
23 advice it will provide to strengthen the 812 process.
24

25 While the Council recognizes the evolutionary nature of EPA's development and use
26 of methodologies for uncertainty analysis, it is unfortunate that the text of Chapter 9 does
27 not contain more specific plans for identifying which are the most important factors
28 underlying cost and benefit uncertainties, and for developing appropriate methodological
29 approaches to characterize such uncertainties. Uncertainty analysis should be carried out
30 as an iterative process, using initial characterizations of uncertainty to guide subsequent
31 efforts to characterize important uncertainties more precisely using available data and
32 expert judgment.⁶
33

34 In Chapter 9 the Agency mentions that it plans to develop an approach that "will
35 involve EPA experts working together to identify the major sources of uncertainty in
36 (emissions and air quality modeling) and then working with a combination of off-line
37 tools and formal and informal elicitation processes to develop a representation of
38 uncertainty in emissions and, perhaps, key air chemistry calculations that can be used in
39 downstream analysis." (page 9-7) Such an "alternative approach" to traditional
40 deterministic cost-benefit analysis seems like an excellent objective for the Agency,
41 consistent with the recommendations of NAS (2002) and the September 2001 Council
42 report. The Council Panel is not aware of detailed plans to develop this "alternative
43 approach". Without further detail it is difficult for the Council to offer constructive
44 criticism of these plans.

⁶ Discussions of the iterative nature of uncertainty analysis are found in standard references such as Morgan and Henrion (1990, see especially p. 40), Howard (1968), and Clemen (1996).

1
2 During the six month period since the Analytical Plan and the charge questions
3 were initially presented to the Council, many of the activities described in Chapter 9 have
4 been initiated, and the PM expert judgment pilot project has been nearly completed.
5 The Council suggests that the Agency may wish to develop more detailed plans for its
6 uncertainty analysis for review by the Council in early 2004, after the pilot project on PM
7 mortality has been completed. We recommend that the Agency again review the
8 guidance and references cited in the 2002 National Research Council report (especially
9 chapter 5), the September 2001 Council report, and the 2003 OMB report.

10
11 An important goal for the Second 812 Report should be the identification of the
12 most important uncertainties associated with the costs and benefits of air pollution, so
13 that the Agency can more effectively target research and improved analytical methods to
14 reduce uncertainties and improve the characterization of remaining uncertainties in
15 subsequent 812 analyses of the costs and benefits of air pollution. The Council believes
16 that more emphasis should be placed on identifying key uncertainties and associated
17 research priorities.

18
19 The Council suggests that the list of “key uncertainties” from the First Prospective
20 Study (Table 9-1) could play a larger and more important role in developing the approach
21 to characterizing uncertainties in costs and benefits (and consequent decisions about the
22 most valuable allocation of scarce analytical resources). The Council hopes the guidance
23 from its current report(s), and further interaction between Agency staff and the Council in
24 2004, can lead to an improved plan for characterizing these uncertainties in the most
25 effective way for the Second Analysis, given the time and resource constraints under
26 which the Agency must carry out the Second Analysis.

1

2

15 COMPLIANCE COST PILOT PROJECT

3 15.1 Charge Question 27:

4

5 Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for the pilot project to
6 develop probability-based estimates for uncertainty in the compliance cost estimates? If
7 the Council does not support this pilot project, or any particular aspect of its design, are
8 there alternative approaches to quantifying uncertainty in cost estimates for this analysis
9 which the Council recommends?

10

11 15.2 Summary of Council Response

12

- 13 • Just including uncertainty in engineering costs is an important improvement over
14 the First Prospective Analysis. But uncertainty in more than just engineering cost
15 estimates should be explored. Other sources of cost uncertainty will also be
16 important and should not be neglected.

17

18 The pilot project on costs described in Chapter 9 is EPA's major new effort for
19 examining uncertainty with respect to costs. The proposed analysis will attempt to
20 identify the key parameters of existing cost models, and then attempt to quantify
21 uncertainty around these (primarily engineering) cost parameters. The Council sees this
22 as a reasonable initial approach to examining uncertainty on the cost side, especially if
23 the cost variation is a reflection of learning and/or technological progress that will likely
24 occur over the 20 year horizon of the analysis. However, the nature of the uncertainty
25 being measured is not completely clear from the description. In general, the Council
26 would like to urge the EPA to be as transparent as possible about the types of uncertainty
27 in costs and how each are treated in the analysis.

28 15.3 Engineering Costs

29

30 An exclusive focus on quantifying engineering control costs would be likely to
31 understate overall cost uncertainties. However, starting with uncertainties in engineering
32 compliance costs is natural because engineering estimates of capital and operating costs
33 are certainly the most visible types of costs that are directly attributable to regulatory
34 compliance. And the very fact that there has been little effort in the past to assess
35 uncertainties in these probably warrants some effort, particularly in the light of (1) the
36 enormous effort that is going in to quantification of uncertainty on the benefits side, and
37 (2) the extensive history of ex ante overestimation of costs from a variety of past
38 regulatory actions, including, the sulfur dioxide rules of the 1990 CAAA.

39

15.4 Sensitivity or Influence Analysis

The plan is to perform a type of sensitivity or influence analysis to determine what parameters of the various cost models (e.g. IPM and ControlNet) have the greatest effect on overall cost estimates. These parameters could include, for example, the coefficient on the cost of SCNR capital or the price of certain precious metals for catalysts. The Council sees this as a reasonable way to identify the key parameters driving costs within the cost models being used in the analysis. However, there can also be *model* uncertainty – the models may not reflect how the regulations will be implemented over time.

15.5 Other Sources of Cost Uncertainty

Although the engineering costs are a reasonable place to start looking at cost uncertainties, the Council strongly urges the EPA to delineate all areas of cost uncertainty and explore others in this analysis. It seems likely that considerable additional uncertainty in costs pertains to what is left out or not counted in the cost estimates (tax interaction effects, process and productivity changes), uncertainty about the introduction and penetration of new technologies (e.g. penetration of alternative fuel vehicles), economic changes (energy prices, aggregate economic activity), and the extent of learning in different industries. Some of these may be included in the scenarios, such as the influence of uncertainty in future energy prices, but others could be considered for future uncertainty efforts.

15.6 Indirect Costs

Another area that could be explored is the magnitude of indirect costs. Direct environmental control costs are measured or calculated, but productivity effects, process changes, etc. are not included as part of these costs. There are empirical studies of these effects that could be drawn on to calculate distributions. For example, the non-environmental costs increase by some expected amount as a result of the requirement to abate in an affected industry (e.g. draw on a study by Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih, 2001; Barbera and McConnell, 1990, and others).

15.7 Learning Assumptions

Learning effects have been documented in manufacturing, as the manufacture of more units is associated with reduced unit costs at a predictable rate as efficiencies are realized in utilizing available equipment and modernizing designs in the light of practical operating experience. It is well worth assessing the body of experience in how the increasingly widespread use of particular types of pollution control equipment is associated with similar reductions in unit capital and operating costs.

One area of promise for uncertainty analysis is to allow some uncertainty around the learning assumptions discussed in Chapter 4. There are some empirical studies, and possibilities to elicit expert judgment about learning for different industries, or processes. The study distributed by the EPA “Assessing the Impact of Progress and Learning curves on Clean Air Act Compliance Costs,” (Manson et al 2002) provides a literature review and summary of the issue. This study suggests three reasons costs may change over time - learning by doing over time, innovation and technological change, and cost-reducing changes in regulatory design.

The study focuses only on the first of these, and shows some of the empirical analyses that have been done to estimate such learning for scrubbers and NO_x source reductions. In chapter 4, the draft Analytical Plan seems to be assuming an 80% rule on this type of learning for many industries. Some quantitative uncertainty analysis around this rule including sensitivity around how long learning persists over time could be done for the industries where learning is assumed.

15.8 Compliance and Enforcement Assumptions and Consistency Requirements

In general, the costs and emissions reductions components of the uncertainty analysis must be consistent. There is a common “80% rule” concerning practical rates of compliance with environmental regulations that should not be confused with a similar rule concerning learning and productivity effects. This incomplete compliance reduces costs, but is also associated with a corresponding 20% reduction in likely benefits that would be achieved with full compliance with the implemented rules. To the extent that uncertainty in costs reflects uncertainty in what controls are used or in how effectively they are used, emissions will also be affected. Compliance assumptions are worth assessing in more detail and are well worth including as part of an overall uncertainty analysis.

If it is being assumed that there is 100% compliance with all regulations (except with I/M programs where now 80% compliance is assumed), then the costs are likely higher than estimated by engineering costs. Enforcement costs could be substantial to ensure 100% compliance. Emissions and costs assumptions must be consistent (i.e. if no enforcement costs are included, then emissions reductions should be lower than currently estimated).

15.9 Remaining Questions

The uncertainty on the engineering cost function parameters being measured appears to be only measurement uncertainty associated with size or capacity of the control unit, (uncertainty in the estimated parameters in equation (1) on page 9-10). Are these engineering cost functions based on data from actual plant level data? Or, are they calculated costs from engineering models of the underlying technology?

1 The Council would like more information on how the cost functions are determined,
2 and how the distributions around the parameters would be estimated for the uncertainty
3 analysis. Does the measurement uncertainty being estimated reflect any learning that
4 might occur over time with cumulative production?

5
6 The first prospective analysis does sensitivity analyses of certain input parameters in
7 some of the cost estimations. Is the Agency still planning to do any sensitivity analysis,
8 beyond the influence analysis suggested for examining the most important parameters in
9 the engineering cost functions?

10
11 There should be some evaluation of possible changes in productivity. It should be
12 noted that purchasing new capital equipment, which may sometimes occur as part of
13 modernization efforts stimulated by compliance requirements, may have positive as well
14 as negative influences on productivity.

16 DATA QUALITY AND INTERMEDIATE DATA PRODUCTS

16.1 Charge Question 32:

Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 10 for evaluating the quality of data inputs and analytical outputs associated with this study, including the planned publication of intermediate data products and comparison of intermediate and final results with other data or estimates? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative approaches, intermediate data products, data or model comparisons, or other data quality criteria the Council recommends? Please consider EPA's Information Quality Guidelines in this regard.

16.2 Summary of Council Response

- The validation exercises described in Chapter 10 of the Draft Plan are necessary and appropriate, but a number of pitfalls, limitations and qualifications are noted.
- The revised Analytical Plan, by itself, is insufficiently clear about what it envisions as "meta-data" for public dissemination. It is not necessarily raw data, but pre-processed data that can be used to replicate intermediate results. The Agency needs clearer guidelines concerning the type and scope of information that will be made public during the course of the analysis and what will be provided only when the analysis is complete.
- Preliminary release of raw data, intermediate data, intermediate models, and other analytical components will certainly improve the transparency of the benefit-cost exercise, but may result in substantial costs to the Agency. The Council supports contemporaneous release along with the final Analysis (or even ex post release of intermediate data and models) as a tool to inform future Prospective Analyses, but not necessarily the current analysis.
- In considering the future of the Section 812 analytical process and the sharing of intermediate data and models with outside researchers, the Agency may wish to consider more fully some alternative mechanisms for engaging third-party researchers in validation exercises. Peer review of requests for data or models, focused calls for external activity, and collaboration or other formalized interactions with external researchers might be considered.
- The outlined activities in the Intermediate Data Products section are, in many cases, simply too terse to permit thorough evaluation by the Council. Some examples of useful intermediate and related data might have been suggested.

- The Stanford Energy Modeling Forum offers a potential useful approach for evaluating analytical strategies that could be adapted to the needs of the Agency in future Prospective Analyses.
- It is difficult to evaluate the Agency’s plans for Intermediate Data Products with respect to Scenario Development because the range of proposed scenarios seems still to be evolving.
- Obviously, consistency checking is important throughout the Analysis, not just ex post. It is also important for the Analytical Plan to be clearer about what is to be compared in consistency checks and how big a difference would be enough to worry about.
- Before comparing the intermediate results of the Second Prospective Analysis with other sources of similar information, it will be important that there be some theoretical basis for expecting similarities. Comparisons based on the out-of-sample extensions of models estimated in very different contexts should be subjected to particular scrutiny.
- Along with a careful accounting of differences between the Second Prospective Analysis and other analyses, there must be an effort to understand the most likely sources of any differences.
- The Agency may have the resources or the authority to assemble intermediate data that would also be valuable to other researchers but is not presently generally available. In the process of encouraging external consistency checking, the Agency could create public goods of great value to the external research community.
- In future Prospective Analyses, consistency checks might be expanded to include assessments of the degree of correspondence between model predictions and other major sources of data about economic activity, emissions profiles, and estimates of health and ecosystem benefits.

16.3 General Advice

The Agency plans to rely upon two methods for enhancing data quality:

- (a.) publishing detailed model outputs to expose the data to scrutiny by third parties (Intermediate Data Products); and
- (b.) comparing certain “produced data” (eg, model output) with counterpart real data (Consistency Checks).

These are both good ideas and will clearly strengthen the findings of the Second Prospective Analysis. Given the time constraints faced by the Agency in meeting the

1 mandated schedule for Section 812 Analyses, the Council supports these two methods.
2 Over the longer term, however, and looking toward future Analyses, a relevant question,
3 however, is whether the planned validation exercises will continue to be sufficient. In the
4 Council's view, these current strategies constitute an appropriate approach to validation
5 under time and resource constraints, but more could potentially be done in each of these
6 two categories in future Analyses.

7
8 The discussion that follows reflects the thoughts of Council members concerning
9 the general task of "validation." The Council recognizes that the term validation means
10 something very specific to the agency. The Council uses the term in this report in the
11 more general sense. The Council does not intend that the Agency should immediately
12 comply with all of these suggestions. Instead, the Council's intent is to provide some
13 reflections on the Agency's current strategy and where it might lead (as information
14 technologies evolve and if sufficient resources could be made available).

15
16 With respect to the first of the two validation approaches (i.e., publishing detailed
17 model outputs, termed Intermediate Data Products), many third parties will be interested
18 in more than just model output. One reasonable objective is to enhance confidence in
19 the main results by validating the computations used in various modeling components.
20 For instance, to ascertain whether a CGE model is producing reliable results, validation
21 involves examining far more than just the outputs – one needs to "look under the hood."
22 Third parties will be interested not only in data inputs, but in the algorithms used in
23 intermediate calculations. For instance, abatement cost curves may be important inputs
24 into a cost model and their assumed or estimated nature will be of significant relevance to
25 validation exercises. The Council suggests that the Agency keep in mind the broader
26 research value of making available to outside researchers, where possible, not just the
27 data articulated in Figure 10-1, but the key intermediate data used in the sequence of
28 models and the algorithms used to process it..

29
30 The second of the two approaches: consistency checks--comparing produced data with
31 counterpart real data--is a great idea a priori. However, this endeavor is limited by the
32 availability of appropriate real data. In the case of direct costs and CGE results, it is
33 suggested that comparisons will be made with the PACE data. Although this is a lofty
34 goal, it is unclear exactly how this will be accomplished. The devil is in the details. How
35 will data on expenditures specifically for pollution control be compared to abatement
36 costs under a counterfactual scenario, let alone the data for total economic costs? In
37 principle, this is a worthwhile undertaking, but the Council strongly encourages that these
38 proposed methods be fleshed out in greater detail.

40 16.4 Advice from Council Subcommittees

41
42 As noted above, the Council focused its discussions of intermediate data products
43 on scenario development, direct cost estimation, economic valuation of benefits, and
44 computable general equilibrium results. It did discuss advice, in addition, from the the

1 Health Effects Subcommittee and the Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee. Advice
2 arising from the work of those subcommittees are noted below.

3
4 The Council supports the Agency's plan to make available through its web site the
5 intermediate information and data products produced in the course of the 812 analysis.
6 The BENMAP system demonstrated to Health Effects Subcommittee appears to be an
7 invaluable tool for both generation and widespread understanding of the analysis and its
8 results. In particular, it will enhance understanding of the assumptions used in
9 constructing the aggregates of results, as well as the consequences of alternative
10 aggregation approaches and assumptions.

11
12 It may be helpful for the Agency to perform some other consistency checks on the
13 air quality from emissions and predicted population exposures in the form of calculations
14 of regional or national "intake fractions" (ratios of total population aggregate intake to
15 aggregate emissions) for pollutants that are not thought to result from secondary reactions
16 in the atmosphere. Finally some comparison of predicted and observed levels of
17 monitored pollutants should be possible, at least for the year 2000. [TAC: Needs more
18 explanation]

19
20 One missing element of the discussion is a plan to utilize the results of these
21 "consistency checks" to derive useful feedback for both the main effect estimations and
22 the various parts of the uncertainty analysis.

23
24 On the emissions side, one important type of input into the assessment of emissions
25 uncertainties can be the amount of change (and the reasons for change) between older and
26 newer estimates of particular emissions from particular classes of sources for recent past
27 years. For example, compare previous year-2000 emissions estimates and more recent
28 estimates for the same or a comparable year. In discussions with the Air Quality
29 Modeling Subcommittee, the following steps were suggested to analyze the implications
30 of such revisions:

- 31 a) Assess and document the changes. The material presented in Exhibit 8 (of
32 Chapter 2) and the accompanying text is a good start on this process.
- 33 b) Try to understand the reasons for the changes; and what they imply about the
34 likely uncertainty in the revised estimates.
- 35 c) Assess the degree of "surprise" (i.e. where possible, compare the extent of
36 each change with the prior belief about the uncertainty in the estimate).

37 Historically, even in fields with well-established procedures for estimating
38 uncertainties (such as measurements of elementary particle masses by physicists), it is
39 found that traditional statistical procedures for estimating standard errors, etc.
40 systematically understate actual uncertainties as later calculated by comparing improved
41 measurements with older measurements and previously estimated uncertainties. For some
42 examples, see Shlyakhter and Kammen (1992), Shlyakhter (1994a, 1994b) and Hattis and
43 Burmaster (1994).

1 These surprises occur because traditional statistical uncertainty estimation
2 approaches tend to be based solely on random sampling-error uncertainties in the data,
3 neglecting what frequently turn out to be appreciable systematic or calibration errors (see
4 Shlyakhter (1994a, 1994b)). Developing fair estimates of uncertainties for the CAAA
5 benefit and cost projections will require analysts to have inputs that can be interpreted in
6 terms of both types of uncertainty. Systematic evaluation of the extent and reasons for
7 changes in successive sets of emissions estimates will be a start toward providing
8 invaluable inputs to the overall uncertainty analysis.

9 On the health side, there is an opportunity to document the history of changing
10 estimates of the overall magnitude of the particle-related mortality problem, as indexed
11 by successively more refined measures of particle exposure—from smoke shade to total
12 suspended particulate to sulfate, to PM10 and now PM2.5. From the magnitude and the
13 trends indicated from these comparisons, the expert elicitees could perhaps be led to
14 adjust/expand their current uncertainty estimates in the light of plausible opportunities for
15 refining our risk assessments further in the next decade or two—e.g. effects of still-
16 smaller sized particles, improved dosimeters based on particle mass deposited in specific
17 respiratory locations, particle surface area or particle number metrics, and particles from
18 higher vs lower potency sources, etc.

19 Another suggestion is that although the text of the Analytical Plan refers to data
20 controls, there is considerable value in having clearly stated data quality objectives and a
21 specific comprehensive data quality assurance (QA) protocol. These objectives should be
22 derived from the context of the 812 analysis and should guide the design and presentation
23 of the intermediate data projects to best serve the needs of specific audiences for the data.
24 Discussion among the group identified two broad types of users whose differing needs
25 should be kept in mind: (1) policy and staff advisors whose main goal may be to just
26 understand the basis of the 812 analysis and its conclusions, and also (2) highly
27 sophisticated analysts who wish to do their own professional evaluations of specific risk
28 and benefit issues based on some of the data generated by EPA and its 812 analysis
29 contractors. With the needs of these two groups in mind, the disclosure and ready
30 availability of the intermediate data products should greatly enhance the value of the 812
31 analysis for both public and private sector decision-makers.

33 16.5 Intermediate data products

34
35 In regard to meta-data for validation, in general, the Council supports the Agency's
36 efforts to post, to an accessible web-site, the "meta data" associated with the Benefit-Cost
37 Analysis of the CAAA. The stated rationale is to enable outside researchers to use and
38 quality-check the data employed in the Second Prospective Analysis.

39
40 The Council, like the Health Effects Subcommittee, would have preferred a clearer
41 presentation of just what intermediate data products and models the Agency plans to
42 release to outside researchers, either during the course of the analysis, or ex post. The
43 Council expressed its need for a clearer understanding of what will constitute "meta-data"
44 in order to react to this suggestion. In the Council Special Panel teleconference of

1 September 24, 2003, the Agency clarified that the elementary data, such as the emissions
2 data used in developing the forecasting scenarios, is voluminous and unwieldy. The files
3 are huge. For smaller samples of data that are well-documented, the original data and
4 any non-proprietary models used to process it should be made available to competent
5 researchers and stakeholders so that they may conduct their own analyses and validations.
6

7 Questions put to the Agency during the Council's teleconferences revealed that the
8 Agency does not plan to post data to the Web before it has been thoroughly reviewed and
9 vetted. In the course of the October 23, 2003 teleconference, it was made clear to the
10 Council that public release of selected meta-data and modeling information is intended to
11 encourage feedback on the strategies used in the Second Prospective Analysis that will
12 inform future Prospective Analyses. The mandated schedule for the Second Prospective
13 Analysis is simply too tight to allow the Agency to wait for additional outside analysis
14 and corresponding feedback prior to finalizing the Second Prospective Analysis. The
15 Council concurs that access to modeling inputs by interested parties can help ensure
16 another layer of independent review.
17

18 The Council acknowledges that the enabling legislation for the 812 process
19 specifically designates whom the Agency should consult in preparing its Analyses.
20 Broad stakeholder input is apparently not intended. In this light, the Council agrees that
21 it is important to recognize that publicly released details of the Analytical Plan will be of
22 great interest to at least two different constituencies: policy-makers and research
23 analysts. Members of each group will have different abilities to take advantage of any
24 posted data and will have different interests in terms of what is made available. It will be
25 challenging for the Agency to deal effectively with both types of consumers.
26

27 The Agency must be aware that providing the enormous amount of information
28 listed in Chapter 10 of the Revised Analytical Plan, developing adequate documentation
29 for these data, and supporting access and use by outsiders is a potentially costly and time-
30 consuming undertaking, even if these data are to be made available only ex post with
31 respect to the Second Prospective Analysis. In some cases, the relevant databases are
32 available to the public elsewhere. In other cases, complete provision will be hampered by
33 the proprietary nature of some of the data or models.
34

35 If the goal behind public release of these data is to allow other researcher to quality-
36 check Agency result, it is unclear how researchers can accomplish this without access to
37 extensive model documentation and the models themselves. For example, intermediate
38 data products may involve modeling outputs such as CGE results, rather than raw data.
39 In particular, as EPA notes elsewhere, aggregate valuation summaries require careful
40 discussion of assumptions and caveats to avoid misinterpretation. These explanations
41 presumably will not be available in full until the Second Prospective Analysis is
42 finalized. This lack of preliminary documentation could make any preliminary release of
43 data or models less useful to outside researchers and/or more costly for the Agency to
44 support. The Council's concerns on this dimension are lessened by the new information
45 that preliminary release is not the Agency's intention. This was not clear from the
46 Revised Analytical Plan.

1
2 Finally, there is always the risk that intermediate results will take on a life of their
3 own. Stakeholders may overreact to preliminary estimates, diverting additional staff
4 resources to manage subsequent public-relations problems. There is a tradeoff between
5 the social value of improved transparency and the resource costs of achieving it.
6

7 16.6 Proposal for problem-oriented meta-data provision

8

9 The Council feels, nevertheless, that the Agency's interest in involving outside
10 researchers in the analysis is admirable as a guiding principle for future Prospective
11 Analyses. The Council considered a number of speculative proposals about how this
12 process could potentially evolve. The following proposals should not be construed as
13 direct advice to the Agency, but as the product of the Council's brainstorming concerning
14 some of the issues raised in the Draft Analytical Plan.
15

16 One approach to the external validation process might be to use the project's web
17 site to pose specific problems and proposed solutions. Where appropriate, data and
18 preliminary analysis related to a particular problem could be provided to encourage
19 involvement and suggestions from outside experts. It might be constructive to explore
20 the feasibility of engaging outside researchers specifically to address mission-critical
21 research questions. This could be accomplished by inviting peer-reviewed requests for
22 original data and access to non-proprietary models so that these outside researchers can
23 coordinate their own, possibly regional, analytical interest with the Agency's need for
24 different types of validation exercises. There might be specific opportunities for these
25 outside researchers to identify the types of data to which they would most like to gain
26 access. An Agency workshop might be a suitable vehicle to bring together Agency
27 modeling needs and researchers with expertise in the relevant area.
28

29 The Agency's comparative advantage in assembling key data from diverse
30 sources could facilitate third-party research by making these data available. For example,
31 one Council member has indicated that it would be desirable to provide some mechanism
32 for requesting the data developed in the detailed runs of air diffusion models for selected
33 areas, such as the South Coast Air Basin in California. This would allow researchers who
34 are working with regional models that have the spatial resolution to accommodate these
35 data the opportunity to use them.
36

37 External research on issues relevant to the Second Prospective Analysis would
38 also be aided by availability of morbidity and mortality data at a level of spatial
39 resolution finer than the county-level information available in the Compressed Mortality
40 Files from the National Center for Health Statistics. For example, deaths from potentially
41 air-pollution-related causes on a five-kilometer grid scale would be greatly valuable, but
42 individual researchers have difficulty gaining access to this type of information..
43

1 16.7 Itemized limitations in data review

2
3 Members of the Council feel that there are some limitations in the plans for data
4 review:

5
6 (a.) The benefits analysis information as outlined briefly in Chapter 10, page 10-2,
7 is inadequate. Results are described as being produced at the state level and by
8 pollutant-endpoint combination. The outline identifies “some of the uncertainties
9 inherent in projections of state-level results ten or twenty years into the future” as
10 the focus of likely meta-data validation exercises.

11
12 (b.) Detailed input information and assumptions embodied in the CGE analysis
13 are essential to evaluating the outputs of that analysis.

14
15 (c.) The Council will defer to the Health Effects Subcommittee in evaluating the
16 Agency’s approach to morbidity and mortality estimates. However, the Council
17 encourages the Agency to stay on top of any emerging or future opportunities to
18 assemble health statistics on related (actual) health conditions that might be
19 associated with morbidity or mortality rates due to air quality. Various
20 prospective cohort studies may be a valuable resource in determining disease
21 incidence, and there is a great need to assemble all available health status
22 databases and panels to identify the incidence of different diseases for areas that
23 are particularly polluted. Given the expense of assembling these databases, EPA
24 should look for opportunities to make those already assembled available for
25 additional research and analysis.

26
27 An example of an important research approach that helps to confirm causality in
28 the effect of changes in pollution exposure on observed health outcomes is the project
29 conducted jointly by the Harvard School of Public Health, Trinity College and the Dublin
30 Institute of Technology in Dublin, Ireland (Clancy et al., 2002). Funded in part by the
31 Agency, these researchers examined the effect of a 1990 ban on coal sales and coal
32 burning in Dublin on death rates in the city for six years before and after the ban went
33 into effect. They found that black smoke concentrations and non-trauma death rates were
34 substantially reduced by the decrease in coal burning. This is in effect a natural
35 laboratory experiment in which a large discrete change in exposure occurs while the
36 population and location is relatively stable.

37
38 There are also at least three other studies that document changes in health
39 outcomes resulting from discrete economic or policy changes. One showed the impacts
40 of a change in sulfur content on fuel oil for power generation and road transportation in
41 Hong Kong (Hedley et al., 2002). Specifically, it showed a decline in disease-specific
42 mortality after the sulfur restrictions took place. Pope (1989, 1991) showed reductions in
43 several health outcomes associated with a temporary shutdown of a steel mill in the Utah
44 Valley. Finally, Friedman et al. (2001) report on the effects of changes in transportation
45 during the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta on air quality and childhood asthma.

16.8 Stanford Energy Modeling Forum Analogy

The Council notes that the ongoing Section 812 Prospective Analyses represent a potentially valuable laboratory for understanding the methods used for constructing a comprehensive benefit-cost of environmental regulation. While it is probably not feasible for the Second Prospective Analysis, the Agency might begin to plan for a process for evaluating the models being used and for learning from these evaluations. A possible approach, broached by the Council in 2001, is to examine formally several models that purport to address the same issue. This is how the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) compares different models. The Agency could target key databases or key modeling steps with specific analytical issues in mind, and invite internal and external researchers to address these issues using competing approaches.

16.9 Scenario development

On the specific topic of Intermediate Data Products to do with Scenario Development, the Council notes that the different scenarios to be examined in the Second Prospective Analysis are still being determined by the EPA. The Council has already discussed and suggested some changes to the scenarios outlined in Chapter 2 of the Draft Analytical Plan, and other scenarios are still under review. One important scenario (or set of scenarios) should look at additional controls beyond current Clean Air Act provisions. EPA is still in the process of defining these, but assumptions about how controls will be tightened and the data and methods used to assess these adjustments will be important to provide to outside experts on an interim basis. These scenarios are particularly important because they may suggest potential directions for future regulations. An advance understanding of the likely consequences of these regulations would be desirable.

16.10 Consistency Checks

Chapter 10 also outlines EPA's plans for internal consistency checks. This summary appears to treat consistency checking as something that happens after models have been constructed and populated with the necessary parameters. In fact, calibration is a necessary and integral feature of model development. Given the numerous assumptions and simplifications required to build models, it is always necessary to check model performance against known, observed values, and make necessary adjustments to improve accuracy. The Council hopes that ongoing consistency checking is standard practice in the Section 812 Analyses.

What is to be compared in making consistency checks? Comparing one model's predictions with another model's predictions, rather than with observational data, is more problematic. Different models use different inputs and employ different analytical structures. Thus it often is unclear whether prediction differences are a result of differences in the input data or differences in the models themselves. (EPA refers to differences in scenarios and differences in modeling approach.) Sometimes it is possible

1 to use one model's data with another model's structure and vice versa to isolate the cause
2 of the discrepancy.

3
4 Inevitably, researchers will have to cope with the question of how to resolve
5 inconsistencies. It often is unclear how big the inconsistencies have to be to raise
6 concerns, given inherent modeling uncertainties and measurement error in the data. How
7 much of a discrepancy is a big discrepancy? The public problem-solving procedure
8 facilitated by publicly available data might be useful in developing a professional
9 consensus about how to resolve or explain discrepancies.

10
11 The Council notes that there is actually only a modest possibility of doing
12 consistency checks. The Agency must keep in mind that only one of the "with" and
13 "without" scenarios can actually be observed. Scenarios involving recent years (e.g.
14 2000) allow us to observe what happened under the "with" case. In the future, both
15 "with" and "without" become projections. Existing surveys such as the PACE refer to
16 regulations that were imposed, not regulations that are projected to be imposed. Thus,
17 even the PACE data do not support ceteris paribus comparisons. It is particularly
18 difficult to do plausibility checks when two different projections are being compared,
19 since either projection could be questionable. In the usual context for comparison in
20 benefit-cost analyses, we know either a baseline or a change. That is, in the
21 retrospective study, we knew actual conditions and projected what happened if we did
22 nothing further to regulate beyond 1970. In the prospective studies, both the baseline and
23 the regulated cases are projected. Thus, there is not a known reference or baseline.

24
25 Using models to project expected quantities out-of-sample, when non-overlapping
26 data has been used to estimate each model, can be risky. For example, transfer of models
27 from US cities to Mexico City predicted so many deaths from air pollution that the
28 number would have amounted to between one-third and one-half of all deaths in that city,
29 a prediction that is implausible. The challenge lies in how to extrapolate the results of
30 studies outside their ranges. Linear extrapolation is clearly not reliable. Nonlinear
31 estimation may offer improvements, but any outside forecasting needs to be subjected to
32 plausibility tests.

33
34 EPA mentions several specific consistency checks. In particular, they plan to
35 compare BenMAP model predictions to actual incidence data. The model predicts
36 changes based on regulatory changes relative to the baseline scenario. EPA notes the
37 inconsistency of trying to compare marginal changes with absolute levels for 2000, but
38 suggests no strategy for checking BenMAP predictions against observational data.
39 Ideally, one would look for a natural experiment where exposures changed, then replicate
40 this change in exposure in the context of the Section 812 models to check predicted
41 marginal changes from these models against observed marginal changes in the natural
42 experiment

43
44 EPA's statement about economic valuation consistency checks is similarly
45 ambiguous. They suggest comparing unit willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates with cost-
46 of-illness (COI) values. Again, these generally are not congruent measures. Depending

1 on how WTP is obtained, it may only measure pain and suffering, or it may include some
2 components of lost productivity and cost of treatment. Estimated COI values often
3 include only a relatively easily observed subset of the components of the social cost of
4 illness. Moreover, COI estimates often rely on average wage and treatment costs rather
5 than marginal values. Thus the problem of comparing marginal changes with observed
6 averages may crop up in this context, as well.

8 16.11 Understanding sources of differences

9
10 A full understanding of the sources of differences in the costs and benefits results
11 by title, provision, and source between the First and Second Prospective studies is critical
12 for interpreting the results of the Second Prospective Analysis. The EPA appears to be
13 considering a number of possible ways to make those comparisons. Comparison of
14 outcomes at the most disaggregated levels is important. An Appendix is suggested on p.
15 10-4 of the revised Analytical Plan. At what level of detail would the comparison of
16 results be provided in this Appendix?

17
18 Because this prospective study will be undertaking more disaggregated analyses,
19 with results by source category and even by provision in some cases, there may be
20 possibilities to compare the results, particularly for the 2000 time frame, to other studies
21 that have been done. Are the results consistent with those from other studies? There
22 could be some attempt to suggest what might give rise to the differences.

24 16.12 Intermediate outcomes and consistency checking

25
26 Any component of the Section 812 Prospective Analyses that leads up to the
27 calculation of final costs and benefits is an “intermediate product” of the analysis. Many
28 of these intermediate products summarize relationships that are used to reach the eventual
29 benefit and cost calculations. These estimated or assumed relationships afford many
30 opportunities for benchmarking the analysis against other studies or against real data. For
31 example, there may be future opportunities to examine the incidence of lung disease by
32 industrial sector for workers, or lung disease against census tracts or zip codes for place
33 of residence. Morbidity information is naturally more difficult to pin down than
34 mortality, since most illnesses are not reportable, whereas the causes of death are.
35 However, assembling whatever information is available on morbidity stemming from air-
36 quality-related disease could be extremely valuable. Public perceptions of air-quality-
37 related health risks will influence the perceived benefits of air quality management and
38 thus individual willingness to pay the costs incurred due to regulation.

1 16.13 Additional specific recommendations

2
3 If not for the current Analysis, then potentially for future Analyses, the Council
4 suggests that some of the following activities might be considered as candidates for
5 addition to the Agency's consistency-checking regimen:
6

7 a.) There does not appear to be a plan to make public the economic projections
8 underlying the emissions estimates and to reference these emissions estimates to
9 actual levels of economic activity in sectoral, regional, or aggregate terms. Levels of
10 economic activity are critically important determinants of emissions and it will be
11 important for these assumptions to be scrutinized as the Agency moves into
12 producing subsequent Prospective Analyses.
13

14 b.) Results at the state level and by pollutant-endpoint combination should be
15 matched to other economic data at the same spatial resolution to offer future
16 opportunities for cross checks. For example, there should be adequate consideration
17 of Census economic information on household income.
18

19 c.) There might be comparisons of the assumptions about future economic activity
20 embodied in the Second Prospective Analysis to actual levels of economic activity by
21 sector and region in actual years covered and with independent national projects. For
22 example, this task could employ regional Federal Reserve Bank statistics and
23 forecasts, or forecasts prepared by other federal sources.
24

25 d.) The analysis might include more-explicit consideration of time profiles of
26 emissions prior to 2000 (actual ambient readings) in comparison to the levels and
27 time profiles projected for future policy effects.
28

29 e.) There might be more attention in future Analyses to the morbidity states that may
30 precede mortality outcomes. What do the available epidemiological results suggest
31 for the incidence of new serious lung and heart conditions? Whether or not these can
32 be proven to be related to air quality, they can influence public perceptions
33 concerning the urgency of air quality management.
34

35 f.) The analysis might be accompanied by comparison of benefits estimates to
36 household income and to WTP estimates for air quality improvements from current
37 hedonic or random utility models for specific areas. This practice has historical
38 precedents and can be used as a gauge of plausibility for the benefits estimates
39 incorporated in the analysis.
40

17 RESULTS AGGREGATION AND REPORTING

17.1 Charge Question 33:

Does the Council support the plans described in Chapter 11 for the aggregation and presentation of analytical results from this study? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative approaches, aggregation methods, results presentation techniques, or other tools the Council recommends?

17.2 Summary of Council Response

- Reporting of central and alternative cases should be associated with likelihoods of these cases, and any provision of a “low” alternative estimate should be balanced by a corresponding “high” alternative estimate. Pivotal assumptions should be clearly identified and the need for additional research on these issues should be emphasized.
- The Council urges the Agency to dispense with benefit-cost ratios and focus attention on net benefits estimates as the appropriate summary measure in Benefit-Cost analysis.
- The Council understands the Agency’s current reluctance to take the somewhat heroic steps necessary to process the time profiles of benefits and costs into net present value (NPV) estimates. However, the Council urges to Agency to persist in its efforts toward this important goal in planning for future Analyses. In the meantime, the Agency must more clearly explain its rationale for annualizing costs but not calculating present discounted values of net benefits. The Council may revisit this topic in subsequent discussion.
- As problematic as disaggregation may be, the Agency should anticipate strong demand for this type of information by policy-makers and stakeholders.
- There is insufficient information in Chapter 11 to permit a thorough review of the Agency’s plans to disaggregate net benefits by sector.
- Spatial disaggregation is problematic, in general, because of all the connections among markets that give rise to general equilibrium consequences from the regulation of any one plant or industry. The Agency is advised to proceed very cautiously in terms of spatial disaggregation, and only in special cases.
- A more through explanation of the inadvisability of further disaggregation by title of the CAAA would help readers understand why no such further disaggregation is planned.

- Comprehensive discussion of Uncertainty (the contents of Chapter 9) has yet to be undertaken. The Council's general sympathy for a move toward formal probability analysis is tempered by the realization that the strategies of the First Prospective Analysis will continue to be useful in the Second Prospective Analysis.

17.3 General Observations

The Council's discussion of this Charge Question was separated rather artificially into a segment on costs and a separate segment on benefits. In this write-up, elements of the discussion that are relevant to both topics have been combined.

The Council notes that the strategy of reporting a "primary" estimate and an "alternative" can be misleading to the public if the alternative estimate combines conservative assumptions on several dimensions and results in a "low" estimate of net benefits. At the very least, if a "low" alternative is offered, so should be a "high" alternative, so readers are not left with the impression that the "true" case is half-way between the primary estimate and the low alternative. Providing only a low alternative invites biased inferences. Computational challenges preclude a full continuous distribution for the range of possible outcomes, for which standard confidence intervals could be constructed. However, information about the full distribution of possible results should be a goal to which the Agency aspires.

If the Agency continues to present sensitivity analyses concerning alternative scenarios, it is essential to associate with each of these alternatives some sense of their relative likelihood. Failure to do so encourages readers to employ a uniform distribution, which is almost certainly inappropriate.

Even at the intermediate data level, there should be more effort to explain how probability weights will be used to combine alternative point estimates of the magnitudes of key relationships. For example, with the ozone/mortality association, suppose there are three credible estimates. If all three estimates are close, then their average could be used. But what if one estimate is very different? The Second Prospective Analysis central case will presumably use the "best estimate" of this relationship. How will that value be determined?

In reporting its main results, the Council encourages the Agency to give particular prominence to the key assumptions and methodological choices that may be driving the results. Clear identification of these pivotal aspects of the analysis will emphasize the need for additional research on these topics and help focus the research community upon finding solutions.

17.4 Primary Results

Benefit-cost ratios versus net benefits. The revised Draft Analytical Plan proposes some changes relative to procedures used in the first prospective study. For example, EPA acknowledges previous SAB comments about reporting benefit-cost (B/C) ratios. They plan to report B/C ratios in this study, but de-emphasize them relative to net-benefit estimates. The role of “appropriate explanation” is important to help readers avoid well-known problems with using B/C ratios for decision making.

However, the Council does not favor ANY use of benefit-cost ratios. This concept does not have a consistent economic interpretation. Consequently, these ratios do not offer new information. If there is a concern that some portion of the constituency for the analysis will be more comfortable thinking in terms of benefit-cost ratios, the calculated benefit-cost ratio should be no more prominent than being mentioned in a footnote. The Agency should take a lead in shifting the emphasis to net benefits information, as opposed to benefit-cost ratios.

It is true that any policy or project with positive net benefits will also have a benefit-cost ratio greater than one, if both benefits and costs were known with certainty. However, in ranking projects with net benefits greater than zero (or less than zero) the net benefits and benefit-cost criteria can give conflicting rankings. Also, given greater attention to uncertainty, the net benefits approach has much to recommend it. The variance of a difference in two random variables is generally easier to calculate than the distribution of a ratio of two random variables. An emphasis on benefit-cost ratios would require consideration of how the variance in the ratio of two random variables (uncertain benefits over uncertain costs) was derived. There are approaches (e.g. Goodman and Hartley (1958), Goodman (1960, 1962), and Bohrnstedt and Goldberger, 1969) but this seems to add needless complexity.

17.5 Future forecasts and present value calculations

In the Second Prospective Analysis, the cumulative or present discounted value of costs, benefits, and net benefits will not be presented. The reason given in the Draft Analytical Plan is that the time paths of costs and benefits are not linear. An example provided is which there may be high up-front costs, with benefits in later years. Analogous problems can afflict benefits estimates, since multi-period chronic health effects must also be accounted for.

Part of this problem is dealt with, implicitly, in the so-called “annual” estimates. For example, the annual costs in each reported year (2000, 2010, and 2020) are average annual costs. If there are up-front capital costs, these are annualized (capitalized forward using an assumed interest rate) to get the annual estimates for the target years. The Council accepts the Agency’s plans, for the Second Prospective Analysis, not to report cumulative estimates in the form of present discounted values, but recommends that the

1 nature of the annual estimates should be made clearer and they should be called
2 “forecasted average annualized costs and benefits.”
3

4 The Analytical Plan states that changing the discount rate will have little effect on
5 the results, because no net present value estimates are calculated. However, changing the
6 discount rate does affect the annualized results in various ways, including the cost
7 estimates if capital costs have been capitalized forwards to produce estimates of average
8 annual costs. The Plan should be more clear about the specific (private?) interest rates
9 used to annualize costs, as opposed to the appropriate (social?) discount rates needed to
10 compute the present value of net benefits.
11

12 Some members of the Council agree with the proposal to delete discussion of the
13 approximate present value of net benefits given the current quality of the components
14 available to calculate it. The practices that will be used to estimate the time profiles of
15 costs and benefits (in particular, the lack of good techniques for interpolation between
16 discrete forecasting years) make these time profiles difficult to rely upon. Further effort
17 to calculate present values would not really be justified on the basis of the underlying
18 quality of these time profiles. Any present value calculations would exaggerate the
19 precision with which these time profiles can be calculated.
20

21 Nevertheless, other members of the Council expresses considerable unease about the
22 fact that present discounted net benefits are, in principle, the criterion upon which
23 judgments are based (prior to the introduction of distributional considerations). When
24 benefits and costs are distributed unevenly over time, it is necessary to determine whether
25 overall present discounted net benefits are positive. By neglecting net present value
26 (NPV) calculations, the Analysis does not provide what is needed to inform policy-
27 makers.
28

29 The Council is troubled by the Agency’s explanation that it has decided not to
30 provide annual interpolations of net-benefit estimates between target years because of the
31 difficulty of quantifying uncertainties related to interpolation. Different strategies for
32 interpolation could be used and the sensitivity of the NPV calculations to these
33 differences could be assessed. If the Agency reports carefully upon the methods used to
34 fill in the intervening years (latency of benefits, durability of costs), then the resulting
35 NPV calculations would be suitably qualified.
36

37 The Agency explained to the Council that the exorbitant data requirements for air
38 quality modeling for the intervening years in the main forecasts were the rate-determining
39 factor in filling in trajectories of costs and benefits for intervening years over the
40 forecasting horizon. However, there would seem to be some prospect of improving upon
41 simple linear interpolation by taking advantage of the richness of emissions trends. The
42 Council urges the Agency to continue to grapple with possible alternative techniques for
43 interpolating the disparate time patterns of benefits and costs and working towards
44 plausible NPV results in future Prospective Analyses.
45

1 As an aside, the Plan suggests that the Agency may produce annual estimates for
2 future years, beyond the main target years, because future annual estimates at a temporal
3 resolution finer than a decade “can be more reliably estimated.” Although such
4 estimates would not involve interpolation, it is not at all clear that the errors inherent in
5 predicting outcomes farther in the future are necessarily smaller than the errors of
6 interpolating between more accurate measures. Any such forecasts should be heavily
7 qualified.
8

9 17.6 Disaggregation

10
11 Chapter 11 of the revised Analytical Plan is advertised to concern “Results
12 Aggregation and Reporting,” although its subject matter could more informatively be
13 termed “Results Disaggregation and Reporting.” The central issue is the extent to which
14 costs and/or benefits should be disaggregated spatially (e.g., by state), by CAAA Title, or
15 by sector.
16

17 EPA notes some potential problems with sectoral and spatial disaggregation,
18 attributed to factors such as nonlinearities, jointness, and incidence dispersion through
19 markets. These problems can result in subadditivity or superadditivity when aggregating
20 up from component estimates or disaggregating down from total estimates. However,
21 because sectoral and geographic incidence is of considerable interest to policy makers, it
22 may be necessary to plan for adding evaluation of alternative disaggregation schemes to
23 the already long list of sensitivity and uncertainty analyses that this study, or perhaps
24 future Prospective Analyses, will require.
25

26 Sectoral disaggregation. Any attempts at sectoral decomposition of benefits and
27 costs must be compared and reconciled with sectoral analyses from the CGE models to be
28 used in this enterprise. Explanations for any anticipated or realized discrepancies
29 between sectoral and aggregated analyses should be clarified. The current description
30 refers to “non-linearities” as the source of potential discrepancies, but this explanation
31 needs to be clearer. In the discussion of sectoral reporting, it is not clear what sectoral
32 breakdown will be used.
33

34 Spatial disaggregation. The Council, in its previous review, argued strongly against
35 spatial disaggregation of the costs of the CAAA. The general equilibrium consequences
36 of air quality interventions are propagated widely throughout the economy, acting as they
37 do through goods markets, labor markets, and capital markets. In its 2001 review, due to
38 these issues of incidence, the Council advised against spatial disaggregation of costs,
39 The Analytical Plan adopts that suggestion with a nicely phrased argument and
40 explanation.
41

42 However, some types of air quality regulations that affect only local or regional air
43 quality, rather than broader areas, may have sufficiently localized benefits that it is
44 reasonable to address spatially disaggregated benefits estimates. Stratospheric ozone
45 concentrations or the effect of carbon emissions on world climate clearly do not fall into

1 this category. Spatial disaggregation of benefits should be contemplated only when the
2 Agency has access to spatially delineated projections for ambient concentrations of
3 pollution. This could offer opportunity for local or regional estimates of benefits derived
4 from hedonic property value and hedonic wage studies.

5
6 Although there are many regulations for which it makes no sense to spatially
7 disaggregate costs, for the general equilibrium reasons mentioned in the last paragraph,
8 there may still be a few exceptions. It must be acknowledged that there will occasionally
9 be vocal demands for spatial disaggregation by policy makers. It may be important for
10 the Agency to anticipate demands for it to examine costs and benefits by geographical
11 area for some provisions of the CAAA, for some sources.

12
13 For example, additional local controls to meet NAAQS may have costs and benefits
14 that are borne primarily, although not entirely, within the region. Certain future policies
15 may make sense in some regions, and not in others. State-by-state costs and benefits
16 probably will not capture the right geographic areas, but it seems important to consider
17 regional disaggregation for some cases.

18
19 Even judicious spatial disaggregation of benefits is not without potential complications,
20 however. The example in the Plan of the geographic dispersion of cost incidence from
21 power plant emission-control investments in Indiana may also apply to benefits in a
22 general-equilibrium analysis. Improved health that improves worker productivity may
23 benefit a firm's shareholders and customers in distant locations. EPA's example of how
24 to allocate visibility benefits accruing to visitors to a national park is a good illustration
25 of where problems may arise. The physical improvement occurs at the national park, but
26 the beneficiaries are park visitors who live elsewhere. Should their benefits be associated
27 with the location of the park, or the location of their residence? In many cases,
28 geographical disaggregation will involve arbitrary judgments that may be difficult to
29 defend.

30
31 Disaggregation by Title. The Council also urged previously that the Agency
32 should pursue disaggregating costs by Title. Although this is not explicitly treated in the
33 text of Chapter 11, Table 11-2 suggests that costs will be aggregated over Titles I through
34 IV. The Council would a priori prefer more disaggregation by Title and suggests that the
35 Plan present reasons why this is not possible or desirable. The 2001 Council review of the
36 first Draft Analytical Plan clarified some of the reasons for limiting disaggregation by
37 title, but too few of these reasons appear in the revised Draft Analytical Plan. To a certain
38 extent, presenting costs by major sector, as planned, will involve generating the kind of
39 data needed to pursue title-by-title disaggregation.

40
41 Cost-effectiveness and disaggregation. The Analytical Plan focuses on monetized
42 benefits and costs. Chapter 11 does not describe any planned reporting of cost-
43 effectiveness measures in the Second Prospective Analysis. The First Prospective Study
44 provided some auxiliary cost- per-life-saved measures. Given that the results from the
45 Second Prospective Analysis are to be calculated and reported on a more disaggregated
46 basis, there may be some cases where these cost-effectiveness estimates can be provided

1 and would be helpful to the constituency's understanding of the effects of the CAAA.
2 The Council acknowledges, however, that when policies provide benefits that are broader
3 than simply improvements in human health, cost-per-life-saved measures can be
4 misleading (e.g. when there may be substantial ecosystem benefits).
5
6

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Appendix A

SAB Review Charge Questions July 3, 2003 – REVISED

This document conveys a set of specific charge questions which EPA respectfully requests that the SAB Council consider during its review of the draft analytical blueprint for the upcoming section 812 benefit-cost study of the Clean Air Act. The charge questions are organized by blueprint chapter or appendix. The first question posed for each chapter or appendix is intended to serve as a general charge question consistent with the statutory criteria for Council review of the section 812 studies. Additional, more detailed charge questions are also conveyed for most chapters and appendices. These supplemental charge questions reflect EPA's desire to obtain specific and detailed advice from the Council on particular analytical issues.

Chapter 1: Project Goals and Analytical Sequence

1. Does the Council support the study goals, general analytical framework, disaggregation plan, analytical sequence, and general analytical refinements defined in chapter 1? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternatives the Council recommends?

Chapter 2: Scenario Development

2. Does the Council support the choices for analytical scenarios defined in chapter 2? Are there alternative or additional scenarios the Council recommends EPA consider for inclusion in the analysis?
3. Does the Council support the alternative compliance pathway estimation and comparison methodology described in chapter 2, including the specification of alternative compliance pathways which may not reflect precisely constant emissions or air quality outcomes between scenarios due (primarily) to the non-continuous nature and interaction effects of emission control options?

Chapter 3: Emissions Estimation

4. Does the Council support the plans for estimating, evaluating, and reporting emissions changes as defined in chapter 3? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends? (Addressed by the Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee Report)
5. Chapter 3 of the analytical plan describes several alternative approaches considered by EPA for estimating non-EGU emissions growth rates. These options reflect different relative emphasis between two conflicting analytical objectives: (1) extensive refinement of the geographically differentiated, source-

specific economic activity growth estimates embedded in EGAS 4.0, and (2) maintaining the current project schedule and budget. EPA plans to use “approach #4”, a compromise option which targets the most important source categories for potential refinement. Does the Council support the initial plan to use “approach #4”? If the Council does not support the use of approach #4, are there other approaches –including either the approaches described in chapter 3 or others identified by the Council– which the Council suggests EPA consider? (Addressed by the Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee Report)

6. Some state-supplied emissions data incorporated in the 1999 National Emissions Inventory (NEI) –the core emissions inventory for this analysis– incorporate different emissions factors from those used in MOBILE6, the mobile source emissions model EPA plans to use for estimating emissions changes between scenarios. Of particular importance, some of the emissions factors embedded in California’s EMFAC model may be significantly different from factors used in MOBILE6. EPA considered three options for estimating emissions changes in California, which are described in chapter 3. EPA plans to implement option #3 based on the belief that the emission factors embedded by California in its EMFAC model may be more accurate for their particular state than the factors incorporated in MOBILE6. Does the Council support the plan to implement option #3? If the Council does not support the adoption of option #3, are there other options –including either the options described in chapter 3 or others identified by the Council– which the Council suggests EPA consider? (Addressed by the Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee Report)

Chapter 4: Cost Estimates

7. Does the Council support the plans for estimating, evaluating, and reporting compliance costs described in chapter 4? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?
8. EPA seeks advice from the Council concerning the choice of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model which EPA intends to use as a post-processor to gauge the general equilibrium effects of the various control scenarios. In the first 812 study –the retrospective– EPA used the Jorgenson/Wilcoxon model to gauge the general equilibrium effects of returning to the economy the reported compliance expenditures which formed the basis of the retrospective study direct cost estimates. This model has since been refined in many ways, and EPA considers both the Jorgenson/Wilcoxon/Ho and AMIGA to be acceptable tools. Although a final decision on model choice can be deferred until later in the analysis, EPA has tentative plans to use the AMIGA model because of its greater sectoral disaggregation, better industrial sector matching with CAA-affected industries, richer representation of relevant production and consumption technologies, and

1 better model validation opportunities due to its use of open code. However,
2 AMIGA is limited given its inability to deal with dynamics over time. Does the
3 Council support the current, tentative plan to use the AMIGA model for this
4 purpose? If not, are there alternative model choices or selection criteria the
5 Council recommends?
6

- 7 9. In the two previous 812 studies, the primary cost estimates reflected use of a 5
8 percent real discount rate, which an earlier Council endorsed as a reasonable
9 compromise between a 3 percent real rate considered by EPA to be an appropriate
10 estimate of the consumption rate of interest or rate of social time preference and a
11 7 percent rate, OMB's estimate of the opportunity cost of capital. Limited
12 sensitivity testing was also conducted in the previous 812 studies by substituting 3
13 and 7 percent rates to annualize the benefit and cost streams. EPA's new
14 Economics Guidelines (peer-reviewed by the SAB EEAC) call for using both a 3
15 and a 7 percent rate. A recent draft of new OMB economic guidelines suggests
16 providing results based on both 3 and 7 percent discount rates, while also
17 acknowledging the need for further efforts to refine analytical policies for
18 discounting methods and rates. EPA plans on following both sets of Guideline
19 documents by using both 3 and 7 percent in our core analyses. It is true that this
20 will require presentation of two sets of results – one based on each rate. This may
21 not be necessary given the expected insensitivity of the overall results to the
22 discount rate assumption. Does the Council support this approach? If not, are
23 there alternative rates, discounting concepts, methods, or results presentation
24 approaches the Council recommends?
25

26 Chapter 5: Air Quality Modeling 27

- 28 10. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 5 for estimating,
29 evaluating, and reporting air quality changes associated with the analytical
30 scenarios? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does
31 not support, are there alternative data, models, or methods the Council
32 recommends? (To be addressed by the Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee
33 when the Agency has more details about the choice of models and the modeling
34 protocols that would be employed.)
35

36 Chapter 6: Human Health Effects Estimation (Addressed by the Health Effects 37 Subcommittee) 38

- 39 11. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 6 for estimating,
40 evaluating, and reporting changes in health effect outcomes between scenarios? If
41 there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support,
42 are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?
43
44 12. EPA seeks advice from the Council regarding the technical and scientific merits
45 of incorporating several new or revised endpoint treatments in the current
46 analysis. These health effect endpoints include:

- a. Premature mortality from particulate matter in adults 30 and over, PM (Krewski et al., 2000);
 - b. A PM premature mortality supplemental calculation for adults 30 and over using the Pope 2002 ACS follow-up study with regional controls;
 - c. Hospital admissions for all cardiovascular causes in adults 20-64, PM (Moolgavkar et al., 2000);
 - d. ER visits for asthma in children 0-18, PM (Norris et al., 1999);
 - e. Non-fatal heart attacks, adults over 30, PM (Peters et al., 2001);
 - f. School loss days, Ozone (Gilliland et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2000);
 - g. Hospital admissions for all respiratory causes in children under 2, Ozone (Burnett et al., 2001); and,
 - h. Revised sources for concentration-response functions for hospital admission for pneumonia, COPD, and total cardiovascular: Samet et al., 2000 (a PM10 study), to Lippmann et al., 2000 and Moolgavkar, 2000 (PM2.5 studies).
13. EPA seeks advice from the Council regarding the merits of applying updated data for baseline health effect incidences, prevalence rates, and other population characteristics as described in chapter 6. These updated incidence/prevalence data include:
 - a. Updated county-level mortality rates (all-cause, non-accidental, cardiopulmonary, lung cancer, COPD) from 1994-1996 to 1996-1998 using the CDC Wonder Database;
 - b. Updated hospitalization rates from 1994 to 1999 and switched from national rates to regional rates using 1999 National Hospital Discharge Survey results;
 - c. Developed regional emergency room visit rates using results of the 2000 National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey;
 - d. Updated prevalence of asthma and chronic bronchitis to 1999 using results of the National Health Interview Survey (HIS), as reported by the American Lung Association (ALA), 2002;
 - e. Developed non-fatal heart attack incidence rates based on National Hospital Discharge Survey results;
 - f. Updated the national acute bronchitis incidence rate using HIS data as reported in ALA, 2002, Table 11;
 - g. Updated the work loss days rate using the 1996 HIS data, as reported in Adams, et al. 1999, Table 41;
 - h. Developed school absence rates using data from the National Center for Education Statistics and the 1996 HIS, as reported in Adams, et al., 1999, Table 46.
1. Developed baseline incidence rates for respiratory symptoms in asthmatics, based on epidemiological studies (Ostro et al. 2001; Vedal et al. 1998; Yu et al; 2000; McConnell et al., 1999; Pope et al., 1991).

- 1 14. EPA plans to initiate an expert elicitation process to develop a probability-based
2 method for estimating changes in incidence of PM-related premature mortality.
3 Plans for this expert elicitation are described in chapter 9 of this blueprint, and a
4 separate charge question below requests advice from the Council pertaining to the
5 merits of the design of this expert elicitation. EPA recognizes, however, the
6 possibility that this expert elicitation process may not be fully successful and/or
7 may not be completed in time to support the current 812 analysis. Therefore, in
8 order to facilitate effective planning and execution of the early analytical steps
9 which provide inputs to the concentration-response calculations, EPA seeks
10 advice from the Council regarding the scientific merits of alternative methods for
11 estimating the incidences of PM-related premature mortality, including advice
12 pertaining to the most scientifically defensible choices for the following specific
13 factors:
- 14 a. Use of cohort mortality studies, daily mortality studies, or some
15 combination of the two types of studies
 - 16 b. Selection of specific studies for estimating long-term and/or short-term
17 mortality effects
 - 18 c. Methods for addressing –either quantitatively or qualitatively– uncertain
19 factors associated with the relevant concentration-response function(s),
20 including
 - 21 i. Shape of the PM mortality C-R function (e.g., existence of a
22 threshold),
 - 23 ii. PM causality,
 - 24 iii. PM component relative toxicity, and
 - 25 iv. PM mortality effect cessation lag structure
 - 26 v. Cause of death and underlying health conditions for individuals
27 dying prematurely due to chronic and/or short term exposures to
28 particulate matter
 - 29 vi. The use of ambient measures of exposure for estimating chronic
30 health effects, given recent research reviewed in the NAS (2002)
31 report that questions the implications of using ambient measures in
32 cohort studies
- 33
- 34 15. EPA estimates of benefit from particulate control may underestimate the impact
35 of nonfatal cardiopulmonary events on premature mortality and life expectancy.
36 For the base analyses, which rely on cohort evidence, the limited follow-up
37 periods for the cohorts may not fully capture the impacts of nonfatal
38 cardiovascular events on premature mortality later in life. For the alternative
39 analyses –including cost-effectiveness analyses– which rely more on acute studies
40 and life-expectancy loss, the years of life are estimated only for fatal events. Yet
41 nonfatal events such as myocardial infarction reduce a person's life expectancy by
42 a substantial percentage.
- 43 a. Do you agree that EPA, in the 812 analyses, should adjust benefit
44 estimates to account for the mortality effects of non-fatal cardiovascular
45 and respiratory events?

- 1 b. What medical studies and mathematical models of disease might be useful
2 to review or use if EPA moves in this direction?
- 3 c. When the nonfatal events are valued in economic terms, should EPA
4 assume that the published unit values for morbidity already account for the
5 life-expectancy loss or should an explicit effort be made to monetize the
6 resulting longevity losses?
- 7
- 8 16. In recent EPA rulemakings, EPA's "base estimate" of benefit from PM control has
9 been based on cohort epidemiological studies that characterize the chronic effects
10 of pollution exposure on premature death as well as capturing a fraction of acute
11 premature mortality effects. If these chronic effects occur only after repeated,
12 long-term exposures, there could be a substantial latency period and associated
13 cessation lag. As such, a proper benefits analysis must consider any time delay
14 between reductions in exposure and reductions in mortality rates. For the acute
15 effects, such as those considered in EPA's alternative benefit analyses, the delays
16 between elevated exposure and death are short (less than two months), and thus
17 time-preference adjustments are not necessary.
- 18 a. In the previous 812 analysis and in recent rulemakings, EPA assumed a
19 weighted 5-year time course of benefits in which 25% of the PM-related
20 mortality benefits were assumed to occur in the first and second year, and
21 16.7% were assumed to occur in each of the remaining 3 years. Although
22 this procedure was endorsed by SAB, the recent NAS report (2002) found
23 "little justification" for a 5-year time course and recommended that a range
24 of assumptions be made with associated probabilities for their plausibility.
25 Do you agree with the NAS report that EPA should no longer use the
26 deterministic, 5-year time course?
- 27 b. One alternative EPA is considering is to use a range of lag structures from
28 0 to 20-30 years, with the latter mentioned by NAS in reference to the
29 Nyberg et al PM lung cancer study, with 10 or 15 years selected as the
30 mid-point value until more definitive information becomes available. If
31 this simple approach is used, should it be applied to the entire mortality
32 association characterized in the cohort studies, or only to the difference
33 between the larger mortality effect characterized in the cohort studies and
34 the somewhat smaller effect found in the time series studies of acute
35 exposure? Should judgmental probabilities be applied to different lags, as
36 suggested by NAS?
- 37 c. Another option under consideration is to construct a 3-parameter Weibull
38 probability distribution for the population mean duration of the PM
39 mortality cessation lag. The Weibull distribution is commonly used to
40 represent probabilities based on expert judgment, with the 3-parameter
41 version allowing the shaping of the probability density function to match
42 expected low, most likely, and expected high values. EPA is still
43 considering appropriate values for the low, most likely, and expected high
44 values –and therefore for the Weibull shape and location parameters– and
45 EPA is interested in any advice the Council wishes to provide pertaining

1 to the merits of this approach and/or reasonable values for the probability
2 distribution.
3

- 4 17. In support of Clear Skies and several recent rule makings the Agency has
5 presented an Alternative Estimate of benefits as well as the Base Estimate. EPA
6 developed the Alternative Estimate as an interim approach until the Agency
7 completes a formal probabilistic analysis of benefits. NAS (2002) reinforced the
8 need for a probabilistic analysis. The Alternative Estimate is not intended as a
9 substitute method and needs to be considered in conjunction with the Base
10 Estimate. Presentation of Base and Alternative estimates in the 812 Report may
11 not be necessary if the probability analysis planned for the 812 Report is
12 successful. While the Base Estimate assumes that acute and chronic mortality
13 effects are causally related to pollution exposure, the Alternative Estimate
14 assumes only acute effects occur or that any chronic effects are smaller in size
15 than assumed in the Base Estimate. The Council's advice is sought on the
16 following matters:
- 17 a. It has been noted by some particle scientists that the size of estimates
18 based on time series studies that incorporate a distributed lag model,
19 accounting for effects of 30 to 60 days after elevated exposure, may be
20 similar in size to some interpretations of the results from the cohort
21 studies. Does the Council agree that it is a reasonable alternative to use an
22 estimate of the concentration-response function consistent with this view?
23 If the Council agrees with the assumption, can it suggest an improved
24 approach for use in an Alternative Estimate? The agency also seeks advice
25 on appropriate bounds for a sensitivity analysis of the mortality estimate to
26 be used in support of the Alternative Estimate.
 - 27 b. An assumption that a specific proportion of the PM-related premature
28 mortality incidences are incurred by people with pre-existing Chronic
29 Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) and that these incidences are
30 associated with a loss of six months of life, regardless of age at death. If
31 these values are not valid, what values would be more appropriate? Do
32 you recommend a sensitivity analysis of 1 to 14 years (with the latter
33 based on standard life tables), as included in the draft regulatory impact
34 analysis of the proposed Nonroad diesel rule?
 - 35 c. An assumption that the non-COPD incidences of PM-related premature
36 mortality are associated with a loss of five years of life, regardless of age
37 at death. If these values are not valid, what values would be more
38 appropriate? Do you recommend a sensitivity analysis of 1 to 14 years
39 (with the latter based on standard life tables), as included in the draft
40 regulatory impact analysis of the proposed Nonroad diesel rule?
 - 41 d. Additional quantified and/or monetized effects are those presented as
42 sensitivity analyses to the primary estimates or in addition to the primary
43 estimates, but not included in the primary estimate of total monetized
44 benefits. While no causal mechanism has been identified for chronic
45 asthma and ozone exposure, there is suggestive epidemiological evidence.
46

- i. Two studies suggest a statistical association between ozone and new onset asthma for two specific groups: children who spend a lot of time exercising outdoors and non-smoking men. We seek SAB comment on our approach to quantifying new onset asthma in the sensitivity analyses.
- ii. Premature mortality associated with ozone is not currently separately included in the primary analysis because the epidemiological evidence is not consistent. We seek SAB comment on our approach to quantifying ozone mortality in the sensitivity analyses.
- iii. Does the Council agree that there is enough data to support a separate set of health impacts assessment for asthmatics? If so, does the approach proposed by the Agency address the uncertainty in the literature?

Chapter 7: Ecological Effects

18. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 7 for (a) qualitative characterization of the ecological effects of Clean Air Act-related air pollutants, (b) an expanded literature review, and (c) a quantitative, ecosystem-level case study of ecological service flow benefits? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?
19. Initial plans described in chapter 7 reflect a preliminary EPA decision to base the ecological benefits case study on Waquoit Bay in Massachusetts. Does the Council support these plans? If the Council does not support these specific plans, are there alternative case study designs the Council recommends?
20. Does the Council support the plan for a feasibility analysis for a hedonic property study for valuing the effects of nitrogen deposition/eutrophication effects in the Chesapeake Bay region, with the idea that these results might complement the Waquoit Bay analysis?

Chapter 8: Economic Valuation

21. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 8 for economic valuation of changes in outcomes between the scenarios? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?
22. EPA's current analytic blueprint calls for an expert-judgment project on VSL determination that would produce a probability distribution over the range of possible VSL values for use in the 812 project. EPA is not sure how much priority to give to this project. A much simpler alternative would be for EPA to specify a plausible range of VSL values. One option would be to use a range bounded by \$1

million (based roughly on the lower bound of the interquartile range from the Mrozek-Taylor meta-analysis) and \$10 million (based roughly on the upper bound of the interquartile range of the Viscusi- Aldy meta-analysis. This range would match that reflected in EPA's sensitivity analysis of the alternative benefit estimate for the off-road diesel rulemaking. The range would then be characterized using a normal, half-cosine, uniform or triangular distribution over that range of VSL values. EPA would then ask this Committee to review this distribution. This approach could be done relatively quickly, based on the reviews and meta-analyses commissioned to date, and would allow a formal probability analysis to proceed, without suggesting that the Agency is trying to bring more precision to this issue than is warranted by the available science.

23. Pursuant to SAB Council advice from the review of the first draft analytical blueprint, EPA reviewed a number of meta-analyses –either completed or underway– developed to provide estimates for the value of statistical life (VSL) to be applied in the current study. EPA plans to consult with the Council (and coordinate this consultation with the EEAC) on how best to incorporate information from the Kochi et al (2002) meta-analysis, other published meta-analyses [Mrozek and Taylor and Viscusi and Aldy], and recent published research to develop estimates of VSL for use in this study. In addition, EPA plans to implement two particular adjustments to the core VSL values: discounting of lagged effects and longitudinal adjustment to reflect changes in aggregate income. Does the Council support these plans, including the specific plans for the adjustments described in chapter 8? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative data or methods the Council recommends?

24. For the 812 Report, EPA has decided to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis of the Clean Air Act provisions using quality-adjusted life years as the measure of effectiveness. This is the standard approach used in medicine and public health and this type of analysis has previously been recommended by the SAB. Moreover, the recent NAS Report (2002) on benefits analysis discussed how this method could be applied to the health gains from air pollution control.

- a. Do you agree that QALYs are the most appropriate measure of effectiveness for this type of analysis? Would you suggest any alternative measures to replace or supplement the QALY measure? (This question relates to effectiveness measures, not monetary benefit measures as used in benefit-cost analysis).
- b. OMB has suggested that EPA plan a workshop with clinicians, social scientists, decision analysts and economists to examine how the specific diseases and health effects in the 812 Report should be handled with respect to longevity impact and health-related preference. Participants would have knowledge of the relevant clinical conditions, the related health preference studies, and the stated-preference literature in economics. The recent RFF conference has laid the groundwork for this type of workshop. Is there a superior approach to making sure that the CEAQALY project is executed in a technically competent fashion and that

the details of the work receive in-depth technical input in addition to the broad oversight provided by this Committee?

- c. Does the Council support the specific plans for QALY-based cost-effectiveness described in the current draft blueprint? If the Council does not support specific elements of these plans, are the alternative data, methods, or results presentation approaches which the Council recommends?

25. EPA plans to use updated unit values for a number of morbidity effects, as described in chapter 8. Of particular note, EPA plans to rely on a study by Dickie and Ulery (2002) to provide heretofore unavailable estimates of parental willingness to pay to avoid respiratory symptoms in their children. This study is not yet published and has limitations concerning response rate and sample representativeness; however, EPA expects the study to be published prior to completion of the economic valuation phase of this analysis. Does the Council support the application of unit values from this study, contingent on its acceptance for publication in a peer-reviewed journal? If the Council does not support reliance on this study, are there other data or methods for valuation of respiratory symptoms in children which the Council recommends?

Chapter 9: Uncertainty Analysis

26. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for estimating and reporting uncertainty associated with the benefit and cost estimates developed for this study? If there are particular elements of these plans which the Council does not support, are there alternative data, models, or methods the Council recommends?
27. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for the pilot project to develop probability-based estimates for uncertainty in the compliance cost estimates? If the Council does not support this pilot project, or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches to quantifying uncertainty in cost estimates for this analysis which the Council recommends?
28. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for the pilot project to develop probability-based estimates for uncertainty in the emissions and air quality modeling estimates? If the Council does not support this pilot project, or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches to quantifying uncertainty in emissions and/or air quality concentration estimates for this analysis which the Council recommends? (To be addressed by the Air Quality Modeling Subcommittee when the Agency has more details about the choice of models and the modeling protocols that would be employed.)
29. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for the expert elicitation pilot project to develop a probability-based PM_{2.5} C-R function for premature

mortality, including in particular the elicitation process design? If the Council does not support the expert elicitation pilot project, or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches the Council recommends for estimating PM-related mortality benefits for this analysis, including in particular a probabilistic distribution for the C-R function to reflect uncertainty in the overall C-R function and/or its components?

30. EPA plans to develop estimates of an independent mortality effect associated with ozone, as described in chapter 9. Does the Council support the use of the most recent literature on the relationship between short-term ozone exposure and daily death rates, specifically that portion of the literature describing models which control for potential confounding by PM_{2.5}? Does the Council agree with the use of that literature as the basis for deriving quantified estimates of an independent mortality impact associated with ozone, especially in scenarios where short-term PM_{2.5} mortality estimates are used as the basis for quantifying PM mortality related benefits? Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for the pilot project to use this literature to develop estimates of the ozone related premature mortality C-R function using the three alternative meta-analytic approaches? If the Council does not support this pilot project, or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches to quantifying ozone-related premature mortality which the Council recommends?

31. EPA plans to work with the Council and the EEAC to develop revised guidance on appropriate VSL measures. We hope to include the Kochi et al (2002) meta-analysis, other recent meta-analysis, recent publications, and the 3 literature reviews sponsored by EPA.(a separate charge question pertaining to this element of EPA's VSL plan is presented below). In addition, EPA plans to conduct a follow-on meta-regression analysis of the existing VSL literature to provide insight into the systematic impacts of study design attributes, risk characteristics, and population attributes on the mean and variance of VSL. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 9 for conducting this meta-regression analysis? If the Council does not support this analysis or any particular aspect of its design, are there alternative approaches which the Council recommends for quantifying the impact of study design attributes, risk characteristics, and population attributes on the mean and variance of VSL?

Chapter 10: Data Quality and Intermediate Data Products

32. Does the Council support the plans described in chapter 10 for evaluating the quality of data inputs and analytical outputs associated with this study, including the planned publication of intermediate data products and comparison of intermediate and final results with other data or estimates? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative approaches, intermediate data products, data or model comparisons, or other data quality criteria the Council recommends? Please consider EPA's Information Quality Guidelines in this regard.

Chapter 11: Results Aggregation and Reporting

33. Does the Council support the plans described in Chapter 11 for the aggregation and presentation of analytical results from this study? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative approaches, aggregation methods, results presentation techniques, or other tools the Council recommends?

Appendix D: Stratospheric Ozone Analysis

34. Does the Council support the plans describe in Appendix D for updating the estimated costs and benefits of Title VI programs? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative data, models, or methods the Council recommends?

Appendix E: Air Toxics Case Study

35. Does the Council support the plans described in Appendix E for the benzene case study, including the planned specific data, models, and methods, and the ways in which these elements have been integrated? If the Council does not support these plans, are there alternative data, models, or methods the Council recommends?
36. A cessation lag for benzene-induced leukemia is difficult to estimate and model precisely due to data limitations, and EPA plans to incorporate a five-year cessation lag as an approximation based on available data on the latency period of leukemia and on the exposure lags used in risk models for the Pliofilm cohort (Crump, 1994 and Silver et al., 2002). Does the SAB support adoption of this assumed cessation lag? If the Council does not support the assumed five-year cessation lag, are there alternative lag structures or approaches the Council recommends?

Appendix H: Meta-analysis of VSL

37. Does the Council support including the Kochi et al. (2002) meta-analysis as part of a the larger data base of studies to derive an estimate for the value of avoided premature mortality attributable to air pollution? Are there additional data, models, or studies the Council recommends? Does the SAB think that EPA should include Kochi et al. 2003 if not accepted for publication in a peer reviewed journal by the time the final 812 report is completed?

Appendix B

Additional Discussion Concerning Costs and Learning

Additional considerations. The assortment of published models that yield markedly different point estimates for learning effects are frequently inconsistent with neoclassical economics in terms of the use of factor inputs. To be deemed admissible, it would also be desirable for a study to meet higher standards in terms of accounting for technical change.

For cost-savings due to learning, there is a potentially very important question of whether firms enjoy advantages, or suffer penalties, for early implementation of technologies. Being a “first mover” may limit opportunities for learning from the experiences of other firms.

It is not clear that cumulative output is the sole, or best, indicator of learning effects on the eventual costs of abatement activities. The time horizon over which cost reductions due to learning will be exhausted is also not clear. Costs just a few months out may differ substantially from the cost levels that can be attained in the long-term steady-state, even when cumulative production is identical. Eighteen months out, costs can be a little lower, or a lot lower, than the level to which they may fall with early learning.

Process versus industry-specific. It should be emphasized in the 812 analysis that the 80% rule of thumb for learning effects is a gross oversimplification. For example, the effect of learning on compliance costs is more likely to be process-specific, rather than industry specific. Thus it may be inappropriate just to make different assumptions across industries. Instead, the correct “representative” learning effect may depend upon the mix of processes used in each industry.

Desirability/attainability of one number for learning. Despite the preliminary results of the meta-analysis and the absence of any real weight-of-the-evidence conclusions concerning learning effects, it would still be helpful to come up with a best estimate to use for assumptions about cost reductions from experience with compliance technologies. It would be easiest if it were safe to assume a single “learning effect” in the form of an unbiased estimate, neither too high nor too low. However, the effect of learning on costs is likely to display considerable systematic heterogeneity across pollutants and technologies. There is unlikely to be a single “one-size-fits-all” number that is satisfactory for all contexts.

Is it preferable to make an inaccurate adjustment for learning (e.g., when it is not known whether the adjustment should be 10% or 20%) rather than make no adjustment at all, which is known definitely to be incorrect (i.e., there need to be some downward adjustment to costs as a result of learning, but the appropriate magnitude of this adjustment is unclear)? The question of just how much must be known before the Agency is warranted in making a quantitative adjustment permeates many aspects of the

1 Analytical Plan, not just the learning issue, and merits more thought and discussion. In
2 principle, what is desired is the best unbiased estimate, but where is the threshold of
3 empirical evidence needed to decide upon the appropriate magnitude of that quantitative
4 adjustment?
5

6 For example, in its review of the Draft Analytical Plan, two years ago, a majority
7 on the Council agreed that there was insufficient evidence to support using for ecosystem
8 benefits a particular percentage of the Costanza et al. (1998) estimates of total value of
9 the earth's ecosystems. This conclusion was reached in part because there was not
10 sufficient evidence to determine the appropriate percentage of these ecosystems values
11 that would have been lost or reduced without the CAAA.
12

13 The Council feels it would be inappropriate to endorse adjustments that have
14 minimal empirical verification as to their specific quantitative values. The cumulative
15 effect of too many such adjustments puts the entire assessment process at risk of losing
16 objective credibility and becoming more a product of subjectivity and political
17 negotiation. The Council encourages the Agency to explore the likely consequences of
18 adjustments that are within the realm of possibility, but not to build in any specific
19 unsupported value for specific adjustments.
20
21

Appendix C

Additional Discussion Concerning the Use of VSLs

- The Council first wishes to highlight persistent conceptual problems stemming from the use of “the VSL.” Normalizing WTP to a 1.00 risk reduction is arbitrary and has proven to be confusing to non-specialists and therefore open to being used in a strategically misleading fashion. As a device for combining WTP estimates based on different risk changes, any arbitrary normalization is equally appropriate and a more policy-relevant risk change would be preferable for normalization, even if this necessitates a change in traditions.
- That WTP should be close to proportional to the size of the risk change has theoretical support and would be enormously convenient. However, empirical tests of this theory are very difficult with hedonic wage data and contingent valuation studies tend to produce results at odds with this assumption. More information on this important aspect of VSL implementation would be valuable.
- WTP for risk reductions should be presumed to be heterogeneous across risks and individuals, unless demonstrated otherwise. It is important that the proposed meta-analyses are designed to recognize this.
- Existing meta-analyses have tended to maintain the hypothesis that there exists a single immutable VSL (or a simple VSL function that depends mostly on income levels). The early Agency posture seemed to be that this unknown VSL that merely needed to be revealed by somehow combining the VSL estimates from different studies.
- The studies that form the raw material for meta-analysis may be compromised to varying degrees by their subjects having had incomplete information about risk. Credible meta-analyses should address these problems as well.
- The Agency should proceed cautiously in adopting the results of existing or new meta-analyses as the basis for an assumed distribution for the WTP that will be appropriate for the Second Prospective Analysis. The contexts of the constituent studies may not adequately match the policy context where the WTP is needed.

VSLs vs. Micromorts

VSL is defined as the marginal rate of substitution (MRS), namely the (local) difference in income that will leave an individual equally well off in the face of a difference in mortality risk. It is well recognized in the literature that this MRS depends on baseline risk, income, and may well depend on other characteristics of the risk and the individual. The units in which this MRS is described are arbitrary (e.g., dollars per


1 pound, pennies per ton, etc.). By focusing on “the Value of a Statistical Life,” we have
2 arbitrarily adopted as our units “millions of dollars per a 1.00 risk change.”
3

4 However, this arbitrary choice unnecessarily courts objections from non-specialists
5 who confuse “The Value of a Statistical Life” (the economists’ technical term for a linear
6 approximation to a marginal measure) with “The Value of Life” in the sense of some
7 measure of the intrinsic value of one human life with certainty. Long ago, Ron Howard
8 (1984) proposed the term “micromort,” meaning the value of a one-in-a-million risk
9 reduction, which would translate into one one-millionth of our usual \$5-6 million VSL,
10 or just 5 to 6 dollars. This metric would be less misleading than the VSL, but
11 unfortunately it has never achieved currency.
12

13 Typically, a policy is characterized as leading to “X fewer deaths in 100,000” and X
14 is then multiplied by “the VSL,” and then by the number of hundreds of thousands of
15 people affected, to yield a total benefits estimate. However, this is the same as
16 characterizing the policy as leading to an average mortality risk reduction for each
17 individual of $X/100,000$. The total benefits estimate is equivalently given by starting
18 with the implied WTP for this small risk reduction for one person, then multiplying by
19 the number of people affected. There is no need to choose a 1.00 risk change as the
20 intervening metric for scaling. Scaling all estimates to the risk change relevant for some
21 specific policy is just as valid.
22

23 Suppose that we are trying to combine the information about WTP for risk
24 reductions from five different studies, each involving one particular (different) risk
25 reduction, r_1 through r_5 , as in the figure. (With any luck, there will be standard errors on
26 the underlying WTP estimates, so that
27 there will be corresponding standard
28 errors on the resulting individual
29 studies’ estimates of VSLs, although
30 these are not depicted in the diagram.)
31

32 If we use the WTP and risk
33 information from each study to
34 impute the associated VSL for a 1.00
35 risk change, the numbers may vary
36 widely, as shown. It is these different
37 VSL estimates that most meta-
38 analyses seek to “average” according
39 to formulas of different complexity
40 and sophistication. By taking some
41 type of average of the five separate
42 VSLs, we can infer an average WTP
43 for risk reductions that controls for
44 the different risks across studies.
45 However, if the true WTP function
46 tracks along the dashed line, and if



1 the policy context concerns a risk change that is, say, slightly larger than r_5 , then the
2 WTP that would be inferred from the average VSL would be an inappropriate estimate.

3
4 diagram may differ because of other types of heterogeneity across the contexts
5 wherein they were derived. In that case, it would of course be inappropriate to average
6 these results, even with normalization to a common risk change.

7
8 VSLs are based on empirical data concerning choices in the neighborhood of very
9 small risks and small risk differences. Outside of this domain, we can really say nothing
10 about WTP for much larger risks and risk changes. The implicit extrapolation to a 1.00
11 risk change that produces a VSL is understood by specialists to be a pure fabrication but a
12 convenient device to control for variations in the sizes of risk reductions across the
13 studies that yield these estimates. Unfortunately, this is often not understood as such by
14 non-specialists.

15 16 Proportionality

17
18 The VSL can be viewed simply as a strategy for getting around the fact that WTP
19 from different studies corresponds to different sized risk changes. It would be
20 inappropriate to average the individual WTP estimates without acknowledging that they
21 apply to different risk changes. The issue of proportionality of estimated WTP for risk
22 reduction and magnitudes of these risk reductions has been raised previously (e.g.
23 Hammitt and Graham, 1999). Certainly, if we wish to maintain the hypothesis that there
24 exists a single one-size-fits-all VSL that is the same for all possible risk reductions, then
25 the estimated WTP for different risk reductions ought to be proportional to the sizes of
26 the risk reductions in question. This constitutes a requirement for a very specific type of
27 “scope test.” However, not all empirical estimates of WTP functions produce parameters
28 that are consistent with this requirement. Some studies show negligible effects of risk
29 changes on WTP. Such a result that is clearly problematic for valuing mortality risks.
30 However, other studies reveal estimates that suggest that WTP is not strictly proportional
31 to the size of the risk change. A theoretical discussion of the likely extent of departures
32 from proportionality is contained in Appendix C.

33
34 Stated-preference (e.g. contingent valuation) studies almost invariably show that
35 WTP is an increasing but concave function of risk reduction. Revealed-preference studies
36 (e.g., hedonic wage studies) typically do not tell us anything about how WTP depends on
37 the magnitude of the risk change because we model workers as choosing jobs from a
38 continuous set of jobs that differ in wage and risk, and typically do not have information
39 on what jobs (and risks) and individual rejects.

40
41 For example, compensating-wage-differential estimates are based on fitting a
42 regression model to data on individual workers’ wages, occupational fatality risks, and
43 other variables such as education and job experience that influence wages. This
44 regression estimates how wages vary with occupational fatality risk, holding other factors
45 constant. Each worker is assumed to prefer the job he holds to other jobs that are
46 potentially available to him, which are characterized by the regression. Setting the

1 independent variables equal to the worker's characteristics, the regression is interpreted
2 as describing how the set of jobs available to him differ in wage and risk.

3
4 Many of the studies that yield WTP estimates do so for only a single common risk
5 difference for all subjects, so there is too little information in any single study to assess
6 the effect of the size of the risk change on WTP. Some sort of preference calibration
7 exercise would be necessary in order to combine all of the available estimates.

8 9 Heterogeneity: Context-dependent WTP

10
11 Many practitioners seem to lose sight of the subtlety that the VSL is not a physical
12 constant, like the constant of gravitation $(6.673 \pm 0.003) \times 10^{-8} \text{ cm}^3 \text{ gm}^{-1} \text{ s}^{-2}$, or the mass
13 of a hydrogen atom $(1.67339 \pm 0.0031) \times 10^{-24} \text{ g}$. Instead, VSL is an artifact of human
14 preferences. It is based on willingness to pay for risk reduction, which depends on the
15 marginal (dis)utility of risk and on the marginal utility of income. While it may be
16 possible to identify some regularities across types of people in these two marginal
17 utilities, it is conceivable that they are essentially unique to each person. Therefore, so
18 can be the corresponding VSL.

19
20 The contexts for empirical studies concerning risk tradeoffs differ in many more
21 ways besides just the risk change they consider. The types of risk and the characteristics
22 of the individuals experiencing these risks can also lead to heterogeneity in WTP. If the
23 policy context is not "in the middle" of the range of study contexts, then it can be
24 potentially very misleading to assume that the "average VSL" implied by the range of
25 available studies is a good measure of WTP to reduce the specific risk in the specific
26 affected population for the policy under consideration.

27
28 The Council agrees that it is important to look at how estimated VSLs depend on
29 characteristics of the individual (e.g., age, life expectancy), characteristics of the risk
30 (e.g., latency, accompanying morbidity, perhaps voluntariness), and any other relevant
31 factors. To the extent that WTP is may not be a precisely proportional function of the
32 size of the risk change, it will also be important to look more closely at the relationship
33 between WTP estimates for different studies, concerning different specified risk changes,
34 and to assess whether the proportionality assumption is generally tenable.

35 36 Problems with Meta-analyses

37
38 The meta-analysis in the Kochi paper, like many other meta-analyses, is premised on
39 the assumption that there is one single VSL value, or simple VSL relationship, that is
40 merely revealed with different degrees of bias and noise by different studies. At best,
41 unfortunately, the underlying construct is probably a complex VSL *function*. This
42 function has many, many arguments. VSL is known to depend on the nature of the risk
43 (severity, latency, voluntariness, etc.) and on the attributes of the individual who is
44 considering this risk (age, gender, health status, etc.). VSL is also likely to depend upon
45 the manner in which the demand information behind it is elicited (from self-selected
46 employment decisions, housing choices, stated preference surveys, etc.). If only this last

1 source of heterogeneity existed, we might be confident that techniques for pooling VSL
2 estimates across studies would be a sensible exercise. Unfortunately, we can be fairly
3 confident that there is fundamental heterogeneity in preferences with respect to risk, so
4 that there is no reason, a priori, to expect that any summary statistic across studies
5 corresponds to any single underlying “true” VSL.

6
7 The distribution of VSLs to be “averaged” in a meta-analysis is an artifact of the
8 range of range of contexts (types of risks and affected populations) analyzed in the list of
9 studies contributing to the meta-analysis. If this distribution of contexts does not
10 correspond to the context pertinent to the environmental policy in question, then the
11 “meta-analysis VSL” may have little to do with people’s willingness to pay the costs of
12 this policy.

13 14 WTP and Incomplete Information

15
16 It is important to recognize two explanations for why people’s empirical decisions
17 about mortality risk may differ from conventional theory: (1.) the individuals may be ill-
18 informed or may make mistakes (e.g., cognitive errors), and (2) the theory may be
19 oversimplified or wrong. It is likely that most people would like to make decisions in a
20 way that optimizes their risk reduction spending (i.e., equal marginal spending per unit
21 risk reduction) across various domains (e.g., housing, employment choices). However,
22 they do not do so in practice because of information limitations and well-known errors in
23 decision making about risk.

24
25 Some published research has made an attempt to sort out which of the factors that
26 lead to differences between perceived risk and simple theory are simply cognitive errors
27 (e.g., susceptibility to framing effects), and which are attributes of preferences potentially
28 meriting normative recognition (e.g., distribution of benefits and risks of activity; such as
29 voluntariness) (see Hammitt, 2000b).

30
31 In general, economists are inclined to defer to “consumer sovereignty” in measuring
32 the types of tradeoffs people are willing to make. In the event of misinformation or
33 cognitive problems, however, good policy should probably over-ride consumer errors
34 where possible and simulate what would have been consumers’ WTP under similar
35 conditions, but with complete and accurate information.

36 37 What to do in the near term

38
39 The Agency needs to verify that the distribution of risk reductions over which each
40 meta-analysis has been estimated, and the context for these reductions, at least
41 corresponds to the types of risk reductions relevant to the Clean Air Act and its
42 amendments. The Panel continues to support meta-analyses of willingness to pay for risk
43 reductions, but discourages the Agency from devoting so much attention to the search for
44 a single one-size-fits-all VSL. Instead, it should be a maintained hypothesis that
45 heterogeneity matters. Heterogeneity should be ignored only if it can be shown to be
46 inconsequential. The benefits from mortality (and morbidity) risk reduction attributed to

1 a particular policy should be commensurate with the size and nature of the risk reduction
2 and with the attributes of the affected populations.
3

4 It seems worth speculating that researchers' habit of talking in terms of conventional
5 VSLs has much to do with the recent public relations problems concerning the "senior
6 death discount." This different VSL for seniors was embodied in the alternative net
7 benefits calculations associated with some recent analyses by the Agency. The public
8 backlash to this differential seems to have been attributable almost entirely to the use of
9 the VSL concept, which led the public to think that the issue at stake is the "*value* of a
10 senior." In reality, the issue at stake is much closer to "how much money should seniors
11 be required to pay for small risk reductions." It is essential to steer the press and the
12 public towards the legitimacy of individual preferences and the corresponding demands
13 (consumer sovereignty), rather than sticking with the arbitrary unit choice that expresses
14 a marginal rate of substitution between risk changes and income as the "value of * life."
15 The word "value" is assumed by non-economists to be something intrinsic. Demand for
16 risk reductions is not intrinsic and immutable, independent of context. It is subjective
17 and individual, and measured differences in this demand across subpopulations and risk
18 contexts should be honored wherever they are based on complete information.
19

20 If WTP for small risk reductions can be shown to be approximately proportional to
21 the size of these risk reductions over the relevant domain of the WTP function, the Panel
22 believes it would be less inflammatory to present the marginal rate of substitution
23 expression in terms of risk changes of a size that are pertinent to policy choices. The
24 Panel recommends that the Agency consider converting VSL estimates into units with a
25 less misleading denominator (micromorts, millimorts, picomorts, etc.). These marginal
26 rates of substitution almost certainly need to be considered as a function of individual and
27 risk characteristics, unless they can be shown, empirically, to be otherwise.
28
29
30